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ABSTRACT 
Recognising the importance of audit committees as a major tool to increase confidence 
in financial statements, the Minister of Commerce in Saudi Arabia issued a resolution in 
January 1994 requiring all public companies to mandate the establishment of audit 
committees. This research seeks to explore the role of audit committees in Saudi Arabia 
and investigate whether the actual practice among these corporations is consistent with 
the best practice that was advocated from the recommendations of both academic and 
professional literatures. The intention was to survey audit committee members, internal 
auditors and external auditors about the effectiveness of audit committees. The 
questionnaire was adopted as the main instrument (followed by some interviews) to 
collect data in Saudi Arabia. 
There was a concern between the respondents that audit committees have little benefit 
in achieving what they were expected to do. The resolution of the Ministry of 
Commerce (1994) did not clearly explain the relationship between audit committees 
with the external and internal auditors, scope of work to be undertaken, independence, 
expertise, transparency, and the required qualifications and knowledge for audit 
committee members. There is an obvious problem with this resolution because it is too 
brief and there are no explanatory/guidance notes to accompany it. Therefore, a number 
of steps should be taken to transform the concept from a good idea on paper to a reality 
in practice. Ministry of Commerce should follow up its concern by issuing further 
clarification of what corporations must do exactly to implement the resolution. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has witnessed 
significant developments in all fields including its business sector. These 
developments have led to an increased perception in the importance of financial 
reports and their impact on the national economy as a whole: Hence, serious steps have 
been taken to promote the accountancy and auditing professions. Among these steps 
was the announcement by the Ministry of Commerce of the Accounting and Auditing 
Standards Guidance in 1985, which became mandatory in 1990. These steps 
culminated in the issue of the Royal Consent in 1991 for the establishment of the Saudi 
Organization for the Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) to handle the regulation of 
the Auditing and Accountancy profession. Recognising the importance of audit 
committees as a major tool to increase confidence in financial statements, the Minister 
of Commerce issued a resolution in January 1994 requiring all public companies to 
mandate the establishment of audit committees. The establishment of audit committees 
in Saudi Arabia is based on protecting shareholder interests. 
Despite its increasing importance, until recently the nature, actual practice and the 
effectiveness of audit committees among Saudi corporations has been under- 
researched in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country to mandate the 
establishment of audit committees within its corporations. 
This research seeks to explore the role of audit committees in Saudi Arabia and 
investigate whether the actual practice among these corporations is consistent with the 
best practice that was adapted from the recommendations of Treadway Commission 
(1987), Macdonald Commission (1988), Cadbury Committee (1992), Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999), and other recommendations, which have been discussed in both 
academic and professional literatures. 
This introductory chapter presents the rationale and the basis for this thesis. This 
chapter focuses on the following issues: research objectives (Section 1.2); overview 
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about Saudi Arabia (Section 1.3); justification for the research (Section 1.4); and the 
structure of the thesis (Section 1.5). 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
There is a vital need to understand the implementation of the emergence of corporate 
governance, and specific aspects such as audit committees in developing countries 
such as Saudi Arabia. The primary research objective is to examine the effectiveness 
of audit committees in Saudi corporations by comparing the actual practice with best 
practice. This study, also, seeks to explore whether there are differences in the 
perceptions of the three samples comprising of audit committee members, internal 
auditors, and external auditors. This study tries, as well, to examine whether the 
agreement between each respective sample towards specific statements is significant or 
not. In other words, are there any areas of agreement across the three samples (audit 
committee members, or internal auditors, or external auditors) as to whether audit 
committees in Saudi Arabia are effective or not. Finally, this study seeks to conduct 
interviews with the above three samples to enrich the research by delving in depth into 
the problems that faced audit committees and through this process make some 
recommendations on how to solve these problems. 
1.3 OVERVIEW ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia encompasses about four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula, 
a landmass constituting a distinct geographical entity, bordered on the west by the Red 
Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean and on the east by the Arabian Gulf (Al-Farsy, 
1994). The total area of Saudi Arabia is over 2,250,000 square kilometres and the 
population in year 2001 is about 21 million, non-Saudi residents are about 5 million 
and Saudis are estimated to be about 16 million (Ministry of Planning, 2001). 
The year 1938 was a remarkable year in the history of the Kingdom, when oil fields 
containing 25% of the world's proven oil resources were discovered. The discovery of 
oil had, and is still having, a strong impact on all aspects of life in Saudi Arabia (Al- 
Angari, 1999). Prior to this, the Saudi economy had not been buoyant, depending 
largely on pilgrims, and ordinary fishing, crafting and agricultural activities (Ba-Eissa, 
1984). Saudi Arabia depends largely on one product, petroleum, (Wilson, 1979). 
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However, the percentage of government revenues, which derive from petroleum, has 
fallen slightly in recent years. Al-Rumaihi (1997) notes that the percentages of oil 
exports to the total exports were 99.3% in 1981,90.7% in 1986,90.3% in 1990, and 
87.8% in 1993. In 1997, the non-oil sector accounted for about 66% of (GDP) Gross 
Domestic Product and in 1999, it was about 72% of GDP (Ministry of Planning, 2001). 
The 1970s were the years of substantial growth in the Saudi economy, which also 
comprised a substantial growth in the number of individuals who sought higher 
degrees in diverse disciplines mainly from the developed countries, especially the UK 
and the USA. Accounting was not an exception. Those who gained higher degrees in 
accounting from the developed countries in the late seventies were the ones who 
pioneered the development of the accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia 
(Alrazeen, 1999). Further, Al-Nafea (1996) mentioned that the massive economic 
activities after the oil boom changed the static business environment of Saudi Arabia 
and led to a dramatic change in accounting techniques, methods and procedures, which 
were used in the Saudi business world. 
The auditing profession in Saudi Arabia has had only a short history. Auditing has 
been practiced in Saudi Arabia since the establishment of the first audit firm in 1955 
(Al-Motairy, 1999). With rapid economic and industrial development in Saudi Arabia 
during the past decades, huge numbers of corporations, limited liability companies and 
other business entities have been formed. As a result, the demand for public 
accountants' services has increased (Al-Rehaily, 1992). 
The year of 1992 witnessed the birth of the first authoritative auditing body, the Saudi 
Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA). This organisation was given 
the right develop accounting and auditing standards and to train public accountants. 
The auditing profession in Saudi Arabia is considered to be the only profession to have 
an authoritative organisation. Other professions such as engineering, law, medicine etc. 
are managed by government ministries (Al-Motairy, 1999). 
Despite the establishment of the SOCPA in 1992, the Ministry of Commerce is still the 
ultimate accounting and auditing authority in Saudi Arabia. Every company has to file 
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a copy of its annual report with the Ministry of Commerce. This same ministry is the 
authority, which offers licenses to public accountants (Ministry of Commerce, 1965). 
1.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
The research seeks to evaluate the audit committee's effectiveness by comparing the 
actual practice with the best practice which have been adopted according to the 
previous research and publishing reports, by governmental and professional bodies. A 
number of arguments justify the importance of this research. 
First, the importance of research within audit committees in UK, USA, Australia New 
Zealand and other countries is acknowledged. This study will contribute to accounting 
knowledge in documenting the actual practice of audit committees in Saudi Arabia. No 
study has been conducted in Saudi Arabia - to my knowledge - to evaluate this 
experiment with audit committees and to study the current practice. The only 
exception is the study of Al-Twaijry et al (2002) that was published in October 2002, 
which looked at the role of audit committees in the Saudi Arabian corporate sector. 
Secondly, as Sommer (1991: 91) noted, "a corporation having an audit committee as 
part of its governance structure and having an effective audit committee are, of course, 
different matters. " This study also aims to reinforce the suggestion that establishing an 
audit committee is one thing; establishing an effective audit committee is another. 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), for instance, claimed that the formation of an audit 
committee does not provide evidence about the actual levels of monitoring that will be 
carried out. Thus, it is significant to evaluate the Saudi experiment to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses and then obtain the appropriate recommendations to enhance 
the role of audit committees within the corporations. 
Thirdly, since Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country to have established audit 
committees within its corporations, it might be useful to learn from this pioneering 
experiment whether these committees are effective in fulfilling their duties or not. This 
evaluation could be used to make recommendations to other Arabian countries mainly 
Arabian Gulf countries, which share strong and similar economic and social links with 
Saudi Arabia (Al-Twaijry, 2000). 
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A final point on the significance of the research is its contribution to the literature in 
the field of audit committees' effectiveness that characterised by the lack of studies 
into this area. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993: 24) reported that "little empirical research 
has been conducted to investigate the effectiveness of audit committees" and 
concluded that the evidence collected to date is weak. Also, Collier (1996) and Collier 
and Gregory (1996) conclude that the evidence collected on audit committee 
effectiveness is limited. Pomeranz (1997) claimed that yet very little is known about 
the actual effectiveness of audit committees. Consequently, the research into the 
effectiveness of audit committees within Saudi corporations seems to be useful to 
supplement the literature in this field. 
1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis has nine chapters including this introduction. Chapter 2 focuses on 
corporate governance issue and the emergence of audit committees in recognition that 
the latter is but one corporate governance mechanism within a menu of possible 
choices. Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature of the development of audit 
committees. The background to the development of audit committees in the USA and 
other countries including UK, Canada, France, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia will be discussed. 
Chapter 4 presents a review of the literature and attributes of the effectiveness of audit 
committees. Chapter 5 focuses on the methodology adopted in this research and how 
the questionnaires and interviews would be conducted. Chapter 6 and 7 present the 
descriptive data analysis and the second part of data analysis, which is testing the 
hypotheses. Chapter 8 presents the results of some interviews that were held with a 
sample of audit committee members, internal and external auditors. The aim of the 
interviews was to complement the close-ended questionnaire. This method will be 
adopted since many researchers mention that when qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches are combined, we have what is called triangulation in action. 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusion, recommendations, limitations, and suggestions for 
future studies. 
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1.6 CONCLUSION 
An overview about Saudi Arabia has been given that indicated that during the last two 
decades significant developments, in all fields including accounting, has been 
experienced. In this introductory chapter, the research is justified by its contribution to 
accounting knowledge; its potential benefits to Saudi Arabia and other Arabian 
countries since Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country that set up audit committees in 
its corporations; and it is presenting some data about the effectiveness of audit 
committees in an area that was characterised by the lack of empirical research. 
This introductory chapter presents the basis for the thesis and gives a brief introduction 
to the research problem. The research objective has also been stated as to evaluate the 
Saudi experiment with the establishment of audit committees within its corporations. 
Hence the purpose of this research is to explore the idea that establishing an audit 
committee is one thing but establishing an effective audit committee is another. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2-1 INTRODUCTION 
There have been many debates over corporate governance in the last three decades. 
The issues involved ranged from fundamental arguments over its relevance, to a 
practical discussion of how to transform the concept from a good idea on paper to a 
reality in practice (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). A substantial review of literature 
going back to Berle and Means (1932) has noted the relative lack of accountability of 
corporate managers and has argued that corporate performance in the United States 
would be improved if corporations had monitors to oversee the managers (Bhagat and 
Jefferis, 2002). Higson (2003) mentioned that corporate governance is not a new 
phenomenon, but it certainly came to prominence in the 1990s. Likewise, Cadbury 
(2002) claimed that corporate governance has been with us since companies began to 
take their present form. 
The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) stated that before 1980, 
there was no reference to the term corporate governance in either professional or 
academic literatures (LIMA, 1999: 2). However, Millstein (1999: 1060) stated that the 
Report of Blue Ribbon Committee frames the issue of improving corporate financial 
reporting in the corporate governance context, since the evolution of modern corporate 
governance that began in the 1970s was rooted in financial reporting issues. 
Similarly, Vinten (1998: 419) claimed that corporate governance is not a new issue. "It 
may be dated back to when incorporation with limited liability became available in the 
nineteenth century, with the need for legislation and regulation. " However, more 
attention has been paid to it over the past few years due to the debate surrounding the 
recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992) on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (Collier, 1997a). 
Keasey and Wright (1997) mentioned that there is no doubt that corporate governance 
has been one of the key business topics of the first half of the 1990s and it will 
continue to be so for the foreseeable future. In the UK, for example, several influential 
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proposals have been produced in recent years in an attempt to settle the practical issues 
(Cadbury 1992,1995, Greenbury 1995, Hampe11998, Turnbull 1999, Higgs 2003). 
In tracing the development of the idea of corporate governance, a useful starting point 
is Tricker's definitions of management and governance. Tricker contends that if 
management is about running the business, and governance is about seeing that it is 
run properly (1984: 7). Similarly Rezaee (1997: 27) defined corporate governance as 
"involving the exercise of power over the direction of the corporate entity and focusing 
on finding ways to make the entity run better. " 
In another definition, the Toronto Stock Exchange defines corporate governance as 
"the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation with the objective of enhancing long-term value for shareholders and the 
financial viability of the business" (quoted in Green 1994: 149). Lewis (1999: 8) also 
defined corporate governance along similar lines as "the whole system of rights, 
processes and controls established internally and externally over the management of a 
business entity with the objective of protecting the interests of all stakeholders. " 
From the various definitions above, it could be argued that corporate governance 
encompasses the entity's board of directors and its overall organisation structure, 
management, and audit committees (Rezaee, 1997). Further, McConomy and Bujaki, 
(2000) argue that a key objective of corporate governance system should be the 
enhancement of shareholder value. Hence, once implemented, an effective corporate 
governance system helps to ensure an appropriate division of power among 
shareholders, the board of directors, and management (McConomy and Bujaki, 2000). 
This discussion uses the corporate governance framework in figure 2-1. The 
framework emphasises two key concerns of corporate governance, which derive from 
the separation of ownership and control. First, the need for the supervision and 
monitoring of the executive and, secondly, mechanisms for ensuring that management 
is accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders. "The framework includes the 
involvement of auditors as independent third parties and links the accountability 
problems of the auditors' role and the expectations that derive from audit activities 
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with the supervisory role of non-executive directors through audit committees" 
(Collier, 1997a: 71). 
Figure 2-1 The Corporate Governance Framework 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
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Source: Keasey and Wright (1993: 292) 
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Pomeranz (1997: 281) noted that there has been an enormous upsurge of interest in 
corporate governance and accountability. 
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The idea of corporate governance is meant to provide a framework to strengthen the 
internal control mechanism in companies. For instance, Katz and Rosen (1994) 
contended that the institutions and rules that comprise the corporate governance 
scheme constitute an important internal control mechanism. These rules specify the 
responsibilities of the managers and set up a body of people to monitor the managers 
and to replace them if necessary. The body responsible for watching over the managers 
is known as the board of directors. Similarly, Cadbury (2002: 33) mentioned the 
importance of the role of the board of directors because they are the "bridge" between 
those to whom the board is accountable and those who are accountable to the board. 
"Boards are the link between shareholders and managers and between companies and 
the outside world. This is why the board is, inescapably, the centre of the governance 
system. " 
Keasey and Wright (1997) argue that the key elements of what constitutes corporate 
governance concern the enhancement of corporate performance via the supervision, or 
monitoring, of management performance and ensuring the accountability of 
management to shareholders and other stakeholders. These aspects of governance and 
accountability are closely interrelated and introduce both the efficiency and the 
stewardship dimensions to corporate governance. Recently, the debate has focused on 
more specific concerns. These revolve around the accountability of those in control of 
companies to those with the residual financial interest in corporate success, normally 
the shareholders, but when a company is approaching insolvency, other stakeholders 
such as its creditors, become part of the widening discussion (Vinten, 1998). 
Abbott and Parker (2002) claimed that the effectiveness of the monitoring function is 
increased by the inclusion of outside (i. e. non-management) directors. Outside 
directors, who are presumably independent of management, reduce opportunities for 
the board to become an instrument of top management and limit management's ability 
to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. It should be noted that Higgs 
(2003) claimed that the term "outside director" is used in the US and elsewhere but it 
is not widely recognised in the UK. The term "independent director" is given a 
particular meaning in this review, and by no means all non-executive directors could, 
or need to, meet it. 
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In a further elaboration of the corporate governance framework, a study by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development OECD (1995) suggested 
that existing systems of corporate governance could be classified into two differing 
models: an "outsider" model and an "insider" model. In the "outsider" model, 
prevalent in the United States, the United Kingdom, and many English-speaking 
countries, the managers are relatively free from control by the board of director, which 
is often closely allied with the management. 
In the alternative "insider" model, specific interests are represented on the board of 
directors, which exerts a strong monitoring and supervisory role in comparison with 
management. Such a system recognises more diverse groups of "stakeholders" or 
"constituents" than simply management and shareholders, including workers, banks, 
and non-financial companies with close ties to the corporation, local communities, and 
the central government (OECD, 1995; Lewis, 1999). 
Keasey and Wright (1997: 2) considered good corporate governance was as much 
concerned with correctly motivating managerial behaviour towards improving the 
business, as directly controlling the behaviour of managers. Also, Ow-Yong and Guan 
(2000) noted that the importance of corporate governance in its contribution both to 
business prosperity and accountability. 
Therefore, there is broad support regarding the importance of corporate governance. 
The problem is how to operationalize it. 
2-2 THE ROLE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
In the effort to devise ways of bringing about good governance in companies, one of 
the issues that has taken an increasing importance is how best to harness the oversight 
process to achieve more fully the goal of quality corporate financial reporting. This 
brought about the idea of audit committees, which is at the core of the corporate 
financial reporting process (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). Furthermore, Pomeranz 
(1997) claimed that the audit committee is being recognised as simply another board 
committee, albeit one which has to work in tandem with the entire board. Moreover, 
Jonas and Young (1999) point out that in today's corporate environment, concepts 
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such as board accountability and audit committee effectiveness are increasingly topics 
of discussion and the subject of corporate governance studies and surveys. 
Jennings (2002) noted that the goal in the creation of independent audit committees 
was to provide shareholders with the assurance that someone from the outside was 
watching over the activities, practices, and behaviours of managers and the company 
employees. Mautz and Neary (1979) in their writings claimed that audit committees 
are indeed useful devices that can provide an additional safeguard in corporate 
governance. The US SAS No. 53 lists the effectiveness of the audit committee as one 
of the factors that "constrain improper conduct by senior management. " (Kalbers, 
1992a: 19). 
Smith (2003: 22) claimed that audit committees would be "beneficial not only in 
increasing the level of assurance against catastrophic failure and gross malfeasance"; it 
would also offer improvements on a wider front, raising the overall standard of 
corporate governance for all companies that implement audit committees. 
The report of the Blue Ribbon Committee marks an important landmark in the 
development of the corporate governance framework. For instance, Millstein (1999) 
claimed that prior to the 1970s, boards of directors were management-dominated, 
passive, and generally inert. Such passivity was largely overlooked, boards of directors 
were not expected to do much more than rubber-stamp management's decisions. Burke 
et al (2001: 11) after a review of the Blue Ribbon Report (1999) and other 
recommendations concerning corporate governance and audit committees considered, 
"The essence of these recommendations to audit committees is that effective internal 
control leads to responsible financial reporting. " 
As important as an audit committee is to the process of corporate governance, it 
constitutes just one aspect of corporate governance. Hence, Klein (1998a) argues that 
if corporate governance mechanisms are substitutable, then strong alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms should mitigate the need for the firm to have an active, 
independent audit committee. 
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - which consists of 20 members and a 
chair from many international countries - issued a paper on internal audit in banking 
organisations and the relationship of the supervisory authorities with internal and 
external auditors in 2001. They recommended that the creation of a permanent audit 
committee is a solution to meet the practical difficulties that may arise from the board 
of directors' task to ensure the existence and maintenance of an adequate system of 
controls (Basel Committee, 2001). The SEC, the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission, 1987) and the Kirk Panel (1994) state 
that the audit committee is an important element in corporate governance and 
instrumental in ensuring the quality of financial reporting (quoted in Abbott and 
Parker, 2000: 47). 
The Treadway Commission believed that the most important factor in preventing 
fraudulent financial reporting is the company's "tone at the top". This means as Rezaee 
and Lander (1993: 39) described, "a visible interest by boards of directors, and 
especially audit committees, in ethical behaviour, strong internal controls, and 
enforcement procedures to limit the risk that fraud will occur. " 
Furthermore, Rowland (2002: 186) claimed "the new rules strive to further the 
monitoring model and activate the board of directors with respect to the financial 
reporting process by creating audit committees that are independent, capable, and 
imbibed with the incentive to oversee management's production of financial 
statements. " 
Verschoor (1992: 20) described the significance of audit committees on corporate 
governance: 
The establishment of standing audit committees of the board of directors in 
public corporations followed by their assumption of greater oversight 
responsibilities for matters of internal control, financial reporting, and auditing 
has been described by at least one prominent authority as the most significant 
new development affecting corporate governance in this century. 
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Also, Burke et al (1999) claimed that audit committees are of critical importance in 
fulfilling the oversight responsibilities of governing boards with regard to an 
organisation's financial reporting, internal controls, and external audit process. 
Similarly, Datta (2000) pointed out that a system of good corporate governance 
promotes relationship of accountability between the principal actors of sound financial 
reporting - the board, the management and the auditor. It holds the management 
accountable to the board and the board accountable to the shareholders. The audit 
committee's role flows directly from the board oversight function. It acts as a catalyst 
for effective financial reporting. 
However, DeZoort (1997) noted that audit committees assume the important 
responsibility of representing boards of directors on oversight matters related to 
financial reporting, auditing and overall corporate governance. As a corporate 
governance mechanism, audit committees monitor management, the external auditor, 
and the internal auditor in an effort to protect shareholders' interests (DeZoort, 1997). 
Moreover, Datta (2000) discussed that a proper and well functioning corporate 
governance system exists when the three main groups responsible for financial 
reporting i. e. the board, the management including the internal and the external 
auditor-form the three legged stool that supports responsible financial disclosure and 
active and participating oversight. The audit committee has an important role to play in 
the process, since audit committee is a sub-committee of the full board and monitors 
this process. 
In discussing the importance of audit committees as a mechanism for corporate 
governance, Millstein (1999) pointed out that the movement to progressive corporate 
governance, which included regulatory, and voluntary measures to improve overall 
board independence and oversight, was initiated by the US Security and Exchange 
Commission's early focus on financial reporting and then audit committee's structure 
and role. It is totally consistent, therefore, that now good corporate governance 
practice points to the audit committee as the focal point for improvements in financial 
reporting (Millstein, 1999). Rezaee (1997: 27) after a review of current reports and 
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recommendations concerning audit committees mentioned, "these reports underscore 
the oversight role of the audit committee as an important factor in promoting the 
quality of corporate governance and enhancing public confidence in the financial 
reporting process. " 
Further, DeZoort (1997) explained that corporate boards and audit committees have 
incentives to avoid the negative consequences (e. g., litigation, damage to reputation) of 
failed monitoring efforts. 
Moreover, DeZoort and Salterio (2001: 32) claimed although the audit committee is 
only one dimension of broad-based corporate governance, a lack of appropriate audit 
committee oversight can ultimately contribute to corporate failure and diminish public 
confidence in the mechanism. Conversely, recent evidence suggests that strong 
corporate governance (including an independent audit committee) has the potential to 
increase audit effectiveness and efficiency by reducing: 
(1) the auditor's perceptions of client business risk; 
(2) the auditor's control risk judgements for specific audit assertions; and 
(3) the amount of planning substantive testing. 
However, as Pomeranz (1997: 283) mentioned that the mere labelling of a group of 
directors as "the audit committee" will not by itself create an effective monitoring 
organisation. Likewise Kleinman and Farrelly (1996), and Archambeault and DeZoort 
(2001) claimed that the use of audit committees does not necessarily mean that 
corporate governance is being practiced effectively. Also, Barker (2002: 6) questioned 
the suggestion that better audit committees are the solution to the current crisis of trust 
in the profession, because if corporate governance in general is defective then a better 
mechanism for selecting the boards of directors is required. 
The answer to poor standards of audit, inadequate controls, poor financial accounting 
and low ethical standards as Barker (2002: 6) describes, "is not an audit committee 
which will act as watchdog, but higher standards of ethical behaviour, frank disclosure 
and a real understanding of the duties imposed on a professional which, when applied 
will lead to trust without policies. " 
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2-3 THE AGENCY PROBLEM 
One key issue that has continued to preoccupy the work of writers on corporate 
governance is what is known as the agency theory. According to Rowland (2002) the 
board of directors is rarely able to manage a large public corporation actively and thus 
must delegates its management responsibility to professional managers - the executive 
officers of the corporation, who have the time and ability to attend to the daily 
operation of the company. 
In the words of Archer and Karim (1997), it is the types of problem that arise from: (1) 
the divergence of the economic interests of the agent (manager of the firm) from those 
of the principal (investor in the firm) in whose interests the agent is supposed to act; 
and (2) the existence of information asymmetry between the agent and the principal as 
to what activities the former has undertaken. 
John and Senbet (1998) traced the primary reason for corporate governance to the 
separation of ownership and control, and the agency problems it engenders, for 
example, between shareholders and managers. It is important to stress that this 
problem arises from two factors: the managers and the owners have different 
objectives and the owner does not have complete information about the behaviour and 
decisions of the managers, so the agency problems arising from conflict of interest 
between managers and equityholders (Goldman and Barley, 1974; Estrin, 1998). 
Similarly, Clifford and Evans (1997) pointed out that agency theory maintains that 
management (agents) will act in an opportunistic manner to increase their personal 
wealth at the expense of the owners (principals) of an organisation. In order to achieve 
this, managers rely upon the dispersed nature of ownership and their access to superior 
information ("information asymmetry"). 
Diacon and Ennew (1996) argued that the need for governance arises because of the 
conflicts of interests inherent in all forms of business enterprise which, in the case of 
insurance companies, arise in two main ways: conflict between customers and owners, 
and between owners and managers. The question of how to align the interests of 
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owners, managers, and others with a stake in the corporate entity has been an active 
issue (Lewis, 1999). 
However, Klein (2002) claimed that although outside directors serve as monitors and 
help alleviate agency conflicts between shareholders and upper management, inside 
and affiliated directors have the specialised expertise about the firm's activities to 
evaluate and ratify its future strategic plans. 
It is often assumed that the level of monitoring can be increased by forming an audit 
committee, for instance, Klein (1998a; 1998b) noted that audit committees help to 
alleviate the agency problem by facilitating the timely release of unbiased, accounting 
information by managers to those with a stake in the company, thus reducing the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Therefore, audit committees 
can be viewed as monitoring mechanisms, which can be voluntarily employed in high 
agency cost situations to improve the quality of information flows between principal 
and agent (Pincus et al, 1989). They also noted that the existence of an audit 
committee, which provides a direct line of communication between the board of 
directors and the auditor, and reduced the information asymmetries between 
management and the board, might be perceived as indicating higher quality 
monitoring. 
DeZoort (1997) mentioned that the agency theory suggests that audit committees, as 
corporate governance monitors, have an incentive to provide accurate public signals of 
their work and be familiar with those signals in an effort to mitigate information 
asymmetry effects and avoid an expectation gap problem. 
However, Turley and Zaman (2002) point out that the empirical evidence that the use 
of audit committees are intended to achieve a decrease in agency costs is very limited. 
Moreover, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) indicate that the auditor's monitoring is 
valuable only if the auditor is competent and independent. Audit independence is 
regarded as the cornerstone of the auditing profession, and as Collier (1997a) argued 
reporting to an audit committee will enhance the external auditor's independent 
position since the external auditor can communicate directly with those directors who 
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are not actively engaged in the management of the company. This view was supported 
by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA, 1981: 47), which reported 
that 72 per cent of external auditors indicated that the existence of an audit committee 
"enhanced their perceived independence, making it easier for them to be objective and 
not to be subject to undue influence by management. " 
Moreover, Pincus et al (1989: 242) argued that both the American Institute Certified of 
Public Accountants AICPA (1967,1978) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission SEC (1979) viewed audit committees as "one of the keys to reinforcing 
and assuring the independence of outside directors. " Non-executive directors "should 
be independent, not only of management but of any other external influence that could 
detract from their ability to act in the best interests of the company. " (Clifford and 
Evans, 1997: 226). 
It should be noted that Baysinger and Butler (1985) compared firm performance to 
board composition using a three scale classification system (insider, grey and 
outsider). Insider directors were typically corporate officers, retirees, or family 
members. "Grey" area directors were not full time employees of the firm but were 
associated in some way. Independent outside directors had no affiliation with the firm 
except for their directorship. They found that corporations with high proportions of 
independent outsider directors achieved relatively higher returns on investment, over a 
period of ten years (quoted in Clifford and Evans, 1997: 225). 
Audit committees may also enhance the independence of internal auditors. Pincus et al 
(1989) argue that the higher the agency costs, the greater the demand for enhanced 
monitoring, and the more likely an audit committee will be formed. However, Lewis 
(1999) noted that there is a contrast between agency theory, -which sees managers and 
employees as agents whose interests may diverge from those of their principals, and 
stewardship theory, which views them as stewards who can be motivated to act in the 
best interests of the principals in a spirit of partnership for the good of the firm. 
Notably, the concept of stewardship is identified by de Geus (1997) as one of the 
characteristics of long-lived companies (quoted in Lewis, 1999). Hence, the 
stewardship model as mentioned by Letza et al (2002) assumes a different nature of 
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agent/managerial behaviour and argues that managers are dependable and should be 
fully empowered. 
2-4 OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
The development of corporate governance mechanisms in Britain were traced to a 
succession of business scandals that drew escalating criticism of the apparent lack of 
controls on business conduct in the United Kingdom in the latter part of the 1980s 
(Boyd, 1996). It was common to see press comment on company failure and audit 
firms being sued after such collapses (Macdonald and Beattie, 1993). A number of 
unsettling corporate scandals were held to characterise the British corporate scene 
(Mills, 1997). According to Rowland, the steady occurrence of such accounting 
irregularities potentially could damage the entire economy severely (Rowland, 2002). 
There were questions raised about the potency of the existing system of self-regulation 
of publicly quoted companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and about 
the ability of the police to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of well-concealed 
frauds within large firms (Boyd, 1996). Boyd (1996) however, noted that the police 
had responded to earlier criticism by consolidating a number of investigative teams to 
create the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) -a unit specialising in the detection of large- 
scale corporate fraud. However, in spite of the existence of the SFO, the spate of major 
frauds continued, and the SFO incurred great costs and met with only limited success 
in prosecuting these cases. 
An important complex and disreputable case involved the theft of over £480 million in 
employee pension funds by the business mogul Robert Maxwell. These funds were 
used to support his ailing business empire. The Maxwell case was the most dramatic of 
the cases involving abuse of power by the founder of a large public firm who acted as 
Chief Executive while simultaneously chairing the board. 
Also, the spectacular collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI) in 1991 sharpened the debate over the role of auditors in the detection of fraud 
and in affirming the going-concern basis of the audited firm. Shortly before the bank 
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collapse, it had released its latest annual report in the United Kingdom, which gave no 
clue to its impending bankruptcy via a massive fraud. The auditors with no 
qualification signed off the audit report in BCCI's annual report. As with some other 
failures, investors had perceived the absence of a warning from the auditors to be a 
validation of good corporate health, contradicting street rumours of malaise within 
BCCI (Boyd, 1996). 
Interestingly, Percy (1997: 24) noted, "it is not surprising that following every wave of 
scandal, normally in recessionary times, the auditing profession becomes the focus of 
criticism... our profession was in the eye of the storm of public scepticism following a 
number of major company failures. " Also, Rowland (2002) pointed out that in the 
1970s corporate scandals in USA called into question the wisdom of allowing 
corporate management to operate without effective supervision, as did the poor 
economic results reported by many companies over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Cohen and Hanno (2000: 133) mentioned that financial-reporting problems of 
companies (e. g., BCCI, Phar-Mor, Bankers Trust, Barings Bank, Centennial 
Technologies, Rite-Aid) are often attributable to weak corporate governance. 
As a consequence to the dramatic corporate failures in the United States in early 2002 
such as Enron and WorldCom companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 130 pages long 
and includes eleven titles was enacted in July 2002. Seaman (2003: 1) described this 
act as "The most comprehensive corporate governance legislation in history. " 
Rowland (2002: 169) claimed that "accounting is the language of business, " and when 
investors lose faith in the ability of that language to describe accurately the true 
financial condition of a firm, they will not commit their savings to the use of 
commerce except at a steep price. 
Whittington (1993) identified the following four themes in recent concerns about 
corporate governance: 
(1) Creative accounting - throughout the 1980s there was a steady increase in the 
use of creative accounting methods, which sought to present company results in 
unduly favourable terms (e. g. Griffiths, 1986). The failure of monitoring 
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systems to protect shareholders by controlling this activity led commentators to 
suggest that the system of corporate governance failed to control the actions of 
directors. 
(2) Business failures and scandals - in the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of 
spectacular failures and scandals (for example, Johnson Matthey, British and 
Commonwealth, Ferranti, Polly Peck, Coloroll, BCCI and the Maxwell 
companies) were attributed in part to deficiencies in corporate governance 
systems. This led to debate about the advisability of one-man-dominated 
companies and the role of non-executive directors. In addition, the perceived 
failure of the accounts to warn that problems were imminent led to a `crisis of 
confidence' in the accounting profession and a focus on auditor/board relations. 
(3) Directors' pay - the rapid increase in directors' pay, associated particularly 
with the expansion of stock option schemes on a rising stock market in the mid- 
1980s, gave rise to considerable concern that directors were able to increase 
their own pay at the expense of shareholders, and without any obvious 
constraint. This concern was reinforced by the very large pay increases 
accruing to senior managers and directors when former state-owned 
corporations were privatised. 
(4) Short-termism - the perceived failure of British industry to invest for the long 
term, for instance as evidenced by the lack of research and development 
investment. This phenomenon has been attributed by some commentators to 
the pressure on management from the stock market to deliver performance in 
the short term as otherwise the company might be subject to an opportunistic 
takeover bid (quoted in Collier, 1997: 72). 
A chronology of key events in the development of corporate governance is shown in 
Appendix 1. 
In Saudi Arabia, there is a dearth of literature in the area of corporate governance due 
to the relative newness of the concept. As a result of the paucity of relevant studies 
about corporate governance, little research work has been undertaken to analyse the 
developments in the Kingdom to date. It is hoped that with the renewed interest being 
shown by various bodies such as the Ministry of Commerce, the Saudi Organisation 
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for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) and other academics and practitioners 
alike, in response to global trends, the void would be gradually filled to cover this 
important area of research. 
2-5 THE CADBURY COMMITTEE 
The Cadbury Committee was set up in May 1991 by the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC), the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession in response to 
their concern about `the perceived low level of confidence both in financial reporting 
and in the ability of auditors to provide the safeguards which the users of company 
reports sought and expected (Cadbury Committee, 1992; CIMA, 1999). 
Hamill et al (2002: 2) claimed 
The corporate control system in the UK has traditionally stressed the importance 
of internal controls and the importance of the role of financial reporting and 
accountability, as opposed to external monitoring devices. This governance 
culture was questioned in the late 1980s to early 1990s following high profile 
governance scandals. This initiated the corporate governance debate in the UK; 
leading to the Publication of the Cadbury Report (1992). 
Whittington (1993) reports that the appointment of the Cadbury Committee on 
corporate governance, which published two reports in 1992 (an interim report in May 
and a final report in December), is symptomatic of the current concern about corporate 
governance in the UK. According to Boyd (1996: 172) " the Cadbury Report 
represents a watershed in the development of corporate governance in Britain, a 
deliberate test of the effectiveness of voluntary regulation and of British corporate 
democracy. " 
Further, Ezzamel and Watson (1997) mentioned that the Cadbury Committee, 
envisaged a much greater monitoring role for non-executive directors and 
recommended a voluntary `code of best practice' to be implemented, along with a 
`statement of compliance' reviewed by the auditors and published with the annual 
financial accounts, by all listed companies reporting after 30 June 1993. Also, Cadbury 
(2002: 22) points out that a more general consequence of the Code of Best Practice 
was that it drew attention to the importance of "the role of non-executive directors on 
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boards and it strengthened their position in the corporate structure through 
recommending the establishment of audit and of remuneration committees. These 
committees were to be wholly or mainly made up of non-executive directors. " 
O'Sullivan (2000a) claimed that recent surveys supply corroboration that the Cadbury 
Committee's recommendations have been widely adopted by large UK companies. 
The Cadbury Report recommended that boards have three committees: the 
remuneration committee, a nominations committee, and an audit committee. These 
committees as Percy (1995: 28) described: 
Assist the board as a whole in governing the company. They help to ensure there 
are checks and balances to see that remuneration is fair and objectively arrived at 
and that non-executive directors and executive directors are appointed through a 
proper process that results in obtaining the necessary calibre and freshness of 
thought without compromising continuity and experience. 
Different writers have intensively discussed the advantages and disadvantages of using 
corporate governance. For instance, CIMA (1999: 1) mentioned that the benefits of 
applying good corporate governance are: 
" Reduces risk. It helps to ensure that the personal objectives of the board and 
the company's strategic objectives are brought into line with those of 
stakeholders; it can help to reduce the risk of fraud. It can provide a 
mechanism to review risk, and it can provide a framework for reviewing and 
assessing projects. 
" Stimulates performance. It institutes clear accountability and effective links 
between performance and rewards, which can encourage the organisation to 
improve its performance. 
" Improves access to capital markets. It reduces the level of risk as perceived by 
outsiders, including investors. In particular, corporate governance can be seen 
as protecting shareholders' rights, and thus make it easier for companies to 
raise finance. 
" Enhance the marketability of goods and services. It creates confidence among 
other stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, and partners in 
joint ventures. 
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" Improves leadership. It allows increased expertise to be brought to bear on 
strategic decision-making, through the influence of non-executive directors 
(NEDs) and because all board members are encouraged to examine board 
decisions critically. The wider pool of knowledge and experience available to 
the board, through the inclusion of external members, helps the board to 
identify opportunities more readily. 
" Demonstrates transparency and social accountability. This in turn can foster 
political support for, and public confidence in, the organisation (LIMA, 1999). 
Higgs (2003: 13) mentioned that good corporate governance must be "an aid to 
productivity, not an impediment. It is an integral part of ensuring successful corporate 
governance, but of course only a part. It remains the case that successful entrepreneurs 
and strong managers, held properly to account and supported by effective boards, drive 
wealth creation. " Hence, good corporate governance practices are seen as being 
essential to protect minority shareholders as well as inspire investor confidence (Ow- 
Yong and Guan, 2000). 
However, in the view of Demirag et al. (2000) as subsequent policy developments 
have begun to recognise, corporate governance is not just about controls, it also 
involves developing and implementing effective accounting and business polices and 
long term strategic objectives. McKnight and Tomkins (1999) added that corporate 
governance makes it possible to find ways of tightening the link between remuneration 
and performance. However, the Cadbury Report places emphasis on the ability of 
market solutions rather than on external regulation to solve corporate governance 
problems, and relies on shareholders (institutional investors) to shake off their 
traditional apathy and take a more active interest in the companies they own (Short and 
Keasey, 1997). Cohen and Hanno (2000: 134) considered that "corporate governance 
includes those oversight activities undertaken by the board of directors and audit 
committee to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process. " 
An important aspect of current governance practice in the UK is the use of non- 
executive directors to monitor the behaviour of company management (O'Sullivan, 
1999). Higgs (2003: 11) described the role of non-executive directors, as "non- 
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executive directors are the custodians of the governance process. " Given that executive 
directors' ability to evaluate their own behaviour is questionable, "non-executives are 
perceived to be the principal monitoring component of the board" (O'Sullivan, 2000b: 
283). Vafeas (2001) noted that the empirical evidence generally suggests that non- 
executives perform an important monitoring role in specific situations where 
shareholders interests are at risk as in the case of takeovers, poison pill adoptions, and 
management turnover decisions. 
In Saudi Arabia, non-executive directors play an important role within Saudi 
corporations. The Ministry of Commerce specified key roles for these directors, which 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
The report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(Cadbury, 1992) recommends that companies should have a minimum number of non- 
executive directors and these non-executive directors should be actively involved in 
areas where conflicts between executive directors and the company stakeholders are 
most likely to arise. It should be noted, "Employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, 
and local community are major stakeholders often mentioned and emphasised within a 
broad definition of stakeholding" (Letza et al, 2002: 4). 
Spira (1999b: 263) discussed that the rationale for the recommendation of the Cadbury 
Committee relies on two important assumptions: 
  That auditor independence is fundamental to improving standards of financial 
reporting and of corporate governance. 
  That independent non-executive directors can protect auditor independence. 
Hurtt et al (1999: 117) pointed out that the basis for requiring audit committee 
membership independence is supported by research studies that have found a 
correlation between audit committee independence with (a) a higher degree of active 
oversight and (b) a lower incidence of financial statement fraud. 
Historically, the role of the non-executive director has been primarily of an advisory 
nature, often appointed on the recommendation of the chairman or one of the other 
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directors. The UK corporate governance initiatives has emphasised the important 
contribution of the non-executive (Mills, 1997). One important contribution identified 
for non-executive by the Cadbury Report was in relation to the audit committee: "The 
board should establish an audit committee for at least three non-executive directors 
with written terms of reference which deal clearly with its authority and duties" (The 
Code of Best Practice, 1992, Para 4.3). 
Consequently Weir and Laing (2000: 4) stated that: 
The main function of non-executive directors is to ensure the executive directors 
are pursuing policies consistent with shareholders' interest. Non-executive 
directors possess two characteristics that enable them to fulfil their monitoring 
function. First, their independence and second, they are concerned to maintain 
their reputation in the external labour market. 
Forbes and Watson (1993) considered that the Cadbury report contains several 
proposals for improving accountability in this area, including a greater role for non- 
executive directors and remuneration committee in the setting of senior executive pay. 
Also, the Cohen commission report (1978) suggests that independent directors could 
play an important role in enhancing corporate accountability to shareholders and in 
balancing the auditor's relationship with management. The Cohen commission referred 
to independent directors and auditors as "natural allies" in efforts to strengthen 
corporate accountability (Kirk, 2000). 
Moreover, the Cohen commission notes "audit committees... cannot function 
effectively unless they include competent, independent, and reasonably active outside 
members of the board. " However, the matter is as Vafeas (2001: 197) described, "that 
is, not all directors, even non-executives, will be equally effective in overseeing the 
financial reporting process. Thus, in the context of audit committees, the choice of a 
new member even among a pool of non-executive director candidates is likely to be 
important. " 
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2-6 THE CRITICISMS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES 
An early criticism of the development of corporate governance codes of practice was 
that the government was failing to provide the legislative framework required by 
business, and that the accountancy profession was prominent in the process of `filling a 
legal vacuum'. This was because the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the 
accountancy profession were two of the three co-sponsors of the Cadbury Committee, 
the third being the London Stock Exchange (LSE) (Dewing and Russell, 2000). 
There are two major criticisms of the evolution of corporate governance codes. Firstly, 
the process of setting and amending the codes has been, to a large extent at least, ad 
hoc. Secondly, the mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the 
codes are at best weak and at worst non-existent (Dewing and Russell, 2000). Hence, 
Corrin (1993) claimed that, 
The Cadbury report is a disappointment. It is a political document designed to 
provide a convenient whitewash for some embarrassing failures by a number of 
people and institutions in an area that has become known as corporate 
governance, and is so removed from reality that it can only be the predictable 
weight of establishment acceptance that has muted criticism... it is blatant slur 
on the integrity of the hard-working, committed and dedicated executive 
director. The whole report is like a script for a `soap' where the non-executive 
director is cast as a saint, the auditor is a tarnished guardian angel, and the 
executive director is a villain. The creation of a part -time elite with special 
powers and protected status is divisive and damaging (Corrin, 1993: 81). 
Ezzamel and Watson (1997) suggested that the ability of non-executive directors to 
exert effective control over executives is seriously compromised. 
Percy (1995: 28) pointed out "there has been much criticism in the UK that external 
auditors are in the pocket of management. " 
Moreover, Holland (1995) argued that problems still remain with aspects of the UK 
corporate governance system. The single tier nature of the UK board means that the 
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supervision and monitoring roles can become entangled with the strategic decision 
making and management role of the board. In contrast, the two-tier German board is 
designed to separate the management function from the supervisory and monitoring 
one, while giving voice to employee interests. In addition, the non-executive director, 
who with other members of the board has the main responsibility for monitoring 
management, has the same legal duties as the executive directors. Adere (1999) argued 
that the primary and most fundamental function of the supervisory board is to ensure 
the competence of the management board. 
The supervisory board as Cadbury (2002) mentioned oversees the direction of the 
business and the management board is responsible for the running of the company. The 
supervisory board controls the management board through appointing its members and 
through its statutory right to have the final say in major decisions affecting the 
company. Collier and Gregory (1996) claimed that two-tier boards involve a separation 
of a unitary board into a supervisory board, which is responsible for supervision and 
accountability of the executive, and a management board, which is responsible for the 
strategy, and day to day running of the company. 
Percy (1997: 25) argued that the corporate governance model of the 19th century is no 
longer suitable for today's society. He mentioned, "Around the world we see different 
models. For example, under the German model, significant institutional shareholders 
are represented on supervisory boards, which, in turn, elect the management board, 
thereby closing much of the communication problem found in the UK and US 
models. " Hence, the supervisory board is very similar as Adere (1999) claimed to the 
UK non-executive directors, bringing an element of objectivity and independence into 
the company. Cadbury (2002) states that the report of Cadbury Committee stressed 
that looking to non-executive directors to contribute in this way did not undermine the 
unitary nature of the board, since all decisions were ultimately the responsibility of the 
board as a whole. 
Many of the initiatives for developing corporate governance practices in the UK have 
relied upon the USA as a source of guidance, but it is important to note some 
cautionary observations that have been expressed about corporate USA. Bhide (1994) 
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has argued that while US securities regulations protect investors and enhance market 
liquidity, they may well alienate managers and shareholders. While US rules 
protecting investors may be the most comprehensive and well enforced in the world, 
they may drive a wedge between shareholders and managers, with the result being 
diffused, arm's-length shareholdings rather than long-term shareholders who 
concentrate their holdings in a few companies (Mills, 1997). 
However, the United Kingdom has one of the most developed corporate governance 
systems in the world, and the differences between the UK and United States, Germany, 
Japan are probably small relative to their differences from other countries (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). It should be noted that in Saudi Arabia the unitary board consists of 
executive and non-executive directors, which is similar in appearance to that of the UK 
with the major differences as a result of the personal and family relationships, which 
exist in Saudi Arabia. 
It is important to note that there are a number of different models of corporate 
governance as seen in figure 2-2. In the Germanic countries, a two-tiered board 
structure institutionally separate management from the supervisory function (Lewis 
1999). Also, Cadbury (2002) discusses that a two-tiered board fulfils the same basic 
functions as a unitary board, but it does so through a clear separation of the task of 
monitoring from that of management. In Japan, the system has traditionally been 
characterised by large associations of companies relatively free from external 
monitoring and working on a basis of internal consensus. In Latin countries (e. g. Italy 
and Spain) wealthy families have owned substantial parts of limited companies. 
Family values and relationships underpin ethnic Chinese businesses and corporate life 
across South East Asia. Close family links and state ownership feature in the business 
life in Arabic and other Islamic countries. 
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Figure 2-2 Representation of national and business cultures 
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2-7 SUMMARY 
In the course of surveying the literatures on corporate governance, this chapter 
commenced with a definition of the concept of corporate governance, which is about 
ensuring that the business is properly run. The audit committee is just one corporate 
governance mechanism within a menu of possible choices. If corporate governance 
mechanisms are substitutable, then strong alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms may mitigate the need for the firm to have an active, independent audit 
committee. 
The agency problem, which arises as a result of the separation of ownership 
(principals) and control (agent) has equally been discussed. A review of the 
development of corporate governance including the recent history of scandals in the 
British corporate scene was also discussed in addition to outlining the main themes in 
recent concerns about corporate governance. A chronology in the development of 
corporate governance has been noted. After that, the chapter argued that the Cadbury 
committee and its report in 1992 represented a watershed in the development of 
corporate governance in Britain. 
Furthermore, the advantages and limitations of corporate governance have been 
discussed. Finally, the chapter discussed the single tier nature of the UK board which 
means that the supervision and monitoring roles can become entangled with the 
strategic decision making and management role of the board and the two-tier German 
board which is designed to separate the management function from the supervisory and 
monitoring one, while giving voice to employee interests. In the UK board, the non- 
executive director, who with other members of the board has the main responsibility 
for monitoring management, has the same legal duties as the executive directors. 
The thesis will now examine a specific aspect of corporate governance - namely the 
audit committee. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUDIT 
COMMITTEES 
3-1 INTRODUCTION 
Audit committees are an essential element of corporate governance (Green, 1994). In 
defining audit committee's emphasis is usually placed on their composition and 
function. For instance, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA, 1992: 
20) defined audit committee as: 
A committee of directors of an organisation whose specific responsibility is to 
review the annual financial statements before submission to the board of 
directors. The committee generally acts as liaison between the auditor and the 
board of directors and its activities may include the review of nomination of the 
auditor, overall scope of the audit, results of the audit, internal financial controls, 
and financial information for publication. 
In the view of Marrian (1988: 2), it is: 
A committee of the board normally comprising three to five directors with no 
operating responsibility in financial management. Its primary tasks are to review 
the financial statements, the effectiveness of the company's accounting and 
internal control systems, and the findings of the auditors, and to make 
recommendations on the appointment and remuneration of the external auditors. 
According to Rickard (1993: 35): 
An audit committee consists of a group of senior staff, chaired by the chief 
executive officer or his deputy. The committee's responsibility is to safeguard 
the independence of the internal audit function and ensure continual 
improvement in management performance and accountability by seeking action 
on internal audit and external audit reports. 
All the above definitions agree that an audit committee is a sub-committee of the main 
board of directors of a company, usually formed from non-executive directors, and 
charged with matters relating to financial reporting, internal control systems and audit 
and to act as a liaison between the board of directors, internal and external auditors. 
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Similarly, Dilworth (1989) points out that audit committees are one mechanism 
through which auditors are held accountable for the scope, nature and quality of their 
work. Audit committees can thus exert a powerful influence on auditors through their 
role in conducting a specific inquiry into the scope, nature and quality of the audit 
work done. 
3-2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUDIT COMMITTEES 
In recent years, the accounting profession, users of financial statements and the 
government have expressed concern over the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. One response on the part of companies to this concern has been the 
establishment of audit committees (McMullen, 1996). 
3-2-1 The development of audit committees in the USA 
McKee (1979: 66) claimed that prior to the rise of the auditing profession in the United 
States, committees such as the audit committee of the East Tennessee and Western 
North Carolina Railroad frequently handled the auditing task in 1870. On February 28, 
1870, shareholders of the ET&WNCRR appointed a special committee to "... inspect 
the accounts of the offices of the Board of Directors of the company and report at the 
next meeting. " McKee (1979: 61) remarks "this may be one of the earliest 
documented instances in the United States of an audit committee reporting to the board 
of directors of a corporation. " 
However, the concept of audit committees and their responsibilities have evolved 
dramatically since they were first proposed more than half a century ago. This concept 
is not new as, according to Birkett (1986) audit committees first attracted attention in 
the late 1930's when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) encouraged their establishment after the McKesson and 
Robbins case. Rittenberg and Nair (1994) however pointed out that audit committees 
were first proposed by the American Institute Certified of Public Accountants 
(AICPA) as early as 1937 and have been endorsed (in form) by the SEC since 1940. 
One interesting trend uncovered during a review of relevant literature suggests that, in 
all of the countries where they have become established, audit committees have been 
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stimulated by unexpected company failures and/or corporate malpractice (Vanasco, 
1994; Guthrie and Turnbull, 1995; Wolnizer, 1995; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Porter and 
Gendall, 1998). In addition, Green (1994) noted that corporate audit committees have 
developed and evolved as a result of dissatisfaction with methods of corporate 
governance. Abdolmohammadi and Levy (1992) point out that audit committees have 
been under pressure to accept increasingly higher levels of responsibility over the past 
decade because of the increasing public pressure for greater corporate accountability. 
The volume of research on audit committees is more in the US than in other countries. 
Perhaps, this is due to the fact that the history of audit committees in the United States 
is longer than in elsewhere (Spira, 1999a). During the 1970s, the role of audit 
committees received a great deal of attention because of demands for greater corporate 
accountability and governance. In view of the increasing size of corporations and the 
separation of ownership and management, shareholders and other constituencies 
needed more assurance with respect to the integrity of the internal and external 
auditing process and the financial reporting process (Spangler and Braiotta, 1990). 
Also, Woolf (1997) mentioned that the appointment of an audit committee is an 
important development intended to `create space' between auditors and the directors of 
the companies they audit. 
It is widely accepted that the idea of audit committees as discussed in the Cadbury 
report (1992) derived from North American experience (Collier, 1996). The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommended the establishment of audit 
committees in the United States as early as 1940 when SEC suggested that the auditor 
should be selected by a special committee composed of non-executive board members. 
SEC decided not to make this a requirement because it would have placed a large 
burden on small companies (Abdolmohammadi and Levy, 1992). Reinstein and 
Luecke (2001: 56) represented the recommendations of SEC Accounting Series 
Release No. 19 (ASR No. 19), which recommended using such audit committees to: 
" Oversee the performance of internal and external auditors; 
" Facilitate the organisation's relationship with the external audit firm; 
" Coordinate the financial audit; 
" Negotiate audit fees; and 
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" Improve the financial reporting process. 
A 1973 White Paper describes audit committees as an "idea that no longer represents a 
corporate luxury, but has become a necessity" (Rittenberg and Nair, 1994: 14). 
The place of audit committees in the corporate governance structure has since 
increased dramatically only over the last three decades (Collier, 1996; Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1998). Williams (1977) noted that in July 1967, the AICPA executive 
committee statement on audit committees of boards of directors recommended that 
publicly owned corporations appoint committees of outside directors to nominate the 
independent auditors of a corporation's financial statements and to discuss the audit 
work with them. Since the 1970's there has been a widespread movement by publicly 
held companies to form audit committees of corporate boards of directors. In 1970, the 
Mautz and Neumann study of Corporate Audit Committees, reported that only 121 out 
of 385 (31%) corporations surveyed had audit committees (Mautz and Neumann, 
1970b). Cottell and Rankin (1988) indicated that the survey results suggest that more 
than 86 percent of companies listed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) have 
audit committees, while more than 79 percent of companies listed over-the-counter by 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) have audit committees and these 
proportions have undoubtedly risen since then (Reinstein and Weirich, 1996). 
In 1977, the SEC approved an NYSE rule requiring all listed domestic companies "to 
establish and maintain thereafter, an audit committee comprised solely of directors, 
independent of management and free from any relationship that would interfere with 
the exercise of independent judgement as a committee member" (quoted in Vanasco, 
1994: 19). 
A spate of scandals had brought independent director responsibility to the fore, 
particularly in respect of the audit committee (Millstein, 1999). Since 1978, the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has required all of its registered companies to have 
audit committees (Cottell and Rankin, 1988). Consequently, studies notably that of 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) show that the percentage of firms with audit committees 
has gone from nearly ten percent in 1958 to nearly forty percent in 1972 and to over 
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ninety percent in 1982. Similar findings were shown in two early studies of audit 
committees by Mautz and Neumann (1970b; 1977). In the first study (1970b), they 
found one-third of their sample had adopted audit committees. In the second study 
(1977), eighty-seven percent of responding chief executive officers indicated their 
corporations had audit committees (quoted in Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998: 129). The 
Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities (often referred to as the Cohen 
Commission, 1978) reiterated the importance of audit committees and independent 
directors in achieving a proper balance between the auditor and management and in 
protecting the shareholder's interest. The Cohen Commission states (quoted in 
Rittenberg and Nair 1993: 65): 
The important point is that the auditor should have direct access to a significant 
number of board members who are not part of management. Non-executive 
members of the board of directors are in a unique position to represent the 
shareholders' interest, to monitor the performance of management, to provide 
adequate support to the independent auditor, and to make changes within the 
organisation. 
The Cohen Commission statement extended the potential responsibilities of the audit 
committee to one of representing shareholders and effecting change in an organisation 
(Rittenberg and Nair, 1993). More recently, Sommer (1991) cites a 1989 Korn/Ferry 
International survey of boards of directors, which found that 97.7 percent of companies 
responding to their survey, (which were listed on all three exchanges) had an audit 
committee and none included "inside" directors, and described this acceptance of audit 
committees as "extraordinary". One reason behind this interest may be as 
Abdolmohammadi and Levy (1992) described that public companies realise the 
importance of the oversight function that audit committees provide. 
In 1985, five sponsoring private sector organisations (AICPA, American Accounting 
Association, National Association of Accountants, Institute of Internal Auditors, and 
Financial Executive Institute) created the Independent National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (NCFFR), commonly known as the Treadway 
Commission (Cottell and Rankin, 1988). Rezaee and Lander (1993) noted that during 
the approximately two years span between the commission's formation and the release 
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of its final recommendations, the Treadway Commission reviewed dozens of studies 
which were conducted by major universities and organisations. These studies focused 
on the areas of lawsuits brought against auditors, management, and companies for 
business failures and fraudulent activities, the role of the SEC in financial reporting, 
corporate codes of conduct, accounting education, opinion shopping, audit committees, 
quality assurance, and many other areas. 
In October 1987, the National Committee on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (NCFFR) 
recommended that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) require all public 
companies to form audit committees composed exclusively of independent directors. 
James Treadway (1986), chairman of the NCFFR, argued that mandating audit 
committees would have significant benefits which has been noted in Pincus et al 
(1989: 239): 
This decision on mandatory audit committees reflects our commission's views 
that an informed, diligent audit committee represents the single most potentially 
effective influence for minimising fraudulent financial reporting and that audit 
committees are an integral part of internal controls. 
In 1987, the NCFFR (the Treadway Commission) was created to identify factors that 
can lead to fraudulent financial reporting and recommend procedures to reduce fraud 
incidences. The Treadway report identified audit committees as an effective means for 
corporate governance and suggested a list of objectives for audit committees to 
consider (p. 12): 
The audit committee of the board of directors plays a role critical to the integrity 
of the company's financial reporting. The Commission recommends that all 
public companies be required to have an audit committee composed entirely of 
independent directors. To be effective, audit committees should exercise vigilant 
and informed oversight of the financial reporting process, including the 
company's internal controls. The board of directors should set forth the 
committee's duties and responsibilities in a written charter. Among other things, 
the audit committee should review management's evaluation of the independence 
of the public accountant and management's plans for engaging the company's 
independent public accountant to perform management advisory services. The 
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Commission highlights additional important audit committee duties and 
responsibilities in the course of discussing other recommendations affecting 
public companies. 
The Treadway Commission offered 11 specific recommendations designed to enhance 
the effectiveness of audit committees: 
(1) Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority to discharge 
their responsibilities. 
(2) Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective overseers of the 
company's financial reporting process and its internal control system. 
(3) Audit committees should review management's evaluation of the independence 
of the company's public accountants. 
(4) Audit committees should oversee the quarterly as well as the annual reporting 
process. 
(5) The SEC should mandate the establishment of an audit committee composed 
solely of independent directors in all public companies. 
(6) The SEC should require committees to issue a report describing their 
responsibilities and activities during the year in the company's annual report to 
shareholders. 
(7) A written charter for the committee should be developed. The full board should 
approve, review, and revise it when necessary. 
(8) Before the beginning of each year, audit committees should review 
management's plan to engage the company's independent public accountant to 
perform management advisory services. 
(9) Management should inform audit committees of any second opinions sought on 
significant accounting issues. 
(10) Together with top management, the audit committee should ensure that the 
internal auditing involvement in the entire financial reporting process is 
appropriate and properly co-ordinated with the independent public accountant. 
(11) Annually, audit committees should review the programme that management 
establishes to monitor compliance with the company's code of ethics. 
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The release of the Treadway Report positioned the audit committee as the "keystone" 
of corporate financial governance (Vanasco, 1994). Furthermore, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) adopted a 
requirement in 1989 that audit committees should be established, "the majority of the 
members of which shall be independent directors" (Rittenberg and Nair, 1993: 63). 
DeZoort (1997) noted that a number of stock exchange reacted quickly to the 
heightened interest in boards of directors and audit committees. The New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) mandated audit committees for companies traded on its exchange in 
1978. In 1989, the National Association of Securities Dealers joined the NYSE by 
requiring audit committees for companies listed on NASDAQ/NMS. The American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), while not requiring audit committees for its listed 
companies, began in 1979 to strongly recommend audit committees with members that 
are independent of management. 
In 1989, the AICPA established a requirement for external auditors to communicate 
formally with audit committees as a standard part of the audit (DeZoort, 1997). This 
movement toward the establishment audit committees, as Cottell and Rankin (1988) 
described, is largely the result of institutional pressures on corporations both to 
strengthen corporate governance and to enhance the external auditor's independence 
and performance. 
The SEC encouraged the NYSE and the NASD to form a private sector body to 
investigate the problems the SEC perceived. In October 1998 the NYSE and the 
NASD formed the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees, which has published its report in early 1999. 
Accordingly, the Committee took an objective "look at U. S. corporate financial 
reporting, specifically assessing the current mechanisms for oversight and 
accountability among corporate audit committees, independent auditors, and financial 
and senior management" (Millstein, 1999: 1057). 
The Report's ten recommendations are grouped in three general categories to enhance 
the process through which the audit committee carries out its duties (Millstein, 1999: 
1063; Reinstein and Luecke, 2001: 57): 
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(i) Strengthening the independence of the audit committee; 
(ii) Making the operation of the audit committee more effective; and 
(iii) Improving the mechanisms for discussion and accountability among 
the audit committee, the outside auditors, and the management. 
The Committee states that quality financial reporting requires transparency and full 
disclosure. The resulting market confidence mandates a proper and well-functioning 
system in which the full board, the audit committee, and the outside auditors form a 
"three-legged stool" that facilitates responsible financial disclosure and appropriate 
oversight (Hurtt et al, 1999: 115). 
The Blue Ribbon Commission's 36 members worked over a nine-month period and 
focused on a broad range of audit committees responsibilities and practices. Rather 
than adopting a regulatory focus, this Report, issued in 1999, "was designed to be a 
working tool for audit committee members in companies large and small, public and 
private, for-profit and not-for-profit" (Bishop et al, 2000: 49). The NACD report 
addresses the audit committee's purpose, composition, and processes, as well as 
implementation and liability issues. Appendices in the report provide sample charts, 
agendas, key questions, and other information. The key points of the NACD 
Commission report are as follows (Bishop et al, 2000: 50): 
(1) The independent audit committee fulfils a vital role in corporate governance. 
The audit committee can be a critical component in ensuring quality reporting 
and controls and the proper identification and management of risk. 
(2) Audit committees require independent, qualified leadership and membership. 
(3) Audit committees need adequate resources, including information and time, 
efficient meetings, and effective relationships - all dedicated to fulfilment of 
the committee's responsibilities. 
(4) All audit committees can improve, whatever their current level of excellence. 
(5) Audit committees that take thoughtful steps to identify and meet their 
responsibilities should not be exposed to greater liability than other directors. 
40 
Chapter Three: The Development of Audit Committees Loughborough University 
As such, audit committee disclosures are an important part of a company's financial 
disclosures. A recent ruling by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
affirms this observation and mandates specific disclosures of audit committee activities 
for fiscal years ending after December 15,2000. These required disclosures to include 
whether the committee had: 
(i) reviewed and discussed the audited financial statements with management; 
(ii) discussed with the external auditor the matters required to be discussed by 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 61; and 
(iii) received from the external auditor the disclosures required by 
Independence Standard Board's Standard No. 1 and discussed with the external 
auditor the auditor's independence" (Securities and Exchange Release, 2000) 
(quoted in Woodlock, 2001: 173). 
In addition, the SEC has also mandated that the audit committee disclose within the 
"annual proxy statement whether the board of directors has adopted a written charter 
for the audit committee. " If such a charter does exist, the company is required to 
include a copy of the charter as an "appendix to the company's proxy statement at least 
once in every three years" (Woodlock, 2001: 173). 
Goodman and Scanlon (2001: 12) noted that the steps toward audit committees as 
following: "the combination of these requirements and suggestions creates a new 
world for audit committees. " 
Recently, a series of accounting and management scandals within major companies has 
undermined investor confidence in corporations and others serving the capital markets. 
In response to the crisis, the US Congress passed legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 that establishes many new requirements, including those governing the 
composition and responsibilities of audit committees. Most observers would agree that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is the single most important piece of legislation 
affecting corporate governance, financial disclosure and the practice of public 
accounting since the US securities laws of the early 1930s (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
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2002). Seaman (2003: 1) described this Act as "most comprehensive corporate 
governance legislation in history. " However, not everyone is convinced by it. 
3-2-2 The development of audit committees in the UK 
Audit committees in the UK are not new. Tricker (1978: 56) has provided a copy of 
the report of the Great Railway's audit committee dated 1872 (Table 3-1). An analysis 
of this report shows that the functions of the committee are not dissimilar from those 
expected of audit committees today (Vanasco, 1994). 
Table 3-1 The report of the Great Railway's audit committee dated 1872 
`Great Western Railway 
Report of the Audit Committee 
The auditors and Mr Deloitte attended the Committee and explained the various matters 
connected with the Finances and other departments of the railway, which explanations 
were highly satisfactory. 
The Committee consider the Auditors have performed their arduous duties with great 
care and intelligence and therefore confidently recommend that they be continued in 
office. 
Paddington Station Benjamin Lancaster 
22w' February, 1872 Chairman. ' 
Collier (1994) pointed out that although the report relates to a period when auditors 
were drawn from the shareholders of the company, with professional accountants 
employed to assist them, the reported functions of the audit committee in reviewing the 
auditors' work and recommending the appointment of auditors are among the key 
functions of present day audit committees. 
The impact of the North American experience on similar problems in the UK is 
reflected in the professional literature. Collier (1996: 131) indicated that the first 
article on audit committees to appear in a UK professional journal was in The 
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Accountant in 1976. The author was a Past President of the Institute of Internal 
Auditors who argued that audit committees, composed of non-executive directors, set 
up to review financial reporting and the interface with the auditors, were "a peculiarly 
North American phenomenon. " 
Collier (1994) noted that the first survey in the UK was carried out by Tricker in 1978. 
The project involved a case study of work at 15 companies. Five of the companies 
(33.3%) had an audit committee or intended to form one in the near future. Surveys by 
Tricker (1978), and Marrian (1988) agree that audit committees in the UK were non- 
existent prior to 1970 and few formed audit committees between 1970 and 1975. These 
observations were confirmed by the Accountants International Study Group (AISG) 
report in 1977, which stated that in the UK, audit committees were uncommon but not 
unknown and that the concept of audit committees had not been generally accepted 
(Collier, 1994). 
Similarly, Spira (1998a: 35) presented an interview with a finance director who said 
"We had an audit committee for years before Cadbury but I cannot for the life of me 
remember how it used to work! It certainly did not seem very important. " 
In December 1992, the Cadbury Committee recommended that all listed companies 
should establish an audit committee. Compliance was not mandatory but the London 
Stock Exchange required all listed companies to disclose their degree of compliance in 
the annual report and accounts. The involvement of the London Stock Exchange is 
limited to ensuring that the degree of compliance is stated and that reasons are given 
for any non-compliance (Collier and Gregory, 1999). Further recommendations on 
audit committees by the Cadbury committee were are as follows (Cadbury Committee, 
1992, Para 4.35): 
a) Audit committees should be formally constituted to ensure that they have a 
clear relationship with the boards to whom they are answerable and to whom 
they should report regularly. They should be given written terms of reference 
which deal adequately with their membership, authority and duties, and they 
should normally meet at least twice a year. 
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b) There should be a minimum of three members. Membership should be confined 
to the non-executive directors of the company and a majority of the non- 
executives serving on the committee should be independent. Membership of 
the committee should be disclosed in the annual report. 
c) The external auditor should normally attend audit committee meetings, as 
should the finance director. As the board as a whole is responsible for the 
financial statements, other board members should also have the right to attend. 
The committee should have a discussion with the external auditors, at least 
once a year, without executive board members present, to ensure that there are 
no unresolved issues of concern. 
d) The audit committee should have explicit authority to investigate any matters 
within its terms of reference; the resources which it needs to do so, and full 
access to information. The committee should be able to obtain external 
professional advice and to invite outsiders with relevant experience to attend if 
necessary. 
e) The audit committee's duties should be determined in the light of the 
company's needs but should normally include: 
(i) Making recommendations to the board on the appointment of the 
external auditor, the audit fee, and any questions of resignation or 
dismissal; 
(ii) Review of the half-year and annual financial statements before 
submission to the board; 
(iii) Discussion with the external auditor about the nature and scope of the 
audit, co-ordination where more than one audit firm is involved, any 
problems or reservations arising from the audit, and any matters which 
the external auditor wishes to discuss, without executive board 
members present; 
(iv) Review of the external auditor's management letter; 
(v) Review of the company's statement on internal control systems prior to 
endorsement by the board; 
(vi) Review of any significant findings of internal investigation. 
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f) Where an internal audit function exists, the audit committee should ensure that 
it is adequately resourced and has appropriate standing within the- company. 
The internal audit programme should be reviewed by the audit committee, and 
the head of internal audit should normally attend its meetings. 
g) The chairman of the audit committee should be available to answer questions 
about its work at the Annual General Meeting. 
Percy (1995) noted that the cornerstone of the Cadbury Report is the code of Best 
Practice designed to achieve high standards of corporate behaviour. Its essence is to set 
a benchmark to encourage rather than legislate good governance. On the other hand 
Collier (1996) argued that, the absence of sufficient non-executive directors on boards 
might have been a factor in delaying the acceptance of audit committees in the UK. 
Interestingly, Bolton (2000: 10) mentioned, "I personally believe that in the UK we 
need to watch what is happening with respect to the corporate governance related Blue 
Ribbon committees, as what happens in the US often comes to the UK after a period of 
time. After all, Treadway did come before Cadbury! " 
The subsequent growth of the audit committee in the UK is charted in Figure 3-1. This 
shows that, among the UK listed companies responding to a questionnaire sent to 
Financial Times All Shares Index companies, there were three peak periods of audit 
committee formation: 1979 to 1981; 1986 to 1990; and 1992 to 1993 (Collier, 1996: 
122). During these three peaks approximately 70 per cent of the entire audit 
committees, which had been set up by the UK listed companies in the sample, were 
formed (Collier, 1996). Since the Cadbury Committee Report (1992), the pressure to 
conform has increased and Collier (1997a) found that by 1994,83.8% of UK listed 
companies had formed an audit committee. 
In late July 2002, the Government asked the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to put 
in hand the development of the existing Combined Code guidance on audit 
committees. In September the FRC issued a Press Notice announcing the establishment 
of this Group, its membership and its terms of reference. The Government's request to 
the FRC to develop guidance on audit committees has its root in the dramatic corporate 
failures in the United States in early 2002. These occurred despite the perception of 
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close US regulation of accounting and auditing and despite the existence of corporate 
governance institutions including audit committees (Smith 2003). The Government 
therefore established its Co-ordinating Group on Auditing and Accounting Issues, on 
which the Financial Reporting Council is represented, to co-ordinate the many strands 
of the UK response to the need to strengthen defences against corporate malfeasance of 
the kind seen in the US (Smith, 2003). 
Figure 3-1 The development of audit committees in the UK, Source Collier (1996: 
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Zaman (2001) argues that the UK move is similar to the developments in North 
America, where a number of similar recommendations were made in official and 
professional reports. 
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3-2-3 The development of audit committees in Canada 
In Canada, the pressure for audit committees arose from corporate collapses in the 
1960s. The bankruptcy of Atlantic Acceptance Corporation Limited in 1965, which 
was a major event in the history of accounting in Canada, has been equated to the 
McKesson & Robbins case in the United States. This event had considerable 
repercussions for Canadian financial practices (Green, 1994; Collier, 1996). The 
resulting Royal Commission Report recommended that "an audit committee, 
consisting of not less than three directors of a company, the majority of whom should 
not be officers or otherwise employed by the company, should review the company's 
financial statements before approval by the board of directors, and should confer with 
the auditors at any time at their own request, or at the request of any auditor" (Green, 
1994: 141). 
In 1967, an Ontario Select Committee on Company Law proposed that audit 
committees be required for companies issuing equity shares (CICA, 1981). The 
Lawrence Committee Report concluded that audit committees would make it easier for 
auditors to retain their independence with clients, and this report identified the audit 
committee as an important communication link between the auditor and the board of 
directors (CICA, 1981). Following the 1984 collapse of the Canadian Commercial 
Bank and Northland Bank and in light of the resulting Estey Inquiry, the CICA 
established the Macdonald Commission (Green, 1994). 
After studying the public's expectations of audits and where a gap exists between what 
the public expects and what auditors can reasonably accomplish, the Commission was 
to develop appropriate recommendations (Macdonald Commission, 1988). The 
Commission however, urged the CICA and individual audit firms to encourage the 
development of effective audit committees through their three recommendations, 
which are: 
(1) The CICA should enlist the support of provincial institutes and other interested 
bodies in seeking legislative amendments that would require all public 
companies to have audit committees composed entirely of outside directors. 
(2) The CICA Auditing Standards Committee should provide guidance in the 
CICA Handbook to matters that should be raised by an auditor with an audit 
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committee (or in the absence of an audit committee, with the board of 
directors) and to actions an auditor should take when not satisfied with the 
results of such communication. The guidance should stress the need for 
timelines in communication. 
(3) The CICA and provincial institutes of chartered accountants should press for 
changes in the law to require that (a) boards of directors draw up and publish to 
the shareholders a formal statement of responsibilities assigned to the audit 
committee, (b) audit committees report annually to the shareholders on the 
manner in which they have fulfilled their mandate, and that (c) audit 
committees review both interim financial statements and annual financial 
statements before publication. (Macdonald Commission, 1988: 38) 
Mills (1997: 128) pointed out that the adoption of audit committees by UK companies 
has been influenced by North American practice where such committees have long 
been established. Audit committees in the USA are a requirement for listing on the 
New York Stock Exchange and in Canada are a legal requirement. In the USA and 
Canada it is the non-executive directors who form the majority, unlike the UK board 
where boards tend to have a majority of executive directors. Furthermore, in the USA 
the issue of non-executive directors' independence is seen as being critical and they are 
supposed to be free from any relationship, financial or otherwise, which might 
"interfere with the exercise of independent judgement and be able to resign if 
necessary from the directorship without financial hardship. " 
The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) amended its rules in April 2002 to recommend 
that an audit committee should be composed of unrelated directors, and all members of 
the audit committee will be required to be "financially literate" with at least one 
member of the audit committee being required to have accounting or related financial 
expertise. The board should adopt a charter for the audit committee, which sets out the 
roles and responsibilities (Smith, 2003). 
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3-2-4 The development of audit committees in France 
In France, audit committees represent a significant corporate movement that began 
around 1985. Momentum has stopped and started at several points; but especially as a 
result of the 1995 Vienot Report, audit committees are becoming a fixture in the 
French business environment (Barbier, 1998). It is interesting to note that, in France, 
the name "audit committee" is not universal. While it is the name of choice for 15 of 
the 20 corporations surveyed by Barbier (1998), others prefer "accounts committee" or 
"finance committee. " However, the audit committee movement in France is still 
growing and still shaping and refining its direction in many organisations (Barbier, 
1998). Recently, the Vienot Report II published in 1999 introduced a certain number 
of recommendations for listed companies, including the installation of an audit 
committee (Lula, 2001). 
The Bouton Report "Promoting better corporate governance in listed companies" was 
issued in September 2002. Some of its key recommendations regarding audit 
committees were (Smith, 2003: 39): 
" The audit committee should report to the board to ensure that the board 
remains fully informed of the work of the committee. 
" The annual report should include a description of the work of the audit 
committee for the given reporting period. 
" Two-thirds of the members should be independent directors and no corporate 
officer be part of its membership. 
3-2-5 The development of audit committees in New Zealand 
In New Zealand there was little interest in audit committees. until the 1990s. Though, 
in recent years they have been established at a rapid rate. Their adoption has been 
stimulated, in particular, by the unexpected share market crash and a requirement for 
the Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of most public sector entities to 
acknowledge, in the financial statements, their responsibilities for those statements and 
for maintaining an effective system of internal control (Porter and Gendall, 1998). 
Bradbury (1990) indicated that in New Zealand there are no regulation or professional 
requirements that prescribe or recommend audit committees. This study suggested that 
audit committees are established in New Zealand to increase the credibility of audited 
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financial statements, to help boards of directors in meeting their responsibilities and to 
enhance auditor independence. In spite of this trend, the formation and composition of 
audit committees in New Zealand is still voluntary. The New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZSE) listing rules simply require companies to disclose in the annual report "a 
statement of any corporate governance policies, practices, processes, adopted by the 
issuer" (Rainsbury, 2002: 5). 
3-2-6 The development of audit committees in Australia 
The Australian interest in audit committees arose in response to high profile corporate 
failures in the 1970s. Guthrie and Turnbull (1995) argued that like the initiatives taken 
in Canada and the United States, the need for considering the introduction of audit 
committees in Australia was instigated by the lack of confidence in the integrity and 
standards of corporate reporting. However, this did not prevent the corporate excesses 
and failures of the 1980s, which created new demands that something be done. There 
were then calls for the establishment of mandatory audit committees in both the public 
and private sectors (Guthrie and Turnbull, 1995). Porter and Gendall (1998) argued the 
development of audit committees in Australia which recommended that audit 
committees be a regulatory requirement for all public companies, were becoming 
commonplace in the UK and Australia. In both of these countries public listed 
companies are now required to disclose in their annual reports whether they have an 
audit committee. 
However, in September 2002 the new release CLERP9 recommended that it will be 
mandatory for the top 500 listed companies to have audit committees and that the best 
practice standards to be developed by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (Smith, 
2003). 
3-2-7 The development of audit committees in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, Teoh and Lim (1996) explained that in the aftermath of the corporate 
scandals in Malaysia, accountants believed that audit committees should be 
established. In fact, Bank Negara, Malaysia's Central Bank, required all banks to 
establish audit committees as early as 1985 and this requirement was later extended to 
insurance companies. Furthermore, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange issued a new 
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corporate disclosure-listing requirement mandating audit committees for all public- 
listed companies effective from 1 September 1993. 
It is interesting to note however, that Porter and Gendall (1998) after a review of 
relevant literature suggests that, in all of the countries where they have become 
established, audit committees have been stimulated by unexpected company failures 
and/or corporate malpractice (see for example, Vanasco, 1994; Guthrie and Turnbull, 
1995; Wolnizer, 1995; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Porter and Gendall, 1998). Hence, the 
responsibilities of corporate audit committees are increasing in both number and 
complexity. This trend was well under way prior to the Enron debacle and will likely 
continue because of it (Felo et al, 2002). 
3-2-8 Audit committees in Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has witnessed during the last two decades 
significant developments in all fields including the business sector. These 
developments led to increased perception of the importance of financial reports and 
their impact on the national economy as a whole. Hence, serious steps were taken to 
promote the accountancy and auditing professions. One of such steps was the 
announcement by the Ministry of Commerce of the Accounting and Auditing 
Standards Guidance in 1985, which have become mandatory since 1990. These steps 
culminated in the issue of the Royal Consent in 1991 for the establishment of the Saudi 
Organisation of Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) to handle the regulation of the 
Auditing and Accountancy profession. Recognising the importance of audit 
committees as a major tool to increase confidence in financial statements the Minister 
of Commerce issued a resolution in January 1994, mandating all public companies to 
establish audit committees. 
The resolution for the establishment of audit committee in K. S. A comprised guidance 
to control the selection of their members. These guidelines are: - 
1) The member should be a shareholder of at least 20 shares and the number of 
the members should be odd and not less than three. 
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2) The member should not be a member of the executive board of directors or 
handle a technical, managerial or consultancy work. 
3) The member should have a good command on financial and accounting 
practices and standards, preferably having appropriate qualifications in this 
field. 
4) The member should not have a direct or indirect interest in the transactions and 
contracts of the company. 
Ultimately the general assembly of shareholders (the annual general meeting) of the 
company has responsibility for the selection of the members of the audit committee. 
The audit committee has the responsibility for nominating the external auditor to carry 
out the external audit and for receiving reports from them. The audit committee should 
nominate five audit firms from those licensed to carry out such work in Saudi Arabia. 
The nominated audit firms are then asked to submit proposals and on the basis of 
these, the audit committee recommends one or more than one firm where appropriate. 
This recommendation will then be taken by the directors to the general assembly, 
which has the ultimate responsibility for appointing the external auditor, determining 
the audit fee and the tenure of office. Subject to the requirements in the resolution, if 
only one audit firm is appointed, then the audit committee does not recommence the 
nomination process until three years after the audit firm commenced the audit. When 
more than one audit firm is appointed, the nomination process does not recommence 
until five years after the audit firms commenced their audit (Ministry of Commerce, 
1994). 
Following various cases of the misinterpretation of the resolution by many 
corporations (such as the level of a good command of financial and accounting 
practices, the appropriate qualifications and other duties and authorities of audit 
committees), critics such as Abulkhair, 1995; Arrubaish, 1995; Shabani, 1995 have 
published their views in the Saudi print media. 
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In Saudi banks, the matter is further slightly complicated as there are two regulatory 
bodies that exercises control namely the Ministry of Commerce and the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA). In 1994, SAMA issued rules for banks in Saudi Arabia for 
organising audit committees. In the SAMA rules (1994: 3) regarding audit committees: 
The board of directors should appoint one of its members as a chairman of the 
audit committee for a minimum of three years and his independence from the 
executive and the management is of utmost importance for his effectiveness. The 
chairman of an audit committee is the one who ultimately determines its 
effectiveness and success, because he normally sets its tone, agenda and style. 
For this reason, the selection of the chairman of the audit committee must 
conform to the following criteria: 
1. He should not be the chairman of the board. 
2. He should not be related to the other members of the board or have any 
financial relationship with them. 
3. He should not have any relationship with the senior management of the bank. 
Membership of audit committees should range between three and five members 
and quorum of half the members is required for a meeting. An audit committee 
may include qualified members from the board, ex-board members and outsiders. 
However, the committee must be composed mostly of outsiders who are not 
board members, senior managers, officers, employees, major customers or agents 
of the bank or its affiliates. The number of meetings an audit committee should 
hold is determined by the size and nature of the bank and the scope of the 
committee's activities. For a committee with normal activities, there should be at 
least four meetings each year. This should include an annual meeting with the 
board of directors. The frequency of the committee's meetings with external 
auditors will depend on its needs and the request from them. Therefore, the 
meetings with external auditors should not be in the minimum requirements of 
four meetings in a year (SAMA, 1994: 3-4). 
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It can be seen from the previous rules that the requirements for the audit committees 
and its membership and other responsibilities that are mentioned in the SAMA rules is 
significantly different from the resolution of Ministry of Commerce (1994), which did 
not explain in detail how these committees would be established. Also, the rules and 
duties that are set out by SAMA are not dissimilar to other regulations and duties 
issued in USA and the UK, which are discussed, in subsequent chapters. 
Since the establishment of the committees in January 1994, over eight years has 
elapsed prior to the fieldwork in 2002. This makes it worthwhile to investigate the 
Saudi experiment in the establishment of audit committees as part of the corporate 
governance and comparing actual practice with best practice. 
It should be noted that Al-Twaijry et al (2002) held some interviews in 1998 with 
academics and external and internal auditors to examine the role of audit committees 
in the Saudi Arabian corporate sector. The interviewees expressed concerns about the 
terms of reference of audit committees and the scope of work undertaken. The 
independence and expertise of audit committee members were called into question. 
The interviewees were of the opinion that there was a clear need for the Ministry of 
Commerce to issue further regulations in order to improve the effectiveness of audit 
committees in Saudi corporations. However, the members of audit committees have 
not participated in these interviews. 
3-3 THE IMPACT OF THE ENRON COLLAPSE 
The world of audit committees is changing significantly. Following recent U. S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reforms, the collapse of Enron Corp., 
those who are being asked to serve on the audit committee of a publicly held company 
are realising how important they are to the company's welfare (Verschoor, 2002). As 
mentioned earlier according to Porter and Gendall (1998) after a review of relevant 
literature suggests that, in all of the countries where they have become established, 
audit committees have been stimulated by unexpected company failures and/or 
corporate malpractice. The collapse of Enron Corporation is referred in this chapter 
since it is expected that the debacle of Enron will contribute to the efforts of 
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practitioners, academics, and government bodies to issue more legislations regarding 
audit committees and its roles. 
Historically, Enron was formed in 1986 from the merger of natural gas pipeline 
companies Houston Natural Gas and Internorth, and in the following 15 years 
diversified to provide products and services related to natural gas, electricity and 
communications (Tonge et al, 2003). In October 2001, Enron Corporation of Houston, 
one of the largest corporations in the world, announced it was reducing its net income 
by $544 million and its shareholders' equity by $1.2 billion. On December 2001, 
Enron filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
With assets of $63.4 billion, it is the largest US corporate bankruptcy (Benston and 
Hartgraves, 2002: 105). 
The price of Enron's stock, which had increased spectacularly over the 1990s from a 
low of about $7 to a high of $90 a share in mid-2000, declined to under $1 by the end 
of year 2001. Many Enron employees who had invested their tax-deferred 401 (k) 
retirement plans in Enron stock saw their assets go from hundreds of thousands and 
even millions of dollars to almost nothing (Benston and Hartgraves, 2002: 105). 
Barrier (2002: 29) presented many reasons for Enron's debacle: 
1. The board assigned the audit and Compliance Committee an expanded duty to 
review the transactions, but the committee carried out the reviews only in a 
cursory way. The board of directors was denied important information that 
might have led it to take action. 
2. Enron executives inflated the company's profits by almost $1 billion in the year 
before the bubble burst - and that internal controls of many kinds, ethical as 
well as financial, failed as the deceptions piled up. Among the culprits, were 
not just the audit committee of the board of directors but also Enron's auditors 
at Andersen, who performed both external and internal audits and provided 
extensive consulting services, as well. 
3. The Enron episode has been a sharp reminder of the critical importance of the 
internal audits relationship with the audit committee. Internal audit, like 
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external audit, needs to report ultimately not to management, but to the audit 
committee. 
Smith (2002) considered: "The cause of the Enron collapse was, at best, smart people 
outsmarting themselves and, at worst, institutionalised fraud at the highest level. " 
Similarly, Jennings (2002) claimed that it appears that many audit committee members 
felt themselves above the human nature of quid pro quo that follows when a director 
has personal ties to the company. For example, Enron's board members were well 
compensated, with a total of $380,619 paid to each director in cash and stock for 2001. 
Abdel-khalik (2002) claimed that although much remains to be uncovered, the larger 
picture of the Enron debacle appears to reveal a disturbing phenomenon: the conflict of 
interest between shareholders and management has been allowed to prosper 
exclusively in favour of corporate management, the party in possession of information. 
Furthermore, Jennings (2002) after giving many examples about the conflict of interest 
between audit committee members and the shareholders of Enron, mentioned these 
types of ties, while not in violation of the rules on independence, encourage audit 
committee members and managers to appease one another in order to continue the 
personal benefits that come from board membership. Their self-interests is the very 
definition of a conflict of interest, and the ethical rules on conflicts of interest exist 
because of human nature. There is often an insurmountable tendency to repay a gift 
that is received. Tonge et al (2003) claimed that Enron's board had taken only fifteen 
minutes to review some of the more dubious transactions underlying the surge in 
earnings. 
One reason that has been emphasised by critics is, in 2000, Andersen was paid $25 
million in audit fees and $27 million for non-audit consulting. This observation has 
given new impetus to demands that CPAs be prohibited from offering non-audit 
services (other than tax preparation and advice), on the assertion that these fees corrupt 
the independence of CPAs. Indeed, in response to this criticism, all of the Big 5 CPA 
firms announced that they would no longer offer certain consulting services to their 
auditing clients (Benston and Hartgraves, 2002). And this has been banned by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002: 54). 
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Jennings (2002: 44) points out: 
Academics are not always grounded in applied business, but business theory. 
Enron had the former dean of Stanford Business School on its board. He served 
as the chair of the audit and compliance committee. This business school dean 
was not schooled enough in financial statements to ask one simple question about 
the reports he and his committee were certifying: If the earnings Enron is 
reporting are this high, why is the margins razor thin? 
Similarly, Tonge et al (2003: 10) point out that the audit committee has the power to 
ask the questions that should have stopped Enron from setting up the. deals that led to 
its collapse: "The committee failed to ask the right questions despite having an 
arguably strong constitution including a retired accounting professor Robert Jaedicke 
and John Wakeham a Chartered Accountant and former Leader of the House of Lords 
in the UK. " Lavelle (2002) claimed that Enron insiders including three current audit 
committee members sold 17.3 million shares for $1.1 billion to an unsuspecting public 
while issuing financial statements later revealed to be pure fiction. 
Furthermore, Rittenberg (2002) indicates that many of the recent failures, ranging from 
Enron Corp. to Micro-Strategy Inc., have occurred because the external auditors did 
not ask the fundamental question: What is the company's business? Answers to that 
question will significantly affect both revenue recognition and risks. This view was 
also mentioned by Benston and Hartgraves (2002) that Andersen's audit personnel also 
might have been incapable of understanding the complex financial entities and 
instruments structured by Enron's chief financial officer. These auditors dealt with 
Enron when it was an oil and gas producer and distributor. In recent years, it became 
primarily a dealer in financial instruments and a developer of new ventures. For 
reasons that have yet to be explained, Andersen did not replace these auditors or 
(apparently) provide them with the requisite expertise. 
Finally, the most important lesson with respect to Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS) is that Andersen's partners and staff do not appear to have 
exercised the requisite scepticism that auditors should adopt. Rather, they appear to 
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have accepted too readily management's valuations and determinations with respect to 
valuations and related party transactions (Benston and Hartgraves, 2002). 
However, as Jennings (2002) described, after a decade of efforts and these most recent 
collapses, the focus should turn to directors and the new efforts are needed to make in 
policing and questioning managers. An audit committee working properly should 
prevent these debacles from happening. This view seems to be in contrast to Porter and 
Gendall (1993) who mentioned that audit committees are not, and cannot be, the 
solution to all corporate ills. These ideas enhance the Higgs' opinion (2003: 12) "no 
system of governance can or should fully protect companies and investors from their 
own mistakes. " It should be noted that the story of the giant that once was Enron, is 
still unfolding and parts of that story will probably remain untold (Tonge et al, 2003). 
3-4 ADVANTAGES OF AUDIT COMMITTEES 
There are several advantages of having an audit committee. Several advantages are put 
forward by various writers such as: McDonald Report (1988); Pincus et al. (1989); 
Haka and Chalos (1990); Luecke and Westfall (1990); Cadbury Committee (1992); 
Porter and Gendall (1993); Guthrie and Turnbull (1995); Wolnizer (1995); Adams 
(1997); and Spira (1999a). The Cadbury Committee (1992) listed the following 
advantages: 
(1) Improve the quality of financial reporting, by reviewing the financial 
statements on behalf of the Board; 
(2) Create a climate of discipline and control which will reduce the opportunity for 
fraud; 
(3) Enable the non-executive directors to contribute an independent judgement and 
play- a positive role; 
(4) Help the finance director, by providing a forum in which he can raise issues of 
concern, and which he can use to get things done which might otherwise he 
difficult; 
(5) Strengthen the position of the external auditor, by providing a channel of 
communication and forum for issues of concern; 
(6) Provide a framework within which the external auditor can assert his 
independence in the event of a dispute with management; 
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(7) Strengthen the position of the internal audit function, by providing a greater 
degree of independence from management; 
(8) Increase public confidence in the credibility and objectivity of financial 
statements (Cadbury Committee, 1992: Appendix 4). 
Collier also (1992) presents the following benefits to the parties involved: 
3-4-1 Advantages for directors 
a. Help directors meet their statutory and fiduciary responsibilities, especially as 
regards accounting records, annual accounts, and the audit. 
b. Improve communication between the board and the external auditors. The 
audit committees will meet the external auditors on several occasions during 
the year and be able to investigate the annual accounts, audit, and quality of 
internal controls. 
c. Strengthen the role of the independent non-executive director by formalising 
their work in a key business area. 
d. Aid non-executive directors in their knowledge and understanding of the 
business; financial statements; accounting and control systems; and enable 
them to bring their wider business knowledge to bear on accounting, auditing 
and internal control difficulties (Collier, 1992: 8). 
3-4-2 Advantages for external auditors 
a. Enhances the external auditor's independent position as the external auditor can 
communicate directly with those directors who are not actively engaged in the 
management of the firm. 
b. Improve communications between the external auditors and the directors. The 
audit committee causes the external auditors and a subset of directors to meet 
on a normal and regular basis. 
c. Pressure management into acting on recommendations made (Collier, 1992: 8- 
9). 
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3-4-3 Advantages for internal auditors 
a. Raise the status of the internal audit function by giving internal auditors 
access to board members. This line of communication should encourage 
internal auditors to enhance the quality of their work and raise their esteem 
among managers who will be aware that internal auditors have this line of 
communication. 
b. Enhance the independence of internal auditors. 
c. Improves communication between the board and the internal audit function. 
The audit committee provides a forum in which a subset of directors can 
consider internal audit work and scope and filter matters for consideration by 
the main board. 
d. Pressure management into acting on recommendations made (Collier, 1992: 
9-10). 
Guthrie and Turnbull (1995) argued that two general themes emerge concerning the 
proposed advantages. The first theme is that audit committees help further the 
independence of non-executive directors, and also that of the internal and external 
auditors. The second theme is that audit committees improve the quality of accounting 
financial reporting and auditing within the host organisation. An audit committee also 
can minimise opportunistic accounting choice behaviour since its functions include a 
review of the firm's accounting methods and changes in accounting methods (Pincus et 
al, 1989). To the extent that an audit committee restricts management's choice of 
accounting methods that are not representational, faithful, extra protection is afforded 
to debt holders, as well as shareholders (Pincus et al, 1989). 
Bradbury (1990) pointed out three functions of audit committees, which are: (1) 
increase the credibility of annual audited financial statements, (2) enhance audit 
independence, and (3) assist directors in meeting their responsibilities. It can be noted 
that an audit committee is potentially efficient to reduce information asymmetries 
between outside (non-executive) and inside directors. 
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Moreover, Verschoor (1992: 20) claimed that: 
The establishment of standing audit committees of the board of directors in 
public corporations followed by their assumption of greater oversight 
responsibilities for matters of internal control, financial reporting, and the 
auditing has been described by at least one prominent authority as the most 
significant new development affecting corporate governance in last century. 
Although these benefits of audit committees provide a compelling case for their 
adoption, there are certain potential problems, which need to be considered. 
3-5 DISADVANTAGES OF AUDIT COMMITTEES 
The theoretical arguments against audit committees were pointed out by Marrian 
(1988); Bradbury (1990); Cadbury Committee (1992, Appendix 4); Porter and Gendall 
(1993); Guthrie and Turnbull (1995); and Collier (1992; 1996). These disadvantages 
can be summarized as follows: 
1) Encroachment on the functions of the executive and dilution of executive 
authority or may pre-empt management responsibility. 
2) Audit committees have a divisive effect because during meetings there can be 
criticism of management on accounting, internal control and financial reporting 
matters without those discussed being present to put their view points across or 
having the right of timely reply. 
3) The diversion of non-executive directors from their strategic and other roles 
into the routine matters of audit and financial reporting. 
4) Audit committees are a step towards radical changes in corporate governance 
and possibly a first step towards two-tier boards. 
5) Audit committees might reduce contact between the auditors and the board. 
The delegation of the functions typically assigned to audit committees may 
cause unease on the main board if the audit committee is largely composed of 
non-executive directors who are not directly involved in management and may 
not fully appreciate the complexity of auditing and accounting matters under 
discussion. 
6) Properly run companies do not need them. 
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7) Audit committees are obstructive to the executives who are trying to run the 
company. 
8) Audit committees are just a rubber stamp. 
9) Too time consuming. 
Furthermore, McMullen (1996: 88) claimed that audit committees are considered by 
some to be "creatures of the company's management rather than watchdogs over 
shareholders' interests. " Critics argue that many audit committees hesitate to stop 
management misdeeds because "they fear rocking the boat and lack access to 
knowledgeable lower level employees. " 
Interestingly, Wechsler (1989: 130) held some interviews with some academics and 
practitioners, some of whom mentioned that: "I used to think that audit committees 
were the idealistic answer to uncovering management fraud. " "Audit committees are 
set up to be cosmetic. Their true purpose is to enable a firm to give false assurances 
that someone inside is watching the store. " 
However, these disadvantages support the idea that establishing an audit committee is 
one thing; establishing an effective audit committee is another. As Sommer (1991: 91) 
noted, "a corporation having an audit committee as part of its governance structure and 
having an effective audit committee are, of course, different matters. " 
It can be noted that audit committees are not, and cannot be, a panacea (Macdonald 
Commission, 1988; Porter and Gendall, 1998). Also, as Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) 
argued it is not safe to assume that all committees naturally possess a certain degree of 
effectiveness. Moreover, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) claimed that except insofar as 
any audit committee is more effective than no audit committee, the formation of an 
audit committee does not provide evidence about the actual levels of monitoring that 
will be performed. The existence of an audit committee in itself as Rittenberg and Nair 
(1994) noted, does not provide sufficient control, nor does it ensure that the company 
will maintain a high standard of financial reporting integrity. Care must be taken to 
structure, staff, and support the audit committee to ensure its effectiveness. 
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Further, Porter and Gendall (1993) claimed that while such procedures can reduce the 
potential problems, the benefits of audit committees could be realised only if the 
committees are composed of suitably qualified members. Also, as Green (1994) 
pointed out that the existence of audit committees in itself will not prevent corporate 
failures, but they will encourage auditor independence, which accordingly may prevent 
fraudulent reporting. Wolnizer (1995) goes so far as to assert that unless accounting 
practices are reformed, audit committees are red herrings. 
3-6 SUMMARY 
This chapter commenced with examination of the audit committee, which has been 
defined as Marrian (1988: 2): 
A committee of the board normally comprising three to five directors with no 
operating responsibility in financial management. Its primary tasks are to review 
the financial statements, the effectiveness of the company's accounting and 
internal control systems, and the findings of the auditors, and to make 
recommendations on the appointment and remuneration of the external auditors. 
A brief background to the development of audit committees in the USA and other 
countries including Saudi Arabia was discussed. Corporate audit committees have 
developed and evolved as a result of dissatisfaction with methods of corporate 
governance. Audit committees research is largely US based since the country has a 
longer history of audit committees and this is why audit committees have been 
described as "a peculiarly North American phenomenon. " It is interesting to note 
however, that many researchers suggest that, in all of the countries where they have 
become established, audit committees have been stimulated by unexpected company 
failures and/or corporate malpractice. This chapter. also discussed the Enron collapse 
since it is the largest bankruptcy in US corporate history. The chapter also reviewed 
discussions on the advantages of audit committees for directors, internal and external 
auditors and other parties. The disadvantages of audit committees also have been 
mentioned. The discussions emphasised the effectiveness of audit committees as an 
instrument for corporate governance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AUDIT 
COMMITTEES 
4-1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses what is meant by the effectiveness of audit committees. It 
commences with a background on the concept of effectiveness, which is an elusive 
term. Then the chapter focuses on the activities of effective audit committees. Also, the 
determinants of audit committee effectiveness will be highlighted in this chapter. As 
well, Obstacles of audit committees' effectiveness would be discussed, and finally 
summary of this chapter is presented. 
4-2 MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS 
Effectiveness is an elusive concept that can be approached through several models, 
none of which is appropriate in all circumstances (Cameron, 1981). Spira (1998a: 32) 
considered that "there is no discussion of the meaning of effectiveness, resources, or 
independence within the literature and this assertion is unsupported. " Similar 
limitations were identified by Cameron (1986) in surveying studies of organisational 
effectiveness, in which he observed that evaluations of effectiveness are problematic 
with regard to arbitrary selection of criteria and confusion between determinants and 
indicators. Lewin and Minton (1986) noted that the multiplicity of means and the 
plethora of ends, as well as the many management philosophies and associated 
organisation designs extant, have made the measurement of effectiveness is a very 
complex problem. It is complex because of the problems inherent in specifying some 
joint preference function or in attempting to specify the weights in some multi-attribute 
effectiveness measures. 
Moreover, Lee and Stone (1997: 98) in explaining their purpose of study noted that 
"actual effectiveness was impossible to observe. " Spira (1998b; 1999a: 233) pointed 
out that "the lack of clarity in the definition of audit committee purpose and the 
differences of emphasis observed internationally make the assessment of audit 
committee effectiveness problematic. " Hence, "measures of effectiveness are difficult 
to quantify. Definitions of audit committee goals are not clearly articulated, while 
benefits and purposes are treated as synonymous. " In addition, Cameron (1981: 11) 
64 
Chapter Four: The Effectiveness of Audit Committees Loughborough University 
claimed that organisational effectiveness has become "an enigma, " and the meaning of 
effectiveness in academic research is unclear because of the variety of referents used. 
Therefore, evaluators of organisational effectiveness will never measure all of the 
relevant aspects of effectiveness of an organisation from all the relevant points of 
view. For this reason, it is very important that evaluators make clear certain critical 
choices they make when measuring effectiveness. 
However, as Baugher (1981: 102) suggested that there is often no single model for 
defining effectiveness in any given situation. It was noted that it is possible to say that 
the investigator should focus on a particular type of effectiveness, however, an 
operation can look at effectiveness from one perspective and ineffectiveness from 
another perspective. It was concluded that "the investigator should determine which 
type of effectiveness is of the greatest concern to the constituency or constituencies to 
which he or she must report. " 
Cameron (1986: 541) agreed with the above statement and also claimed that "there is 
no single model or criteria for organisational effectiveness. There cannot be a single 
theory about effectiveness, and the primary task facing any investigator of 
effectiveness lies in determining what are the appropriate indicators and standards. " 
For this reason, the selection of data by which to measure effectiveness is valuable 
because an organisation may be judged effective on the basis of biased (Cameron, 
1981: 10). The author also compared twenty-one empirical studies of organisational 
effectiveness on the basis of the type of effectiveness criteria used and the sources 
from which the criteria were derived, and it was discovered that no overlap occurred in 
the criteria of effectiveness in approximately 80 percent of the studies. 
However, according to Lewin and Minton (1986: 519), "organisations are effective if 
relevant constraints can be satisfied and if organisational results approximate or exceed 
a set of referents for multiple goals. " 
It should be noted that Cameron (1981) differentiates between effectiveness and 
efficiency and commented that these terms are often confused. It was explained that 
organisational efficiency is generally understood to be the ratio of organisational 
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inputs to outputs, or the amount of resources expended in the production of an 
organisational output. 
Many authors who have written on audit committees' effectiveness have used the word 
"effectiveness" to mean the "carrying out or fulfilling its specific oversight 
responsibilities or duties" [Jenkins and Robinson (1985: 34) Sommer (1991: 92); 
Kalbers (1992a: 24); Kalbers and Fogarty (1993: 27); Rittenberg and Nair (1994: 1); 
Vanasco (1994: 28); Porter and Gendall (1998: 68); Millstein (1999: 1063); SEC 
(1999) noted by Raghunandan et al . (2001: 108); and Smith (2003: 3)]. 
Many studies have used "discharging their oversight responsibilities" for the definition 
of audit committees' effectiveness, [see for example: Braiotta (1986: 23); Verschoor 
(1989: 16); Lee and Stone (1997: 98); Pomeranz (1997: 281); Rezaee (1997: 39); Neal 
(1998: 6); Turley and Zaman (2002: 3) and Watts (2002: 1)]. DeZoort (1998: 1) 
defined effectiveness as "a committee's collective ability to meet its oversight 
objectives. " 
Baugher (1981: 102) noted that "the investigator should determine which type of 
effectiveness is of the greatest concern to the constituency or constituencies to which 
he or she must report. " This research will use the word "effectiveness" to refer to audit 
committees carrying out its specific oversight responsibilities. These responsibilities 
will be quoted from the recommendations of Treadway Commission (1987), 
Macdonald Commission (1988), Cadbury Committee (1992), Blue Ribbon Committee 
(1999), and other recommendation, which has been noted by the academic and 
practitioner literatures. 
Woodlock and Claypool (2001: 28) mentioned that once the audit committee is made 
aware of its current practices, a comparison needs to be made between current 
practices and those that constitute best practices. By doing this, the audit committee, 
the CEO, the CFO, and the external auditor are better to assess where to commit 
resources to close the gap between current and best practices. Moreover, Rowland 
(2002) claimed that the monitoring model is manifest in actual corporate practice 
compared with best practice guidelines. 
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4-3 ACTIVITIES OF EFFECTIVE AUDIT COMMITTEES 
The audit committee's role has evolved over the years and now with the 
recommendations of Treadway Commission, Macdonald Commission, and Cadbury 
Committee. Functions normally performed by audit committees vary in accordance 
with the mission statement or charter granted to them by the board of directors (Rezaee 
and Farmer, 1994). The board scope of the audit committee's functions can be 
classified into four groups: 
1) Financial reporting process; 
2) Internal auditors responsibilities; 
3) Annual audit and the external auditors' activities; and 
4) Corporate governance responsibilities. 
4-3-1 Financial reporting process 
The financial process and ensuring reliable financial information is one of the most 
important functions of the audit committee (Rezaee and Farmer, 1994). 
While the audit committee should not become involved in day-to-day operations, 
there is pressure from the oversight role for the audit committee to get more 
involved to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process. Whereas 
management is primarily responsible for the fair presentation of financial 
statements, the audit committee's role as informed, vigilant, and effective 
overseers of the financial reporting process is important (Rezaee and Farmer, 
1994: 14). 
In the case of accounting and financial reporting matters, audit committees are 
expected to: [Mautz and Neumann (1970a: 61); Braiotta (1986: 19); Luecke and 
Westfall (1990: 14); Rittenberg and Nair (1994: 40); Rezaee and Farmer (1994: 14); 
Wolnizer (1995: 47); Lee and Stone (1997: 105); Porter and Gendall (1998: 59); and 
Smith (2003: 6)] 
(1) Review all financial statements, whether interim or annual, before they are 
approved by the board of directors and publicly disseminated to ensure their 
objectiveness, accuracy, and timeliness; 
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(2) Review all existing accounting policies, and concentrate on the impact on the 
financial statements of any changes in accounting policies including the likely 
impact of any contemplated changes; 
(3) Evaluate exposure to fraud; 
(4) Appraise key management estimates, judgements, and valuations where they 
are thought to be material to the financial statements; 
(5) Evaluate the adequacy of financial statement disclosures; 
(6) Review adequacy of organisation's structure, including management's 
implementation of internal controls; and 
(7) Review all significant transactions, especially those that are non-routine and 
those that might be illegal, questionable, or unethical. 
4-3-2 Internal auditors responsibilities 
The audit committee can strengthen the entity's internal audit function by ensuring that 
management has established and is maintaining an adequate and effective internal 
audit structure (Rezaee and Farmer, 1994). Also, Oliverio and Newman (1993: 68) 
after discussion in the Treadway Commission's Report identified the interaction 
between the internal audit function and the audit committee that should ensure "the 
internal audit function's effectiveness and objectivity. " 
In the case of internal auditors responsibilities, audit committees are expected to 
(Wolnizer, 1995: 48): 
(1) Evaluate the independence and competence of internal audit function; 
(2) Discuss with the chief of internal auditors: 
- internal audit findings and reports; 
- effectiveness of internal controls; 
- problems in performing the internal audit. 
(3) Review the scope of internal audits planned for the year; 
(4) Review management's response to internal auditors' recommendations; 
(5) Review and approve internal audit budget; 
(6) Review the relationship between internal and external auditors and co- 
ordination of their work; 
(7) Appoint and dismiss the head of internal audit. 
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4-3-3 Annual audit and the external auditors' activities 
The audit committee is a valuable instrument for initiating direct contact with the 
independent (external) auditor, participating in the selection of the external auditor, 
and promoting effective communication between the independent auditor and 
corporate directors (Rezaee and Farmer, 1994). 
In the case of annual audit and external auditors, audit committees are expected to 
(Wolnizer, 1995: 47): 
(1) Review the findings of the external audit; 
(2) Determine the completeness and appropriateness of management's response to 
audit findings; 
(3) Evaluate independence of external audit function; 
(4) Review the reasonableness of the external audit fees; 
(5) Arbitrate in disputes between management and auditors; 
(6) Nominate external auditors; 
(7) Review the management letter prepared by the independent auditors; and 
(8) Discuss with external auditor: 
- conduct and problems of the audit; 
- audited financial statements; 
- scope and timing of the audit. 
4-3-4 Corporate governance responsibilities 
Good corporate governance practice points to the audit committee as the focal point 
for improvements in financial reporting (Millstein, 1999). In the case of corporate 
governance responsibilities, audit committees are expected to (Wolnizer, 1995: 47): 
(1) Facilitate and enhance communication between the external auditors and the 
board of directors; 
(2) Review corporate policies and practices in the light of ethical considerations; 
(3) Monitor the manner in which the company's affairs are conducted and, where 
applicable, compliance with the company's code of corporate conduct; 
(4) Review significant transactions outside entity's normal business; and 
(5) Review adequacy of management information systems. 
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4-4 DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS 
The role and responsibility of audit committees has come under intense scrutiny in the 
last decade. As a result the need to evaluate the effectiveness of their performance has 
never been a higher priority (Watts, 2002). However, the formation of an audit 
committee does not provide evidence about the actual levels of monitoring that will be 
performed. Rittenberg and Nair (1994: 59) summarised the result of their study that 
indicated that an effective audit committee has several attributes. These attributes may 
be abridged as: 
1- independence from management, 
2- access to information, and 
3- resources. 
Also, Rezaee (1997: 34) pointed out "The effectiveness of the audit committees' 
involvement in corporate governance and the extent of the board of directors reliance 
on audit committees' services depends on the availability of resources and the degree 
to which audit committee members are independent from management. " 
Rezaee (1997: 37) considered that the audit committee needed access to information 
regarding corporate governance, the financial reporting process, and internal controls. 
In order to begin the process of determining what the criteria should be for measuring 
audit committee effectiveness concerning their presently assigned responsibilities, the 
attributes that have been summarized by Rittenberg and Nair (1994); and Rezaee 
(1997) will be presented in the following section. 
4-4-1 Independence From Management 
Audit committees, like external auditors, must be independent, which includes 
independence from the company - not being part of management or otherwise 
affiliated with the company (Rittenberg and Nair, 1994). Davidson and Ebersole 
(2000: 42) noted that there is a strong relationship between the audit committee's 
independence from management and its effectiveness in overseeing the company's 
financial reporting process. Independence is critical to holding management 
accountable to the shareholders. Verschoor (1989: 14) pointed out that according to the 
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NYSE, "any non-employee, or non-affiliated director can be considered to be an 
independent director". 
The NYSE requires listed companies to have at least a two-member audit committee 
composed of all independent directors. On the other hand, Treadway Commission 
recommended that "the board of directors of all public companies should be required 
by SEC rule to establish audit committees composed solely of independent directors". 
The NASD requires that all national market system companies establish and maintain 
audit committees that have a majority of independent directors (Treadway Commission 
1987: 40). 
The NYSE Listed Company Manual characterizes independent directors as those who 
are "independent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of 
the Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgement as 
a committee member. " (quoted in Treadway Commission 1987: 41; Blue Ribbon 
Committee 1999: 1079). It follows with the definition of independent director by the 
NASD, as "a person other than an officer or employee of the company or its 
subsidiaries or any other individual having a relationship that, in the opinion of the 
board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgement in 
carrying out the responsibilities of a director" (quoted in Blue Ribbon Committee 
1999: 1079). 
The Committee stated that the current NYSE and NASD standards on independence 
allow for too much discretion and should be fortified. Apostolou and Strawser (1990) 
suggested that audit committees should be comprised of directors who are not 
affiliated with the organisation's management or ownership and have no participation 
in its day-to-day operations. This requirement is necessary to ensure that the audit 
committee may objectively perform its duties. Moreover, Blue Ribbon Committee 
(1999) noted that the rationale supporting the call for a majority of independent 
directors on a board of directors, that independence is critical to ensuring that the 
board fulfils its objective oversight role and holds management accountable to 
shareholders is especially applicable to the audit committee. 
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It should be noted that the NYSE adopted a very general concept of independence, 
which presented above, while the NASDAQ rule takes a much different approach to 
the definition of "independent", listing some specificity disqualifying relationships. 
The NASDAQ approach might reflect the difference between the companies it lists 
and those that the NYSE lists. Many NASDAQ companies are smaller in size, less 
mature in history, and often have less sophisticated advisors (Scott, 2001). The 
definition that the SEC has traditionally used in various of its regulations defines an 
affiliate as "a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, 
controls, or as controlled by, or is under common control with the company" (quoted 
in Scott, 2001: 563). 
As noted by Wolnizer (1995) the principal benefits expected of audit committees are 
predicated on the belief that, by virtue of their independent status, external auditors 
and non-executive directors will exercise independent judgement in respect of the 
financial and other matters considered by them. The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999: 
1072) mentioned examples of such relationships that may interfere with the exercise of 
their independence from management and the corporation. These examples include: 
"A director being employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the 
current year or any of the past five years; 
"A director accepting any compensation from the corporation or any of its 
affiliates other than compensation for board service or benefits under a tax- 
qualified retirement plan; 
"A director being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or 
has been in any of the past five years, employed by the corporation or any of its 
affiliates as an executive officer; 
"A director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive 
officer of, any for-profit business organisation to which the corporation made, 
or from which the corporation received, payments that are or have been 
significant to the corporation or business organisation in any of the past five 
years; 
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"A director being employed as an executive of another company where any of 
the corporation's executives serves on that company's compensation 
committee. 
Further, Kirk (2000) claimed that the Cohen Commission recognised the important 
role that independent directors could play in enhancing corporate accountability to 
shareholders and in balancing the auditor's relationship with management. The Cohen 
Commission referred to independent directors and auditors as "natural allies" in efforts 
to strengthen corporate accountability. The Cohen Commission, however, noted that 
"audit committees... cannot function effectively unless they include competent, 
independent, and reasonably active outside members of the board" (quoted in Kirk 
2000: 106). Menon and Williams (1994) suggested that an active audit committee, 
staffed totally by outsiders, is a key element of corporate governance. Indeed, even 
such a strong advocate of the audit committee as the SEC notes that having insiders on 
an audit committee may be worse than having no committee at all. Al-Twaijry et al, 
(2002: 290) commenting on the view of Menon and Williams (1994) stated "because it 
would mislead shareholders into thinking that effective monitoring was taking place. " 
Consequently, the committee should consist of directors who are, and appear to be, 
independent of management's influence (Vafeas, 2001). 
Those views seem to be consistent with Beasley (1996) who found that the percentage 
of outside directors was significantly lower for firms with fraudulent activity than for 
firms without fraudulent activity, and that fraud firms had audit committees with a 
significantly lower percentage of outsiders than no-fraud firms. McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) found that companies without reporting problems were more 
likely to have an audit committee composed solely of outside directors than companies 
with reporting problems. 
To be effective, such a committee must be made up of independent directors 
representing public shareholders. If given relatively specific responsibility for the 
review of both independent auditing and financial reporting, it can, without 
destroying the present structure of the accounting profession, separate 
independent auditors from management in a way that should strengthen the 
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independent of the former without usurping any of the operating responsibilities 
of the latter (Mautz and Neary, 1979: 84). 
Within the literature on auditor independence, a distinction is frequently made between 
independence in fact and independence in appearance. Spira (1999b: 264) quoted 
definitions of independence in fact and independence in appearance taken from US 
auditing standards. "The former relates to the mental attitude of the auditor and is 
difficult to establish or to demonstrate. The latter relates to circumstances which could 
be perceived as threatening independence, and which might be controlled so as to 
display the necessary distancing which is seen as fundamental to objectivity. " Spira 
(1999b) mentioned how interviewees highlighted that independence in fact was of 
greater significance than independence in appearance and that an emphasis on the 
latter could undermine audit committee effectiveness. 
It is interesting to note, however, that Klein (1998a) found in her study sample of 771 
US firms listed on the S&P 500 as of March 31,1992 and 1993 that despite 97.9% of 
all audit committees for large U. S. firms have at least one outside, independent 
director, more than one-half of the sampled firms also have at least one affiliated, 
interested director and nearly 5% have a member of the firm's upper management. 
These percentages as Klein (1998a: 22) described, "fly in the face of the Treadway 
Report which advocates that audit committees be comprised solely of independent 
directors. " 
Moreover, Raghunandan et al (2001: 116) found that 114 chief internal auditors of 
public manufacturing companies in the US indicated that only 68 percent of the 
responding companies had audit committees without inside or "grey directors. " This 
result provides an empirical basis for the concerns expressed by the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999) about the need to strengthen the independence of audit committee 
members. It should be noted that grey directors are "those, who, although not 
employed by the corporation on whose board they serve but are affiliated with it or its 
management". These so-called grey area directors include, among others, relatives of 
management, consultants to the firm, interlocking directors and retired executives of 
the firm (Vicknair et al, 1993: 53). However, as Kleinman and Farrelly (1996) noted 
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that corporate governance advocates have questioned the composition of the board of 
directors in many firms, claiming that too many directors have strong ties to 
management and too few are truly independent and qualified to make objective 
judgements. 
In the UK, Cadbury Committee (1992: 22) defined independence of non-executive 
directors as "They should be independent of management and free from any business 
or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgement. " 
4-4-1-1 Selection and nomination process 
Usually, audit committees are selected from the board of directors, who normally in 
the common practice are elected by the shareholders from a slate of candidates 
nominated by management. Whereas the basic principle of corporate governance is 
that the shareholders elect the board of directors who in turn select top management 
(John and Senbet, 1998). This current process virtually guarantees that all directors 
would have had some prior relationship with management. If audit committees are 
selected this way, it is difficult to see how they could be truly independent and how 
they could deliver on the high expectations that have been placed on them (Rittenberg 
and Nair, 1994: 175). 
While describing the current process, Boyd (1996: 175) stated that "unless non- 
executives are independently wealthy they may at any time be reluctant to bite that 
hand that feeds them. " Moreover, Rezaee and Farmer (1994: 12) claimed that if 
management uses its influence to elect audit committee members, the independence of 
the committee is likely to be impaired. "The effectiveness and efficiency of the audit 
committee's role should not be abrogated because of insufficient audit committee 
independence from management. " Further, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) noted 
that several recent studies have produced a correlation between audit committee 
independence and two desirable outcomes: a higher degree of active oversight and a 
lower incidence of financial statement fraud. 
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However, Rittenberg and Nair (1994) suggested that an alternative solution would be 
to have at least some directors elected directly by shareholders, that is, nominated by a 
group other than management. This arrangement could lead to a system of dual boards- 
a managerial board and a supervisory board -a system of corporate governance that 
already exists in some countries as discussed in the chapter (Corporate Governance). 
Clearly, ensuring the independence of audit committee members in more than a 
superficial way implies re-examining the basics of corporate governance in this 
country. 
4-4-1-2 Independence in assessing fair presentation 
Independence from management also becomes more important as the roles of 
judgement and estimation in the preparation of financial statements increase 
(Rittenberg and Nair, 1994). Carcello and Neal (2000) examined the relation between 
audit committee independence and auditor reporting behaviour. They consider the 
relation between (1) the percentage of audit committee members affiliated with the 
company (i. e., directors who lack independence), and (2) the likelihood that the auditor 
will issue a going-concern report. They found an opposite relation between the 
likelihood of receiving a going-concern report and the percentage of affiliated directors 
on the audit committee. This finding seems to be similar to the results of McMullen 
(1996) which found that an audit committee independent of management is more likely 
to mitigate any management pressure on auditors to issue a clean opinion when a 
going-concern report is necessary. For this reason, Rittenberg and Nair (1994) pointed 
out that in a sense, the audit committee is an additional check and balance in the 
financial reporting process to ensure that both management and the external auditor are 
focusing on the substance of transactions. 
4-4-1-3 Independence in setting the agenda 
The other provision relates to issues concerning the independence of the audit 
committee that should be specified in a charter for the audit committee and also in 
setting its agenda. Since the audit committee is responsible for maintaining 
communication between the board and external and internal auditors, as well as 
management, it is essential for the audit committee to be independent of management. 
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Rittenberg and Nair (1994) noted that establishing the independence of audit 
committees includes such basic steps as allowing them to determine their own agenda. 
If the independence of audit committees is to be preserved, they must be insulated 
from pressures exerted by those who might be affected negatively by the committee's 
actions. This protection may be provided by management commitment to having an 
effective audit committee; a chief executive officer who wants an effective audit 
committee will be a powerful force in the right direction (Rittenberg and Nair, 1994). 
Burke et al. (1996) recommend that a best practice audit committee use an agenda at 
all meetings. The committee's chairperson holds informal pre-meeting agenda 
discussions with the organisation's chief financial officer (CFO) and a representative 
of the external auditors. The success of the audit committee depends on the absolute, 
unconditional, and uncompromising openness of the organisation's management and 
auditors. 
Moreover, Olson (1999: 1107) pointed out that audit committees function best when 
they have careful advance planning of their schedules and agendas. Meeting schedules 
and meeting agendas should be planned out in advance by the audit committee chair 
and corporate financial officers to be certain that these important "big picture" issues 
are not scanted as the number of formal and procedural duties increases. Further, Ecton 
and Reinstein (1982) claimed that an agenda, developed well in advance of the 
meetings, is essential if members are to have the time required to prepare for the 
sessions; agenda also draw explicit, advance attention to the issues the committee is 
expected to consider. They also pointed out (p. 36) that agenda that encompasses four 
main points: 
1) A detailed description of items to be considered; 
2) References to pertinent backup documentation; 
3) A list of the committee members primarily responsible for leading the 
discussion about each item; and 
4) Ample time for further items of discussion. 
Kalbers (1992b) considered that the lack of preparation by audit committee members 
can obviously reduce the effectiveness of audit committees and discourage quality 
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interaction with internal auditors. However, the matter is, as Rittenberg and Nair 
(1994) noted, that unless the support from a chief executive officer is institutionalised 
it might prove tenuous. The ability of an audit committee to set its own agenda should 
be stated in its charter. 
4-4-2 Access To Information 
Effective audit committees need information. Bull and Sharp (1989) suggested that 
open lines of communication must exist between the audit committee and those in the 
company who can provide them with information. There are three main sources of this 
information: (1) the external auditors, (2) the internal auditors, and (3) other company 
personnel such as company counsel and the financial management of the company 
(Rittenberg and Nair, 1994: 61). 
4-4-2-1 Issues to be discussed with the external auditor 
The external auditors are in a "unique position to judge the effectiveness of the audit 
committees of the companies they audit" (Sommer, 1991: 92). The justification for an 
independent external audit arises from two specific needs (Green, 1994: 138). First, 
there may be a potential conflict between management and the owners of the company. 
In theory, the board of directors is responsible for monitoring the performance of 
management. In practice, the external auditor, in exchange for an appropriate fee, 
provide that safeguard by determining whether the financial statements that 
management prepares satisfy their fiduciary responsibilities to the shareholders. 
Second, other financial statement users such as potential owners, creditors, and 
regulatory agencies are interested in knowing that financial statements "present fairly 
the financial operations of the company and are in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles or an appropriate alternative basis. " The report of the 
independent external auditor is intended to assure the interested stakeholder that this is, 
in fact, the case. However, as Apostolou and Strawser (1990) noted the actual and 
perceived quality of the external audit would be enhanced by the presence of a 
corporate audit committee. Also, Green (1994: 138) claimed that the corporate audit 
committee is an excellent vehicle to reduce management pressure on auditors. Just as 
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there is a danger in auditors being too "close" to management, there is an analogous 
danger in boards of directors being too "close" to management. 
Though the shareholders nominally make the audit appointment, they are highly 
influenced by management. By involving the audit committee in the nomination of 
auditors and in the decision to change auditing firms, a higher degree of independence 
from management is attained (Green, 1994). 
Rezaee (1997) noted that audit committees look to and rely on both internal and 
external auditors to give adequate and useful information concerning corporate 
governance, the financial reporting process, and internal controls. 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999: 1086) stated that: 
The audit committee is dependent on both management and the outside auditors 
for a full range of information- based in both fact and judgements- regarding the 
financial reporting process. Under the current auditing standards, the outside 
auditor is required to communicate certain information to the audit committee, 
including matters such as disagreements with management, consultations with 
other accountants, and difficulties encountered in performing the audit such as 
unreasonable delays by management or unavailability of client personnel. In 
addition, the auditor is required to report to the audit committee "reportable 
conditions, " which are deficiencies that could adversely affect the company's 
ability to produce reliable financial statements. Further, the outside auditor may 
be required to report illegal acts detected during the audit to management and the 
audit committee. 
Further, Rezaee (1997) claimed that a close working relationship between the audit 
committee and auditors allows the committee to understand how the internal and 
external audit functions are working to ensure sufficient corporate governance and 
dependable financial reporting. 
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Rittenberg and Nair (1994) maintained that the audit committee should be sensitive to 
management's contacts with other auditors and the reasons for, and the results of, such 
contacts. The committee, also, should specify that it expects to be informed 
immediately if any issue requires its attention. 
Moreover, many practitioners' literature such as Arthur Andersen (1991; 1994); and 
Ernst & Young (2000) recommend that the external auditor are expected to bring 
technical competence, sound business judgement, integrity and objectivity to the 
financial reporting process. Among other things, they are responsible for 
communicating to the audit committee regarding the scope of their annual audit of the 
financial statements, the extent of their involvement with interim reports, the results of 
their work and other important information as circumstances dictate. In this respect, 
the committee should carefully identify and communicate to the auditors its 
expectations in these and other areas. 
The independent auditors must in turn be prepared to answer all questions about the 
audit results and the business and financial risks facing the company in a candid and 
open manner. As with internal auditors, the external auditors should have a direct line 
of communication with the audit committee (Arthur Andersen, 1991; 1994); Ernst & 
Young (2000). In addition, Cadbury Committee (1992, Appendix 4, Para 6) 
recommended that "the (audit) committee should have a discussion with the auditors, 
at least once a year, without executive board members present, to ensure that there are 
no unresolved issues of concern". 
Though, at the completion of the audit, the committee should determine the significant 
financial reporting issues that the external auditor discussed with management, the 
implications of those issues, the effects of alternative treatments, and the resolution of 
those issues. Other significant items that should be discussed include the nature, 
sufficiency, and reasonableness of reserves and estimates made by management and 
whether litigation and other contingencies have been reflected appropriately in the 
statements (Rittenberg and Nair, 1994). Moreover, SAS No. 90 requires the external 
auditor to discuss with the company's audit committee his or her judgements about the 
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quality, not just the acceptability, of the accounting principles applied to the 
company's financial reports (Woodlock et al, 2001: 19). 
Interestingly, Mautz and Neumann (1970a: 57) held some interviews with many audit 
committee members, some of whom mentioned that: 
When I meet with the independent CPAs as chairman of the audit committee, I 
drive them to the wall. I push them with questions until they commit themselves 
that there is nothing about the company's accounting, nothing about the 
cooperation they got during their audit, nothing in the way of limitations on their 
work that bothers them - indeed, that they have no reservations at all about the 
audit or the company's financial statements. The annual meeting of our corporate 
audit committee with the independent accountants is little more than a formality. 
We meet for lunch, receive the report, ask the accountants if they found anything 
of particular interest, and that is all. 
4-4-2-2 Issues to be discussed with the internal auditor 
In June 1999, the Board of Directors of the Institute of Internal Auditors approved the 
following definition of internal auditing (Basel Committee, 2001: 2): 
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity 
designed to add value and improve an organisation's operations. It helps an 
organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined 
approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, 
and governance processes. 
Internal auditing has made steady and impressive progress as a profession during the 
past 50 years (Verschoor, 1992; Rezaee and Lander, 1993). Also, internal auditing is 
one of the critical resources of the audit committee in meeting its responsibilities 
(Rezaee and Farmer, 1994; Montondon, 1995). The Treadway Commission (1987: 34) 
noted the importance of an effective internal auditing function and an informed audit 
committee in preventing fraudulent financial reporting. Particularly, the commission 
noted that the internal auditing function and the audit committee, together with internal 
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accounting controls, "comprise the internal controls that can prevent and detect 
fraudulent financial reporting. " 
In fulfilling the expanded oversight responsibilities, the audit committee must rely on 
internal auditors for much of its information concerning corporate activities 
(Apostolou and Strawser, 1990). To be most effective, internal auditors should have 
direct and unrestricted access to the audit committee (Montondon, 1995). Internal 
auditing is a valuable resource that can provide the information needed for audit 
committees to meet their governance mandate. The information asymmetry between 
audit committees and management is more likely to be reduced when there is high- 
quality interaction between audit committees and the internal auditors. Besides, 
Vanasco (1994) pointed out that internal auditors must accept the challenge of 
providing relevant information and training to audit committee members. This 
information and training should enable audit committees to address the full range of 
issues related to internal control, organisational governance, and management 
reporting. As well, Margheim (1986) presented in his results that external auditors 
reduced planned audit hours if the internal auditors had a high level of competence in 
the work they performed. 
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999: 1090) stated: 
The internal auditor occupies a unique position - he or she is "employed" by 
management, but is also expected to review the conduct of management. This 
can create significant tension since the internal auditor's "independence" from 
management is necessary for the auditor to objectively assess management's 
actions, but the auditor's "dependence" on management for employment is clear. 
It is important to have formal mechanisms in place to facilitate confidential 
exchanges between the internal auditor and the audit committee. These 
mechanisms may take the form of regular meetings independent of management, 
or regular confidential memos or reports circulated only to the audit committee. 
In addition, Wagner et al. (1988) noted that the effectiveness of internal auditors is 
enhanced when they are provided a non-management forum for communicating their 
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findings. The audit committee provides an opportunity to discuss sensitive issues and 
to monitor recommended changes. 
Verschoor (1990a) described the fraudulent financial reporting to which MiniScribe 
Corporation admitted from 1986 through 1988. The fact that the MiniScribe audit 
committee failed to insist that the company establish and maintain an effective internal 
auditing function was a crucial indicator of its failure to properly oversee matters of 
financial reporting, auditing and internal control. Verschoor (1990b) mentioned that 
internal auditors find themselves frequently on the defensive because the 
improvements in control systems they recommend sometimes do cost money. The 
MiniScribe case is an excellent example of a situation where weak or non-existent 
controls may have saved money in the short term, but over the longer term could cost 
the various stockholders of the company dearly. It could even result in the inability of 
the company to continue to exist. 
However, Raghunandan and McHugh (1994) point out that the mere presence of an 
internal auditing function and an audit committee is not sufficient to deter management 
fraud. The internal auditing function and the audit committee must be effective. Also, 
as Haka and Chalos (1990) claimed, because internal auditors are typically employed 
by and work closely with management and depends very heavily on the support and 
guidance of the organisation's management (Rickard, 1993), some evidence suggests 
that the position of the internal audit function in the organisation might compromise its 
independence. Hence, internal auditors should report directly to the audit committee. 
Also, if the position of internal auditors is viewed as an integral part of the monitoring 
function, then the internal auditor's independence is essential (Montondon, 1995). For 
this reason, (Jenkins and Robinson, 1985: 34; Marsh and Powell, 1989: 57; Verschoor 
1993: 64; Liu et al 1997; Borelli 2001: 43; and Smith 2003: 12) claimed the audit 
committee should review and approve the appointment and replacement of the director 
of internal auditing. 
This view is consistent with The Institute of Internal Auditors, which mentioned 
(quoted in Jenkins and Robinson, 1985: 34): 
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To help assure independence, the director of internal auditing should have direct 
communication with the audit committee. The director should attend audit 
committee meetings and meet privately with the audit committee at least 
annually. Independence is further enhanced when the audit committee concurs in 
the appointment or removal of the director of internal auditing. 
It should be noted that the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) issued Statement on 
Internal Auditing Standards No. 7, "Communication with. the Board of Directors" 
(SIAS 7) provides explicit guidance to internal auditors for communicating with 
corporate audit committees (quoted in Apostolou and Strawser, 1990: 39). Hence, 
improving the nature of communication between the internal auditors and the audit 
committee could help enhance the internal auditing department's independence. 
Apostolou and Strawser (1990) suggested that the requirement for private meetings 
between the internal auditors and the audit committee should allow any significant 
findings to be communicated without fear of reprisal from corporate management. 
Further, Raghunandan et al (2001: 108) and Montondon (1995: 67) noted that the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, 1993 based on a benchmarking survey of audit 
committees), suggests that to be effective an audit committee should meet with the 
chief internal auditor at least four times each year. Thus, as Rezaee and Lander (1993) 
suggest the audit committee should not only review the appointment and replacement 
of the director of internal auditing department, but also serve as a channel of 
communication between the director of internal auditing and the board. 
Rittenberg and Nair (1994) stated that issues which the internal auditors can assist the 
committee with include special projects, such as reviews of the company's computer 
data processing and controls, any specific security programs to prevent computer 
fraud, and review of officers' expenses and use of company assets. 
The audit committee can also help ensure that the work of the internal and external 
auditors is-properly coordinated and that any differences in findings or judgements 
between the two are reconciled. These abilities require, as Rezaee and Farmer (1994) 
mentioned, that to ensure the competency of internal auditors and to enhance the 
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quality of the internal audit function, the audit committee should satisfy itself that the 
internal auditors have appropriate qualifications, are sufficiently trained, have adequate 
knowledge of current technology, and are provided with an adequate budget to 
maintain professional competence through continuing education. The audit committee 
should also develop an overall appraisal of the total audit needs of the organisation and 
ensure that the work of internal auditors is properly coordinated with that of the 
external auditors (Rezaee and Farmer, 1994). Interestingly, Ridley (2000: 54) said 
"The potential for fraudulent financial reporting is one of the things that is likely to 
keep your audit committee awake at night". 
Rezaee and Lander (1993: 39) noted that several benefits could be gained from the 
internal auditor working closely with the audit committee. These benefits are as 
follows: 
(1) Better financial reporting should be the result of the internal auditor being 
assured that the audit committee is informed as to management's application 
of accounting principles and judgements regarding estimates. The audit 
committee is typically sensitive to management's judgements and their 
influence on the company's financial statements. 
(2) Better compliance with the company's code of conduct will result from the 
internal auditor keeping the audit committee informed of any areas of non- 
compliance. 
(3) Quicker awareness of problems between management and the internal 
auditor will result from the audit committee and the internal auditor 
maintaining constant, open line of communication. 
(4) Better compliance with regulations imposed on the company will result 
from the internal auditor bringing any violations to the immediate attention 
of the audit committee. 
(5) A reduced potential for legal liability should be a result of the internal 
auditor's monitoring both of the financial and the non-financial areas and 
the audit committee being kept apprised of possible areas where the 
company could be held legally liable. 
(6) The most important benefit to be gained is from independence both of the 
audit committee and internal auditor. Their independence will help to bring 
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a quality of fairness not only to the financial statements but also to the 
company as a whole. 
As noted earlier in our discussion on independence, Scarbrough et al. (1998) found 
that Canadian audit committees with solely non-employee directors were more likely 
to have frequent meetings with the chief internal auditor, and to review the internal 
auditing programme and results. 
4-4-2-3 Issues to be discussed with other company personnel 
Rittenberg and Nair (1994) claimed that other sources of information for audit 
committees include the company legal counsel and the company's financial 
management. The committee should meet regularly with the legal counsel to seek 
information about the nature and status of any claims against the company. Arthur 
Andersen (1994) indicated that the audit committee should meet periodically with 
those responsible for income tax and other tax-related compliance, and review and 
understand important issues and judgement matters. Further, Rezaee and Farmer 
(1994) claimed that audit committees should ask about health care liabilities, and 
lawsuits. In addition, they should inquire about current maturities of debts, lease 
obligations, and the status of large construction projects. 
In particular, as smith (2003: 4) considered that "the management is under an 
obligation to ensure the audit committee is kept properly informed, and should take the 
initiative in supplying information rather than waiting to be asked". Also, the audit 
committee should have access to the services of the company secretary and staff on all 
audit committee matters. The company secretary should ensure that the audit 
committee receives information and papers in a timely manner to enable full and 
proper consideration to be given to the issues. Finally, the board of directors should 
make funds available to the audit committee to enable it to take independent legal, 
accounting or other advice when the audit committee reasonably believes it necessary 
to do so (Smith, 2003). 
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However, as Olson (1999) noted effective audit committees understand that they are 
not and cannot be auditors or lawyers. They focus on being comfortable with the 
integrity and skill of the auditors, internal and external, who report to them. 
4-4-3 Resources 
An effective audit committee needs resources. The term is used widely to include 
access to qualified members, management support, adequate time for meetings, 
training, and a charter (Rittenberg and Nair, 1994). 
4-4-3-1 Audit committee charter 
The charter is "a formal statement of the charge, or to acknowledge the existence of 
the audit committee in the corporate bylaws" (Pomeranz, 1997: 282). Historically, 
most audit committees in the United States were working with charters written in the 
1970s. They were very short and consisted of four to eight lines of text. It was a big 
jump from this to the Treadway recommendations in 1987 (Marsh and Powell, 1989: 
55). 
A carefully developed audit committee charter is the key to ensuring a proper structure 
of the audit committee. The major purpose for developing a charter is to formally 
establish the audit committee as a functional element of the company's over all 
organisational structure (Rezaee and Farmer, 1994). Typically, the committee's charter 
should detail the committee membership and term of office; roles and responsibilities; 
relationship with management; internal and external auditors; and frequency and 
timing of meetings. This document need not be complex, and it should be approved by 
the board and discussed with management and the auditors (Arthur Andersen, 1991). 
Bean (1999: 47) considered: "a comprehensive charter enhances the effectiveness of 
the audit committee, serving as a road map for committee members. " Burke et al 
(1996: 75); Reinstein and Luecke (2001: 59) indicated that a best practice audit 
committee has a written charter "tailored" to its organisation that clearly outlines the 
committee's duties and responsibilities. This charter is developed, periodically 
updated, and approved by the governing board. The charter defines the background 
and experience requirements for committee members and sets guidelines for the 
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committee's relationships with management, external auditors, and others. As well, 
Raghunandan and McHugh (1994) claimed that a charter establishes a framework to 
enhance the effectiveness of the audit committee. 
In addition, Bean (1999) mentioned that many companies' audit committee members 
may not have the expertise in matters of internal control, and some people serving on 
audit committees have very little accounting or financial background at all. 
Accordingly, audit committee members need a reference guide to their responsibilities, 
which is the function of an audit committee charter. With regard to the charter for the 
audit committee, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999: 1073-1074) recommended that 
each company's audit committee adopt a written charter that: 
  Describes its responsibilities and how it carries out those responsibilities; 
  Is approved by the full board; 
  Is reviewed and assessed on an annual basis; 
  Specifies that the outside auditor is ultimately accountable to the board and the 
audit committee; 
  Requires a dialogue with the auditor about all relationships that may impact the 
auditor's objectivity and independence; and 
  Requires the taking of appropriate action by the audit committee to ensure the 
independence of the outside auditor. 
Nevertheless, as Vanasco (1994: 15) pointed out: "The acceptance of the charter by the 
audit committee is paramount in the audit function. " He mentioned as well (1994: 16) 
that: 
The importance of such acceptance by the audit committee is reiterated twice in 
the Standards for Professional Practice of Internal Auditors. In the General 
Standard 110, the director of internal auditing is charged to seek approval of the 
charter by management as well as acceptance by the board since independence is 
enhanced when the director seeks such approval. 
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As mentioned above, the charter could also enable audit committees to be effective. 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993: 45); Porter and Gendall (1998: 67) suggest that the 
effectiveness of audit committees could be improved if governing bodies ensure that: 
(1) The objectives and responsibilities of their entity's audit committee are clearly 
defined in a written statement; 
(2) All relevant parties routinely receive the minutes of audit committee 
meetings; and 
(3) Information about the existence, membership and functions of the audit 
committee is disclosed in their entity's annual report. 
Moreover, Arthur Andersen (1994: 8) noted that it is deemed extremely important that 
audit committees have unrestricted access to all relevant internal and external 
information to fulfil their oversight responsibilities. "For audit committees, the most 
fundamental key factor for success is the ability to get all relevant information and to 
get it voluntarily. " The charter can define this right and authority. 
Bean (1999) claimed that the charter also served as a script for the committee members 
when they questioned management, the external and internal auditors. The audit 
committee may find a record of the deliberations leading to the final document helpful, 
especially if disagreements about interpretation arise. In addition, Rittenberg and Nair 
(1994) maintained that the charter should be developed by outside directors, and each 
company should develop a charter suitable for its circumstances. 
It should be noted that, Marsh and Powell (1989: 56-57) also Davidson and Ebersole 
(2000: 41) suggested an audit committee charter contained the authority of an audit 
committee and the responsibilities in financial reporting, corporate governance and 
internal control. 
However, the new rules in the United States required the board of directors of 
companies to adopt a charter by June 14,2000 and publish it as an appendix to the 
proxy statements relating to votes of shareholders occurring after December 15,2000. 
If a charter is not adopted, that must also be disclosed in the proxy statement. The 
charter should be included as an appendix in the proxy at least once every three years 
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(Verschoor, 2000: 36; Borelli, 2001: 41). Also, Woodlock and Claypool (2001: 27) 
mentioned that audit committees of publicly traded companies will be required: 
to include within the annual proxy a statement of whether, based on its review 
and discussions of the audited financial statements with management and its 
discussions of certain matters with the external auditor, the committee 
recommended that the company's financial statements be included within the 
Annual Report for the most recent fiscal year. 
This disclosure will appear over the printed names of each member of the audit 
committee (Woodlock and Claypool, 2001: 27). Interestingly, Bull and Sharp (1989) 
during their interviews with some audit committee members, found that some 
members seem to feel a charter is unnecessary. 
4-4-3-2 The required qualifications for audit committees 
Audit committees need other resources in the form of qualified, experienced, and 
knowledgeable directors. Members should be willing and able to challenge 
management, to understand the business and its risks, and to devote the time to 
understand the committee and audit committee issues (Rittenberg and Nair, 1994). 
In 1993 the Institute of Internal Auditors released a report, "Improving the Audit 
Committee Performance: What Works Best. " This report cited the expertise of the 
audit committee; in particular the committee's background information and training as 
the most important determinant of audit committee effectiveness (Hurtt et al, 1999: 
121). 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999: 1081) recommends listed companies to have an 
audit committee comprised of a minimum of three directors, each of whom is 
financially literate (accounting and/ or related financial expertise - where "expertise" 
signifies past employment experience in finance or accounting requisite professional 
certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which 
results in the individual's financial sophistication, including being or having been a 
CEO or other senior office with financial oversight responsibilities). The Sarbanes- 
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Oxley Act required US companies to disclose whether, and if not - why not, the audit 
committee includes at least 1 financial expert, who has (Seaman, 2003: 15): 
" Understanding of GAAP; 
" Preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally comparable issuers; 
" Application of principles in connection with estimates, accruals, and reserves; 
" Experience with internal accounting controls; and 
" Understanding of audit committee functions. 
DeZoort (1998) found that member experience in auditing and internal controls had a 
positive effect on member performance on internal control evaluation tasks. 
The audit committee should also consider training and education programmes to 
ensure that its membership has the proper background and knowledge base and stays 
current as to relevant developments in accounting and finance. The Cadbury 
Committee (1992, Appendix 4, Para 6) recommends: "Audit committees will be as 
good as the people on them: effectiveness depends crucially on a strong, independent 
chairman who has the confidence of the board and of the auditors, and on the quality 
of the non-executive directors". Olson (1999: 1110) noted that the best audit 
committee members spend hours learning about the company and its business. They 
visit facilities, talk with employees, read (publications and analyst reports), and learn 
about the enterprise's major competitors. "In the electronic age, they may even visit 
chat rooms devoted to the company or its industry to see what the buzz is about the 
company. " With this base of knowledge, they are able to make better oversight 
judgement about risk management and financial reporting issues. 
Similarly, Abdolmohammadi and Levy (1992) strongly recommended that audit 
committees have at least one member who is reasonably knowledgeable about auditing 
and financial reporting. Smith (2003: 9) considered that at least one member of the 
audit committee should have significant, recent and relevant financial experience, for 
example as an auditor or a finance director of a listed company. "It is highly desirable 
for this member to have a professional qualification from one of the professional 
accountancy bodies. " Also, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) reported that audit committee 
member diligence was a major component of effective audit committees. 
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Lee and Stone (1997: 102) explained the "diligence" as "Willing to be effective. " 
Moreover, Bull and Sharp (1989: 50) presented the qualities needed for audit 
committee service. These qualities include: 
  Financial statement literacy: an understanding of how business activities 
are reflected in the financial statements. 
  An ability to recognise potential problems through analyses and 
discussions. 
  An understanding of the auditing process - internal and external. 
  The disposition to ask probing questions and get answers to them. 
  Skill in communicating with managers, statement prepares and auditors. 
  Natural curiosity. 
Davidson and Ebersole (2000: 43) pointed out that the audit committee's 
understanding of accounting matters and internal controls over financial reporting (its 
financial literacy) is strongly related to effectiveness. Hurtt et al (1999: 124) described 
financial literacy for audit committee members consists of "the ability to read and 
understand fundamental financial statements, including a company's balance sheet, 
income statement, and cash flows statement. " The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) 
suggests that members of the audit committee with limited familiarity with finance can 
achieve financial literacy through company-sponsored training programmes. This level 
of literacy can also be achieved through completion of a basic financial accounting 
course such as those taught in most MBA programmes at colleges and universities 
(Hurtt et al, 1999). 
Woodlock et al (2001: 23) presented six required steps to ensure financial literacy of 
audit committee members. These steps include: 
1. Exposing members of the audit committee to your industry and business. 
2. Conducting audit committee orientations. 
3. Encouraging audit committee members to make site visits. 
4. Providing audit committee members with opportunities to learn about the 
significant accounting practices in the company's industry. 
5. Providing audit committee members with opportunities to learn about 
significant financial trends in the industry. 
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6. Briefing audit committee members on new technology and the impact 
technology will have on the financial systems the company now operates. 
In searching for directors to meet these qualifications, corporations might consider 
(Bull and Sharp, 1989: 50; Rezaee, 1997: 39): 
  CEOs, chief operating officers, chief financial officers and chief internal 
auditors of other corporations. 
  Retired CPA firm partners. 
  Academics with relevant backgrounds. 
  Managers of autonomous divisions of large corporations. 
Burke et al (1996) concentrated on the committee chairperson who should be selected 
on the basis of his or her business, financial, leadership, and communication skills. 
They demonstrated that the selection of the chairperson is particularly important 
because "the activities and much of the dialogue of the audit committee are driven by 
the chairperson (p. 78)". 
Lee and Stone (1997) added that audit committee effectiveness is associated with an 
appropriate matching of committee responsibilities and member experiences. 
Likewise, DeZoort and Salterio (2001: 33); and Raghunandan et al. (2001: 107) noted 
that Kirk Panel (1994) stated: "The effectiveness of audit committees is affected, first 
and foremost, by the expertise of members of audit committees in the areas of 
accounting and financial reporting, internal controls, and auditing". Raghunandan 
(2001: 108) claimed as well that the SEC expresses its belief that having at least one 
member with an accounting or finance background will "enhance the effectiveness of 
the audit committee in carrying out its financial oversight responsibilities". Since the 
SEC's rule makes corporate governance oversight more arduous, audit committee 
members will have to commit more time on the job to meet this requirement (Investor 
Relations Business, 2001). 
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However, Verschoor (1993: 61) noted that the GAO survey I expressed concern bank 
audit committee members' expertise might not always match their oversight 
responsibilities; 35% of the audit committees reported no committee members had 
auditing or accounting expertise. As well, the results of Windram and Song (2000) 
study found that half of the audit committees do not have a directors with a relevant 
qualifications in UK companies. Also, Raghunandan et al. (2001) from responses of 
114 chief internal auditors of US public manufacturing companies indicate that only 
68% of the responding companies had at least one member with an accounting or 
finance background. These results provide an empirical basis for the anxiety expressed 
by the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) about the need to strengthen the qualifications 
of audit committee members. 
Many authors mentioned that audit committee members - just as auditors are to 
perform their duties with "healthy scepticism"- should not accept everything at face 
value. The sceptical, the inquisitive, and the analytical from among the ranks of the 
board should be pressed into service on this committee, to ask managers thought- 
provoking questions [see for example: Luecke and Westfall (1990: 14); Olson (1999: 
1111)]. In addition, Marsh and Powell (1989: 56) noted, "If an audit committee does 
not have some degree of healthy scepticism in looking at management's reports, it is 
simply failing to meet its responsibilities. That is what oversight is all about. " 
44-3-3 Regular meetings for audit committees 
To be effective, the audit committee should devote the time necessary to carrying out 
their responsibilities. Verschoor (1989; 1992) noted that the number of committee 
meetings held per year and their duration are also a principal measures of the rigour 
with which an audit committee has pursued its responsibilities and this is recognised as 
principal measures of effectiveness. Windram and Song (2000) indicate that audit 
committee's financial literacy and meeting frequency are very significant determinants 
of its effectiveness in financial reporting. Rezaee and Farmer (1994: 13) claimed that 
the number of meetings should be determined in light of the need for the following: 
1 The General Accounting Office exists to support the Congress in meeting its Constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal 
government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds, evaluates federal 
programs and activities, and provides analyses, options, recommendations, and other assistance to help 
the Congress make effective oversight, policy, and funding decisions (source: http: //www. gao. gov/). 
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  Review of quarterly and annual financial statements; 
  Review of audit plans of the external and internal auditors; 
  Review of the results of examinations and recommendations by external and 
internal auditors; and 
  Report on any significant matters falling within the responsibilities of the 
audit committee, including reports on the company's compliance with its 
code of conduct or any significant litigation. 
Rittenberg and Nair (1994) suggest that enough time should be scheduled at each 
meeting to deal with all important issues. Additionally, audit committee members must 
take the time to understand the issues and prepare for meetings. Hence, the Public 
Oversight Board (POB 1993) went on to acknowledge that member time constraints 
and background inherently limits audit committee effectiveness (quoted in DeZoort 
and Salterio, 2001: 33). 
Cadbury Committee (1992, Appendix 4, Para 6) mentioned that "the audit committee 
should normally meet at least twice a year", "the head of internal audit should 
normally attend audit committee meetings, as should the finance director. Other board 
members should also have the right to attend". 
The Treadway Commission (1987) also recommends that audit committees meet at 
least four times a year. As well, The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) 
Report noted that many financial frauds occurred in companies where audit 
committees met infrequently (quoted in Turner, 2001). 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, ICAEW (1997, 
Appendix C: 37) suggests specimen calendar and agendas for an audit committee's 
meetings. This assumes a December year-end for reporting purposes and an internal 
audit department which has co-ordinated its work cycle with that of the external 
auditors. It is also assumed that three full meetings plus an away day constitute an 
appropriate starting point for the company's needs (See appendix 2). 
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Abdolmohammadi and Levy (1992: 56) suggest an example for audit committee's 
meetings in regard to external auditors, the audit committee may have a typical four- 
meeting schedule per year: one meeting in the middle of July to plan the audit, one 
meeting in the middle of November to review the interim report on the status of the 
audit, one meeting at the beginning of February to review the earnings release and the 
auditors' report, and a final meeting in the middle of April to review management 
responses to auditors recommendations. 
However, as Menon and Williams (1994) noted although the majority of firms 
voluntarily formed audit committees, many of these firms did not appear to rely on 
them. In addition, fifty-seven audit committees from the whole sample, which was 148 
- about 38.5% - randomly selected over-the-counter (OTC) in 1986-1987, did not meet 
at all or met only once during the year studied. Also, Klein (1998a) found from her 
sample, which consists of 771 US firms over a two-year period, that only 38.9 % of 
audit committees meet four or more times per year. Moreover, consistent with a survey 
conducted in 1991 and reported in Collier and Gregory (1999), average audit 
committee meeting in the UK is 2-3 times a year. Windram and Song (2000: 17) 
showed that "it falls short of the recommendations of four meetings by Blue Ribbon 
Committee and PricewaterhouseCoopers. " 
4-4-3-4 Training and skill sets 
Audit committee members may need training in order to understand the issues and be 
effective committee members. They need to know the company's operations and 
business. An understanding of the nature of the business would alert them to the issues 
that pose a risk, such as excessive debt, impaired long-lived assets, obsolete inventory, 
or uncollectible receivables (Rittenberg and Nair, 1994). This process also would make 
committee members conscious of where and how judgements are used and where 
exposures in the form of potential losses exist in the company. 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999: 1093) recommended that "The audit committee 
should also consider training and education programs to ensure that its membership 
has the proper background and knowledge base and stays current as to relevant 
developments in accounting and finance". It was also recommended that "training may 
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be conducted by professionals within the company, but the committee should also have 
the ability to engage outside advisors for educational programs". 
Smith (2003) considered that the company should provide an induction programme for 
new audit committee members. Training should also be provided to members of the 
audit committee on an ongoing and timely basis and should include an understanding 
of the principles of and developments in financial reporting and related company law. 
Arthur Andersen (1994: 6) claimed that the committee's knowledge and proficiency 
are enhanced through ongoing training and access to relevant industry and financial 
information and other resources. Such needs include: 
  Orientation for new members; 
" Periodic financial briefing by management; 
  Periodic reports from relevant operating officers which focus on problems, 
risks and issues; and 
  Updates on developments in accounting and financial reporting standards. 
Moreover, Rittenberg and Nair (1994) argued that audit committee members also need 
to understand the internal control structure of the company and should be kept abreast 
of changes in that structure and the implications of those changes on managing the 
risks facing the business. An understanding of control concepts would help the 
committee to ensure that functions independent of management, such as the loan 
review process in a bank, are truly independent. They also concluded that much of this 
training can be provided by the financial management of the company as well as by the 
internal and external auditors. 
However, there is no evidence in the literature regarding the length of time necessary 
to become confident and begin to perform effectively, Abdolmohammadi and Levy 
(1992) inferred from the comment by the 69 audit committee members respondent that 
it may take some 3-5 years. One implication of their conclusion is that rotation of audit 
committee members should be avoided at least for the first five years on the 
assignment. 
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4-5 OBSTACLES TO AUDIT COMMITTEES' EFFECTIVENESS 
There are in the literature many arguments about the limitations to audit committees 
effectiveness. Cadbury Committee (1992, Appendix 4, Para 5) said: 
The effectiveness of audit committees will be reduced, however, if they act as a 
barrier between the auditors and the executive directors on the main board, or if 
they encourage the main board to abdicate its responsibilities in the audit area, so 
weakening the board's collective responsibility for reviewing and approving the 
financial statements. They will also fall short of their potential if they lack the 
understanding to deal adequately with the auditing or accounting matters that 
they are likely to face, if they remain under the influence of any dominant 
personality on the main board, or if they simply get in the way and obstruct 
executive management, and stifle entrepreneurial skills. 
Moreover, Olson (1999: 1102) claimed that the risk of overloading committee 
members with too many responsibilities can have three adverse impact: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
committee effort and energy may be dissipated in so many directions that 
the committee becomes ever more busy but ever less effective; 
good directors may decline to take on the burden of audit committee 
service; and 
based on some unfortunate case law developments, those who do serve may 
face increased risk of personal liability or at least a greater chance than 
other directors of being named as defendants in shareholder lawsuits. 
Also, Olson (1999: 1108) noted that the best audit committees do not take on too many 
responsibilities. In order to be effective overseers of the financial function and focus 
on "big picture" risk issues, good audit committees do not become buried in reams of 
reports and detailed review of disclosure documents. Similarly, Braiotta (1986) 
suggested that audit committees could busy themselves with an endless number of 
activities in light of their evolving scope of responsibilities, it is essential that the 
board of directors monitor any additional charges to the committee. Such a review will 
enable the board to maximize the operational effectiveness of the audit committee. 
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Rittenberg and Nair (1994), Vanasco (1994) and Braiotta (1999) pointed out that the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) has performed a number of studies relating to failed 
financial institutions. In October 1991, GAO issued a report entitled Audit Committee: 
Legislation Needed to Strengthen Bank Oversight that analyses the extent audit 
committees of large banks (assets of $ 10 billion or more). Their findings were: many 
of the causes of the failures were related to numerous internal control breakdowns, 
which contributed to improper extensions of credit, outright fraud, and insider loan 
dealings. The criticism touched on areas such as independence, expertise needed to 
perform their tasks, and the lack of information needed to perform independent 
assessments of key bank operations. In the GAO's view, members of bank audit 
committees who have large customer relationships with their respective banks may 
lack independence and may have impaired objectivity. The GAO reported that many 
bank audit committee members had customer relationships with the bank. More than 
half of the audit committee chairs interviewed indicated that their committees lacked 
expertise in some specific areas where they had oversight responsibilities. However, 
these risks demonstrate the significance of independence, expertise, training, 
qualifications, and all attributes that have been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
4-6 SUMMARY 
In the course of surveying the research of the word "effectiveness", it was discovered 
that effectiveness is an elusive concept that can be approached through several models, 
none of which is appropriate in all circumstances. However, many arguments in the 
literature recommended that the investigator should determine which type of 
effectiveness is of the greatest concern to the constituency or constituencies to which 
he or she must report. For the purpose of this research, effectiveness of audit 
committees has been used as "carrying out or fulfilling its specific oversight 
responsibilities or duties. " 
Then, the chapter commenced with the activities of effective audit committees which 
were: financial reporting process; internal auditors responsibilities; annual audit and 
the external auditors; and corporate governance responsibilities. The chapter outlined 
the determinants of audit committee effectiveness. These attributes may be abridged 
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as: 1- independence from management: a- Selection, and nomination process; b- 
Independence in assessing fair presentation; and c- Independence in setting the agenda 
2- access to information: a- Issues to be discussed with the external auditor; b- Issues 
to be discussed with the internal auditor; and c- Issues to be discussed with other 
company personnel 3- resources: a- Audit committee charter; b- The required 
qualifications for audit committees; c- Regular meetings for audit committees; and d- 
Training and skill sets. Finally, this chapter discussed the obstacles to audit 
committees' effectiveness such as the lack in independence, expertise, training, and 
qualifications that might pose a threat to the effectiveness of audit committees. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5-1 INTRODUCTION 
Conducting a research project requires the development of an appropriate research 
approach and the adoption of data collection techniques. The quality of the collected 
data determines the quality of the findings of the research (Gill and Johnson, 1997). 
The use of a particular methodology for a research project depends on the scope, 
purpose, target population, etc. of the study as well as the resources available to the 
researcher. It is essential, therefore, that in order to achieve their objectives, 
researchers adopt the right methodology to achieve the research objectives; and select 
the right data collection techniques through which they can collect the required data 
within their available resources (Gill and Johnson, 1997). 
The following section will review relevant literature about research methodologies. 
The meaning and characteristics of the approach and data collection techniques 
adopted in this research (the questionnaire) will also be discussed. In addition, the 
section will explain how the interviews were conducted and how the samples were 
chosen. 
5-2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The term "paradigm" refers to the progress of scientific practice based on people's 
philosophies and assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge; in other 
words "how research should be conducted" (Hussey and Hussey, 1997: 47). Hussey 
and Hussey (1997) argue that there are two main research paradigms or philosophies. 
Although there is considerable blurring, the two paradigms can be labelled positivist 
and phenomenological. Therefore, the type of methodology that has been chosen 
should reflect the assumption of the research paradigm. 
Research studies are conducted for the purpose of obtaining data that is ordinarily not 
available from other sources regarding a specific area of knowledge. Obtaining 
empirical data can be done using many different techniques. The most common ones 
include interviews, observations, case studies and questionnaires. The method selected 
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depends on the goals and objectives of the research, the sample of respondents 
involved, the time set for the completion of the study, and monetary considerations 
(Al-Assaf, 1995). 
Table 5-1 summarises some of the common terns for the main research paradigms 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997: 47): 
Table 5-1 Alternative terns for the main research paradigms 
Positivistic paradigm 
Quantitative 
Objectivist 
Scientific 
Experimentalist 
Traditionalist 
Phenomenological paradigm 
Qua tat l\'C 
Subjectivist 
Humanistic 
Interpretivist 
5-2-1 Data collection methods 
In social science, there are two main types of empirical research: the quantitative 
approach and the qualitative approach. Because quantitative research is deductive, 
researchers deal directly with operationalisation, the manipulation of empirical 
variables, prediction, and testing. Quantitative research therefore places great emphasis 
on methodology, procedure, and statistical measures of validity. Consequently, 
quantitative research reports should be organised to show a clear progression from 
theory to operationalisation of concepts; from choice of methodology and procedures 
to the data collected; from statistical tests to findings and ultimately conclusions 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
As the names suggest, qualitative data is concerned with qualities and non-numerical 
characteristics, whilst quantitative data is all data that is collected in numerical form 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Qualitative research is inductive in nature. Qualitative 
researchers use field research methods, primary case studies and participant 
observation within natural settings. The report will present much descriptive material. 
The report should also show how the observations prompted the researcher to analyse 
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and isolate variables (induction) and how, in turn, these variables may be developed 
into a theory (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
One of the main advantages of a quantitative approach to data collection is the relative 
ease and speed with which the research can be conducted. In a descriptive study, the 
use of quantitative methods can give a spurious objectivity to information, which can 
lead to reductionist tendencies. This means that the richness of the data and its 
contextual implications may be lost, thus contributing to a narrower and less real 
interpretation of phenomena (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Qualitative data collection methods can be expensive and time consuming, although it 
can be argued that qualitative data in business research provides a more `real' basis for 
analysis and interpretation. Moreover, a qualitative approach presents problems 
relating to rigour and subjectivity (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Many researchers such as Sekaran (1992) and Churchill and Iacobucci (2002) point out 
that quantitative research, while being very useful, is greatly improved when used in 
conjunction with other qualitative research methods such as case studies, interviews 
and observation. When qualitative and quantitative research approaches are combined, 
we have what is called triangulation in action (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 
1996; Easterby-Smith et al 2002). Triangulation is used by researchers to improve the 
accuracy of their judgement by collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same 
phenomenon. Triangulation allows researchers to be more confident of their results 
(Morgan, 1998). 
According to Morgan (1998), the main purpose of combining qualitative research with 
quantitative research is to achieve one or more of the following: 
(1) to arrive at a better understanding of the topic being studied; 
(2) to design a research methodology; 
(3) to learn from specialists about certain issues related to the subject matter; 
(4) to become acquainted with problem areas or constraints; 
(5) to assess the feasibility of the topic being researched. 
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5-2-2 Types of research methodology 
As discussed earlier, there are a number of different types of research methodology, 
some of which lend themselves more to one paradigm than another. However, some 
methodologies can be used under either a positivistic or a phenomenological paradigm, 
depending on the assumptions of the researcher (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Table 5-2 
below presents the main methodologies used in business research. However, it should 
be noted that these two paradigms are near the extremities of the continuum; each 
methodology can be moved some way along the continuum according to the individual 
researcher's assumptions (Hussey and Hussey, 1997: 59). 
Table 5-2 Methodological assumptions of the main paradigms 
Positivistic Approach to social sciences Phenomenological 
Associated methodologies Associated methodologies 
Cross-sectional studies Action research 
Experimental studies Case studies 
Longitudinal studies Ethnography 
Surveys Feminist perspective 
Grounded theory 
Hermeneutics 
Participative enquiry 
5-3 THE RESEARCH APPROACH IN THIS STUDY 
Surveys are often conducted simply because it is the only way to get the information 
needed. Individuals or organisations usually sponsor surveys for one of three basic 
reasons (Alreck and Settle, 1995): 
(1) They want to influence or persuade some audience; 
(2) They want to create or modify a product or service they provide for a particular 
public; 
(3) They want to understand or predict human behaviour or conditions because it is 
the focus of their academic or professional work. 
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Hussey and Hussey (1997) pointed out that "a survey is a positivistic methodology 
whereby a sample of subjects is drawn from a population and studied to make 
inferences about the population. Having decided on a sample, it is necessary to decide 
on how to ask the survey questions. The alternatives are face-to-face or telephone 
interviews or questionnaires. " This study employed both qualitative and quantitative 
survey methods. With these particular methods it is possible to systematically collect 
data from a large number of individuals across different organisations. 
Since the current research made use of questionnaires and interviews, it is thus 
important to note some of the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. 
5-3-1 The questionnaire 
The questionnaire is a technique for collecting data. It is . 
the most frequently used 
method in the social science field (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). It is a highly structured 
method of collecting specific information as a response to highly directed questions. It 
is simply a list of questions that take the form of "close" (fixed alternatives) and 
"open-ended" choices. Questionnaires tend to be used to explore attitudes and opinions 
about certain issues, objectives and situations. The questionnaire also has other 
functions such as measurement of awareness, knowledge, and behaviour (Al-Assaf, 
1995). 
Questionnaires are a popular method for collecting data. A questionnaire survey is 
cheaper and less time-consuming than conducting interviews, and very large samples 
can easily be taken. Many researchers such as Al-Assaf (1995); Oppenheim (2000) 
pointed out that a questionnaire has the advantages of increasing the generalisation of 
data while at the same time giving the respondents freedom to express their points of 
view. Among its other advantages is that the questionnaire is relatively inexpensive 
and a relatively unskilled person can administer it; it can also be administered in 
person or by email; and it generally offers the anonymity that may lead respondents to 
be more open and truthful (Al-Assaf, 1995; Matthews, 2002). 
Questionnaires are associated with both positivistic and phenomenological 
methodologies. Under a positivistic paradigm questionnaires can be used for large- 
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scale surveys. A positivistic approach suggests that closed questions should be used, 
whereas a phenomenological approach suggests open-ended questions. Consequently, 
open-ended questions do not lend themselves to large-scale surveys (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997). 
In the case of a questionnaire, the researcher must be familiar with the guidelines for 
its preparation and with good practice in this field. Oppenheim (2000) indicated that 
the main factor in questionnaire design is clarity, and that complex and confused 
wording must be avoided. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that a pilot study should 
be conducted to establish that the proposed questionnaire is intelligible and clear to 
members of the target population. Also, the researcher must ensure that the 
questionnaire is unambiguous, reliable and valid for the purpose for which it is to be 
used (Oppenheim, 2000; Easterby-Smith et al 2002). 
Open-ended questions allow people to give answers in their own words, like an essay 
examination question (Weisberg et al, 1996; Peterson, 2000). Open questions offer the 
advantages that the respondents are able to give their opinions as precisely as possible 
in their own words. Also, academic researchers, who can take years to analyse 
interview data, use open-ended questions more often, but they can be difficult to 
analyse. 
Dillman (1978) claimed that open-ended questions are likely to be used in two 
distinctly different situations. One is a situation in which respondents can express 
themselves freely. The other common use is to elicit a precise piece of information that 
respondents can recall without difficulty when there are a very large number of 
possible answers and listing all of them would increase the difficulty of answering. 
In a questionnaire survey, open questions may deter busy respondents from replying to 
the questionnaire. Closed-ended questions offer a series of alternative answers among 
which the respondent must choose, like a multiple-choice examination question 
(Weisberg et al, 1996). Closed questions are very convenient for collecting factual data 
and are usually easy to analyse, since the range of potential answers is limited. It is 
also easy and inexpensive to work with the resulting data. If the closed-ended format is 
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chosen, however, care must be taken in writing the answer choices so that all possible 
opinions are included and none of the categories overlap (Weisberg et al, 1996). 
Dillman (1978) also pointed out that questions of the closed-ended type are often used 
to establish priorities among issues and decide among alternative policies. Similarly, 
closed-ended questions are indispensable for exploratory studies in which the 
researcher's main purpose is to find the most salient aspects of a topic, perhaps in 
preparation for developing closed-ended questions for a later survey. However, unless 
the researcher's knowledge of the subject allows meaningful answer choices to be 
stated, useful results cannot be obtained. Perhaps the most frequent criticism is that the 
preferred options of all respondents are not stated (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Alreck and Settle (1995) suggest that mail questionnaires with a return rate of about 
10% are often considered normal. In Saudi Arabia where this study was conducted, a 
response rate of 15% is considered normal (Al-Turki, 2002). This low response rate 
can be attributed to the following reasons: 
1) Researcher's lack of understanding of the local culture; 
2) Researcher's lack of good contacts in the target organisations; 
3) Wrong timing (for example, Summer and official holidays) of the survey. 
Many studies, for example Al-Assaf (1995); Oppenheim (2000); Al-Turki (2002), have 
shown that those who are better educated and more interested in the topic tend to 
answer mail surveys. In order to increase the response rate, researchers, such as Alreck 
and Settle (1995) suggest using combinations of different techniques among which are 
the following: 
Questionnaire length: Researchers should be aware that long questionnaires 
discourage the target respondents from completing the instrument and consequently it 
is either not fully completed or not returned at all. In both cases, the study's validity 
will be seriously jeopardized. Therefore, researchers should try to make their 
questionnaires as short and concise as possible. 
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The survey sponsorship: If the study is sponsored by recognised organisations, 
respondents are more likely to be motivated to complete and return the instrument. 
This study was sponsored by Umm Al-Qura University, which is one of the leading 
universities in Saudi Arabia. The researcher was supplied with an official letter from 
this respected institution of learning confirming its sponsorship of this study and 
encouraging the target organisations to participate and complete the accompanying 
questionnaire. 
Follow-up efforts: This technique is one of the most effective ways to increase the 
response rate. It is used either to check if the respondents received the instrument or to 
remind them to complete and return it. In recent years, researchers have greatly 
improved the response rate to data collection in mail surveys by applying a technique 
called the Total Design Method (TDM) (Dillman, 1978,2000); and (Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
The follow-up technique is to send a reminder letter or a postcard to respondents who 
have not replied within two weeks (or more) of the first mailing. A second follow-up 
letter with a new questionnaire and a return envelope would be sent to the respondents 
at the end of the third week (or more) of the original mailing if no reply is received. A 
third follow-up letter including a questionnaire must then be sent registered by mail to 
all of the organisations that have not replied by the end of week seven of the original 
mailing. 
The present researcher carried out field visits and used telephone, fax and email 
communications to contact most of the sample organisations, which did not reply 
within 3-5 weeks of the original mailing. This technique was very useful because over 
60% of the total number of responses was gathered using this follow-up method. 
Cover letter: A cover letter is an important factor that can increase the response rate 
because it tells the target respondents about the purpose of the study, its importance 
and its sponsors. The cover letter also assures the respondents of the confidentiality of 
their answers and that the information provided will be used for research purposes only 
(Al-Assaf, 1995). The present researcher obtained and used a letter that fulfilled the 
above suggestions to accompany the questionnaire. Other methods used by researchers 
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to increase the response rates include enclosing self addressed prepaid envelops and 
the use of motivating incentives such as sending a copy of the research's results as 
requested. 
The questionnaire (close-ended) was adopted as the main instrument (behind some 
interviews) to collect data in Saudi Arabia. The reasons for using a questionnaire in 
this research which are also consistent with the views of Foddy (1999) and Oppenheim 
(2000) are: 
1- It is the most common method of data collection in survey research because it 
assures the anonymity of respondents and enables them to respond more freely 
and at their convenience. This has a positive effect on the credibility of the 
research since the data gathered is believed to be representative of the 
respondents' knowledge of the subject; 
2- It is suitable for an individual researcher who has limited resources in terms of 
time and financial resources; 
3- It can be distributed to large numbers of respondents and a wider range of 
respondents gives greater credibility to the data collected. 
5-3-1-1 Procedures of the questionnaire survey 
During the planning stage of this study, the first problem that came to light was the 
fact that there were very few research studies and little information about audit 
committees in Saudi corporations. This lack of research makes the effectiveness of 
audit committees in Saudi Arabia, the subject of this thesis, a grey area. Therefore, it 
was felt that the questionnaire method would generate far more data than any other 
method while at the same time minimizing the time and efforts required of the 
researcher and the respondents. 
This method is generally found to be the best technique to collect data from a large 
group of respondents in a short time and provides the opportunity for the respondents 
to give frank and precise answers. 
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In this study, audit committee members, internal and external auditors were the key 
informants because they were considered as having the necessary responsibility and 
closing from their current practices. 
5-3-1-1-1 Questionnaire design 
Conducting a questionnaire survey is the process of translating concepts into 
measurable variables (Saunders et al, 1997). The questionnaire was designed and 
developed by the researcher after a review of prior studies in the same field. The aim 
of the questionnaire was to collect the data necessary to evaluate the audit committee's 
effectiveness by comparison the actual practice with best practice which have been 
adopted according to the previous research and publishing reports by the governmental 
and professional bodies. 
The questionnaire was designed to be closed-ended and specific enough to reveal 
answers to the instrument's questions, yet general enough to allow respondents not to 
reveal any sensitive information. A close-ended question as mentioned earlier offers a 
selection of answers from which the respondent is asked to select one. Other 
researchers (Alreck and Settle, 1995; Oppenheim, 2000) found this method acceptable 
for collecting data on causes and effects in social studies. 
All questions in this instrument were constructed according to the Five-Point Likert 
Scale with a value of 1 indicating that the respondent strongly disagrees with that 
factor and the highest number 5 indicating that the respondent strongly agrees with that 
factor in the actual practice in his corporation. The Five-Point Likert Scale has been 
used in this instrument in preference of the Seven-Point Likert Scale since the 
participants in Arabic countries seem to be uncomfortable with a complex scale such 
as six or seven point scale. This point was noted after the researcher discussions with 
Academics in Saudi Arabia during the pilot study. 
Before translating the instrument to the Arabic language, the researcher discussed its 
questions with Dave Coates, a statistician from the Business School at Loughborough 
University, for their suitability to test the research hypotheses. The questionnaire was 
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then translated, pilot tested, edited and coded for the purpose of computer processing 
in the later stage of analysis. 
The purpose of the Arabic version of the questionnaire was to permit respondents with 
little or no knowledge of English to participate in the survey. This was a very 
important stage in this study since any mistakes in translation could change the 
meaning and context of the questionnaire. The translation was then checked and 
reviewed by a specialist in Arabic language, an external auditor, and an internal 
auditor. The purpose of the review was to correct any grammatical errors and any 
mistakes in usage of accounting or auditing terms. After minor corrections had been 
made, the questionnaire was ready for pilot testing. 
5-3-1-1-2 The pilot study (testing the instrument) 
Social science researchers emphasise the importance of conducting a pilot study to 
establish that the proposed questionnaire is understandable and clear to the members of 
the target population. As Salant and Dillman (1994: 120) mentioned that pre-testing a 
questionnaire is like test-driving so, "Test-driving" a questionnaire is time-consuming 
but absolutely essential. Similarly Alreck and Settle (1995: 178) noted that even well 
trained and highly experienced researchers find some changes that will improve the 
performance of the questionnaire by conducting a pilot study. And sometimes the pre- 
testing of the questionnaire will reveal very serious errors, oversights, or problems that 
would have spelled disaster if they had not been detected and corrected before going 
into the field or the mail. As well, Stebbins (2001: 29) claimed that "the rise of 
quantitative research brought with it the need to pre-test measuring instruments and 
conduct pilot studies to iron out kink in procedures and sharpen precision so the main 
study could proceed as flawlessly as possible. " 
The revised questionnaires were then sent to eight academics in Saudi Universities 
with an interest in auditing, five internal auditors, seven external auditors, three audit 
committee members in Saudi corporations and seven colleagues who are studying 
Ph. D. in accountancy in Saudi Arabia and in the UK. The aim of this stage is to assess 
whether the research instrument is valid for the task or not. As Hussey and Hussey 
(1997) mentioned that validity is the extent to which the research findings accurately 
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represent what is really happening in the situation. An effect or test is valid if it 
demonstrates or measures what the researcher thinks or claims it does. In other words, 
in validity assessment, the basic question that we try to answer is: Are we in fact 
measuring what we think we are measuring? ' (Diamantopoulos and Schlegclmilch, 
2000: 34). In addition, the other objective of piloting is to detect the validity and 
reliability of the questionnaire. According to Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 
(2000: 34), a measure that is valid is also reliable but the reverse is not necessarily 
true. 
All of the piloting samples had a covering letter explaining the nature, and objectives 
of research. The reviewers were requested to note their observations, and then make 
recommendations to the questionnaire and comment on the ways to develop it as well 
as making suggestions that could facilitate the analysis of data. 
In all, thirty questionnaires were sent out of which twenty-three were returned. Table 
5-3 below indicates the response rate of the pilot study that was been conducted before 
the main survey study. 
Table 5-3 Pilot study response rate 
Piloting parties Sent Response Response rate 
Academics 8 6 75% 
Audit committee members 3 2 67% 
Internal auditors 5 4 80% 
External auditors 7 5 71% 
PhDs students 7 6 86% 
From the table above, six responses were received out of the eight questionnaires from 
Saudi academics. The quality of the responses is in the diversity of the background of 
the respondents for instance one is an editor of an accounting journal, another is the 
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director of the Saudi Accounting Association (SAA), and finally one is the also the 
head of department of accounting at the King Abdulaziz University. 
Also, four questionnaires were returned from internal auditors in Saudi corporations 
and five questionnaires from external auditors. Finally, two questionnaires were 
returned from the audit committee members while six of the researcher's colleagues 
returned theirs. In addition to the above, two specialists in statistics in Saudi Arabia 
received and returned the questionnaire to check the types of statistical tests that might 
be done for interpretation and analysis and their suggestions and comments are hereby 
acknowledged. 
It should be noted that the researcher received many useful suggestions from all the 
parties who took part in the pilot study. Some of these corrections were about 
rephrasing the words in some of the statements while others were suggestions about 
dividing the statements in the questionnaire into appropriate groups to facilitate 
interpretations and analysis. 
5-3-1-1-3 Questionnaire structure 
The questionnaire was divided into six parts followed by many short demographic 
(general) questions in order to provide sufficient motivation for the respondents to 
complete and to reduce the possibility of boredom which might induce the respondent 
to give up; thus it was designed to give an impression of answering short sections, 
rather than a long questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was also designed to ensure that respondents followed precise and 
specified instructions. The most important instruction for the external auditors was the 
requirement that the respondents had already audited at least one of Saudi corporation 
to ensure their knowledge for the actual practice in Saudi corporations. This was 
important since the establishment of audit committees is a requirement of the Ministry 
of Commerce only for the corporations in Saudi Arabia. The final version of the 
questionnaire consisted of six parts without the demographic questions containing 39 
questions included the other two statements that evaluate the effectiveness of audit 
committees in general. Also this category will be helpful in the building hypothesis. 
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It should be noted that questions of the questionnaires have been adopted from many 
literature reviews such as: Braiotta (1986,1999); Collier (1992); Kalbers (1992a); 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993,1998); Rezaee and Farmer (1994); Rittenberg and Nair 
(1994); Wolnizer (1995); DeZoort (1997); Lee and Stone (1997); Rezaee (1997); 
Porter and Gendall (1998); Blue Ribbon Committee (1999); Jonas and Young (1999); 
and Ernst and Young (2000). However, the questionnaire has been reviewed and 
slightly changed by the parties of piloting to be compatible with the Saudi 
environment. 
These groups are as follows: 
Part I: Corporate Governance: 
Part one consists of 8 statements (S1-S8), which focus on the duties of audit 
committees in corporate governance. These statements were related to the research 
hypotheses. As mentioned earlier that the establishment of standing audit committees 
of the board of directors in public corporations followed by their assumption of greater 
oversight responsibilities for matters of internal control, financial reporting, and 
auditing has been described by at least one prominent authority as the most significant 
new development affecting corporate governance in this century (Verschoor, 1992). 
G1: Role of audit committees in corporate governance Statement no. 
1- The audit committee reviews and analyses the significant changes (1) 
in accounting policies. 
2- The audit committee reviews the annual financial statements. (2) 
3- The audit committee reviews and analyses the accounting estimates (3) 
and judgements. 
4- The audit committee monitors corrections made by management (4) 
related to reported deficiencies in the independent auditor's management letter. 
5- The audit committee reviews and analyses the adequacy and (5) 
effectiveness of the internal controls of the company. 
6- The audit committee monitors corrections made by management (6) 
related to reported deficiencies reported by the internal auditors. 
7- Employees are encouraged to report incidents of errors or (7) 
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irregularities to the audit committee. 
8- Beyond meeting legal or other regulatory requirements, the audit (8) 
committee serves an important need in this company. 
The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (1): Differences observed in the meat: scales of the participants (audit committee 
members, internal auditors, and external auditors) - with respect to the effectiveness 
of audit committees in corporate governance - are statistically insignificant. 
Part II: The role with the external auditors: 
Part two consists of 5 statements (S9-S13) and focuses on the role of audit committees 
with the external auditors since the audit committee is a valuable instrument for 
initiating direct contact with the independent (external) auditor, participating in the 
selection of the external auditor, and promoting effective communication between the 
independent auditor and corporate directors. 
G2: Role of audit committees with the external auditor * Statement no. 
9- The audit committee reviews and analyses the scope and activities (9) 
of the annual audit by the independent auditors. 
10- The audit committee evaluates the independent auditors' (10) 
performance, including determination of independence. 
11- The audit committee reviews and analyses the results of the annual (11) 
audit by the independent auditors. 
12- The audit committee nominates the independent 
auditors. (12) 
13- The audit committee enhances the independence of the external (13) 
auditors. 
The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (2): Differences observed in the mean scales of the participants with respect to 
the effectiveness of audit committees with the external auditor are statistically 
insignificant. 
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Part III: The role with the internal auditors: 
In this part, five statements (S14-S18) were directed to the respondents to indicate the 
relationship between audit committee members and internal auditors. Internal auditing 
is one of the critical resources of the audit committee in meeting its responsibilities 
(Rezaee and Farmer, 1994; Montondon, 1995). In addition, Apostolou and Strawser 
(1990) pointed out that in fulfilling the expanded oversight responsibilities, the audit 
committee must rely on internal auditors for much of its information concerning 
corporate activities. For this reason, these statements about the role of audit 
committees with internal auditors have been mentioned since it is a very important part 
of their effectiveness. 
G3: Role of audit committees with the internal auditor Statement no. 
14- The audit committee reviews and analyses the scope and (14) 
activities of the internal auditors. 
15- The audit committee reviews the appointment and replacement (15) 
of the director of internal auditing. 
16- The audit committee reviews and analyses the internal audit (16) 
reports and findings. 
17- The audit committee enhances the independence of the internal (17) 
auditors. 
18- The audit committee evaluates the internal auditors' performance. (18) 
The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (3): Differences observed in the mean scales of the participants with respect to 
the effectiveness of audit committees with the internal auditor are statistically 
insignificant. 
Part IV: The authorities of audit committees: 
Part four consisted of six statements (S19-S24). They were designed to obtain 
information about the authorities that audit committees should apply to do their jobs 
effectively. Arthur Andersen (1994: 8) noted that it is deemed extremely important that 
audit committees have unrestricted access to all relevant internal and external 
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information to fulfil their oversight responsibilities. "For audit committees, the most 
fundamental key factor for success is the ability to get all relevant information and to 
get it voluntarily. " The charter can define this right and authority. 
G4: The authorities of audit committees Statement no. 
19- The audit committee has very little authority. (19) 
20- Audit committee has ready access to relevant information. (20) 
21- Audit committee has ready access to all levels of management. (21) 
22- Objectives, responsibilities, and authority of the audit committee are (22) 
clearly defined in a written statement (charter). 
23- Audit committee obtains prompt responses from management. (23) 
24- Non-members attend meetings as required. (24) 
The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (4): Differences observed in the mean scales of the participants with respect to 
the authorities of audit committees are statistically insignificant. 
Part V: The literacy of audit committees: 
This part contained eight statements (S25-S32). In this part of the questionnaire, the 
attempt is to evaluate the literacy (expertise, qualifications, knowledge, and ability) of 
audit committee members because it is a crucial factor to their effectiveness. 
Bull and Sharp (1989: 50) presented the qualities needed for audit committee service. 
These qualities include: Financial statement literacy - an understanding of how 
business activities are reflected in the financial statements; an ability to recognise 
potential problems through analyses and discussions; an understanding of the auditing 
process- internal and external; the disposition to ask probing questions and get answers 
to them; skill in communicating with managers and auditors. Moreover, Windram and 
Song (2000) indicate that audit committee's financial literacy and the frequency of 
meetings are very significant determinants of its effectiveness in financial reporting. 
117 
Chapter Five: Research Methodology Loughborough University 
G5: Personal characteristics, educational and professional qualifications (literacy) 
of audit committees Statement no. 
25- Audit committee members have a sufficient knowledge (25) 
of the entity's business. 
26- Audit committee members are able to bring up and mediate problems. (26) 
27- Audit committee members have a full understanding of the purpose (27) 
and responsibilities of the audit committee. 
28- Audit committee members have knowledge of accounting practice. (28) 
29- Audit committee members have knowledge of auditing practice. (29) 
30- Audit committee members have ability to ask probing questions. (30) 
31- Audit committee members are carefully selected. (31) 
Hence, the null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (5): Differences observed in the mean scales of the participants with respect to 
the literacy of audit committees are statistically insignificant. 
Part VI: The diligence of audit committees: 
Part six consists of 7 statements (S33-S39), which focus on the diligence that audit 
committee members should apply to fulfil their duties successfully. Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1993) reported that audit committee member diligence was a major 
component of audit committee effectiveness. Lee and Stone (1997: 102) explained the 
"diligence" as "Willing to be effective. " It should be noted that the statements number 
33,39 have not followed any of the last groups in the questionnaire since these 
statements seem to be general and it is difficult to classify them into any of the 
previous groups. The aim of asking these two questions is to measure the perceptions 
of participants of the effectiveness of audit committees in general. 
G6: Diligence of audit committee members Statement no. 
32- Audit committee members are independence from management. (32) 
33- Audit committee members have sufficient time to devote to (34) 
committee's affairs. 
34- Agenda and related material are provided to members ahead of meetings. (35) 
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35- Meetings between the audit committee and the independent auditors (36) 
are typified by open and frank dialogue. 
36- The audit committee meets frequently enough. (37) 
37- The audit committee meets long time enough to carry out the mandate (38) 
of the committee. 
The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (6): Differences observed in the mean scales of the participants with respect to 
the diligence of audit committees are statistically insignificant. 
The other two statements Statement no 
38- The audit committee accomplishes very little. (33) 
39- The audit committee is effective. (39) 
It should be noted, that the statements number 33,39 have not followed any of the last 
groups in the questionnaire since these statements seem to be general and it is difficult 
to classify them into any of the previous groups. The rationale behind these two 
questions is to measure the perceptions of participants toward the effectiveness of audit 
committees in general. 
As well, in accordance with established principles in 'designing questionnaires, 
statements no 19 and 33 were worded in an opposite manner to the preceding 
statements. An agreement to these questions would mean the exact opposite and vice 
versa. Therefore in collating the results of the questionnaires, if the respondent chose 
strongly agree, the relevant code is not scale 5, but scale 1. The objective of this way in 
questioning is as Spector (1994: 252) mentioned that one of the ways in which bias can 
be reduced is by using items that are phrased in opposite directions. By varying the 
direction of questioning, bias produced by response tendencies will be minimised. 
Part VII: The respondents' information and characteristics: 
The questions in this part varied across the three versions of questionnaires. The first 
version was designed for the audit committee members and consisted of seven 
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questions which were focused on the respondents' characteristics that were thought 
might influence the effectiveness of audit committees. The first question was to know 
the category of the respondent (audit committee member, internal or external auditor). 
The next couple of questions (2-3) were related to the professional and educational 
qualifications for audit committee members since the resolution of the Commerce 
Ministry required that members should have a good command of financial and 
accounting practices and standards, preferably with appropriate qualifications in this 
field (Ministry of Commerce, 1994). 
The fourth question in this part was about the current job of the audit committee 
member in his corporation. The aims of the question was to investigate whether the 
corporations implement the requirement of the Ministry of Commerce, which 
stipulated that the member should not be one of the executive directors, or handle a 
technical or managerial work even by way of consultation (Ministry of Commerce, 
1994). The questions 5-6 were related to the number of audit committees meeting and 
the duration of such meetings as Verschoor (1989; 1992) noted that the number of 
committee meetings held per year and their duration are also a principal measures of 
the rigour with which an audit committee has pursued its responsibilities and this is 
recognised as a principal measure of effectiveness. Also, Windram and Song (2000) 
indicate that audit committee's meetings frequency is a very significant determinant of 
its effectiveness in financial reporting. 
The last question number 7 related to the number of audit committee members in a 
corporation, which was in response to the resolution of the Ministry of Commerce 
(1994) that required the number of the members should be odd and not less than three. 
The respondents' information characteristics for the second version of the 
questionnaire, which were designed for the internal auditors, consisted of three 
questions. The first question was about whether or not there was a department for 
internal auditing in the corporation. The aim of this question was to ascertain the 
importance of the internal audit function since it is one of the critical resources for the 
audit committee in meeting its responsibilities (Rezaee and Farmer, 1994; Montondon, 
1995). In fulfilling the expanded oversight responsibilities, the audit committee must 
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rely on internal auditors for much of its information concerning corporate activities 
(Apostolou and Strawser, 1990). 
The other two questions were about the professional qualifications and the experience 
of the internal auditors. Rezaee and Farmer (1994) mentioned, that to ensure the 
competence of internal auditors and to enhance the quality of the internal audit 
function, the audit committee should satisfy itself that the internal auditors have 
appropriate qualifications, are sufficiently trained and also have a sufficient 
experience. 
The respondents' information characteristics for the third version, which were sent to 
the external auditors, consisted of three questions. The first one was to ascertain 
whether or not the external auditor audits or audited a Saudi corporation since audit 
committees are compulsory implemented in Saudi corporations according to the 
resolution of the Ministry of Commerce (1994). It was thus necessary to know whether 
the respondent audits or has audited a corporation because this research is interested in 
having an all round perception in respect of the three samples which are related to the 
audit committees. 
For this reason, the researcher made it crystal clear to the respondent in this version 
that he should be sure that he audits or has audited a corporation before completing the 
questionnaire. Also, as mentioned above that the first question in part seven was 
whether the respondent audits or has audited a corporation. Based on this, seven of the 
respondents had not audited a corporation and as a result their questionnaires have 
been removed and not taken into account in this study. 
The other two questions were about the professional qualifications and the experience 
of the external auditors just as was discussed earlier regarding the internal auditors. 
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5-3-1-2 Validity 
Validity and reliability are the two major issues that a researcher must take into 
consideration when he or she uses a data gathering or measurement instrument. The 
importance of validity and reliability has been well documented within the research 
methodology literature. Spector (1994) asserts that one of the most vital steps in 
developing and/or validating a scale is the conceptual task of defining the construct, in 
other words, the construct of interest must be clearly and precisely defined. There are 
different kinds of validity. Generally, however, there are three types of validity of 
measurement that most researchers are concerned with. They are content validity; 
criterion-related validity and construct validity (Churchill and lacobucci, 2002). 
5-3-1-2-1 Content Validity: The content validity of an instrument is the extent to 
which it provides adequate coverage of the topic under study. To evaluate the content 
validity of an instrument researchers must first agree on what elements constitute 
adequate coverage of the problem. The determination of content validity is 
judgemental. The designer may determine the validity through a careful definition of 
the topic of concern, the items to be scaled, and the scales to be used (Sekaran, 1992). 
Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (2000) argue that the procedure for this way is the 
agreement between expert and / or non-expert judges as to the suitability of the 
measure. Also, during the pilot study, the duration taken to complete the questionnaire 
was checked and timed to ensure that it was not too long as to make the participants 
shy away from completing it and answering all the questions. 
The content validity of the instrument of this study was established through the pilot 
study as discussed earlier. During this period, the questionnaire was distributed to eight 
academicians who have an audit bias, five internal auditors, seven external auditors, 
three audit committee members and seven PhD students in accountancy as discussed 
earlier. 
The results showed that the questionnaire covered the important aspects identified 
within the literature review. The results also showed that minor modifications were 
needed before the questionnaire could be finally used in the main study. 
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5-3-1-2-2 Criterion-related Validity: This form of validity reflects the success of 
measure used for some empirical estimating purpose. Researchers may want to predict 
some outcome or estimate the existence of some current behaviour or condition. The 
criteria used may be subjective (does the evidence agree with what a researcher 
believes) as well as objective (does the evidence agree with other findings of the 
researcher) (Churchill and lacobucci, 2002). 
5-3-1-2-3 Construct Validity: This deals with the degree to which the scale represents 
the concept being measured (Tull and Hawkins, 1993). Attitude scales and personality 
tests generally concern concepts that fall into this category. Even though, this 
validation situation is much more difficult, researchers still want assurance that their 
measurement has an acceptable degree of validity. 
The questionnaire used in this study contained clear and direct questions; this was 
reflected from the piloting tests, which showed that the construct validity is acceptable. 
Moreover, using the interviews as supportive data gathering techniques contributed 
positively to the construct validity. Finally, using the Likert scale with its 5 categories 
also contributed to improving the construct validity. 
5-3-1-3 Reliability 
Reliability is concerned with the accuracy and precision of a measurement procedure 
(Sekaran, 1992). It is distinguished from validity in that validity is represented in the 
agreement between two attempts to measure the same trait through maximally different 
methods, whereas reliability is the agreement between two efforts to measure the same 
trait through maximally similar methods (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002: 413), or as 
Oppenheim (2000: 159) described reliability as "consistency. " 
Reliable instruments are refined to the degree that they can be used over and over and 
work well at different times and under different conditions. In general, the researcher 
can improve reliability if external sources of variation are minimised and the 
conditions under which the measurement occurs are standardized. There are three 
common methods of estimating reliability (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996): 
1- the test-retest; 2- the parallel-forms and 3- the split-half. The test-retest method is 
123 
Chapter Five: Research Methodology Loughborough University 
used to administer the instrument to the same group at two different times and to 
compute the correlation in the two sets of scores. The coefficient that the researcher 
obtains is the reliability estimate. With this method, error is defined as anything that 
leads a person to get different scores from the two different measurements (Alreck and 
Settle, 1995; Oppenheim, 2000). 
In the parallel-forms method, the researcher develops two parallel versions of a 
measuring instrument. These two versions are administered to the same group of 
people, and then the two sets of results must be correlated in order to obtain an 
estimate of reliability. 
The split-half method estimates reliability by treating each of two or more parts of a 
measuring instrument as a separate scale. Each of the two parts is treated separately 
and scored accordingly. The two parts are then correlated (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996). 
Another method to test the reliability of the instrument is to use similar questions in 
different parts of the questionnaire. This is called items' internal-consistency reliability 
test. It means, "multiple items, designed to measure the same construct, will 
interrelate with one another" (Spector, 1994). This reliability procedure when run for 
each scale shows how the individual items of that specific scale compete to be 
incorporated in it whilst maintaining an acceptable level of reliability. Churchill and 
Iacobucci (2002) noted that an appropriate way to assess the internal homogeneity of a 
set of items is to look at all the items simultaneously, using coefficient alpha. One 
reason is that coefficient alpha has a direct relationship to the most accepted and 
conceptually appealing measurement model, the domain sampling model. 
The key assumption in the domain sampling model is that all items, if they belong to 
the domain of the concept, have an equal amount of common core. This statement 
implies that the average correlation in each column of the hypothetical matrix is the 
same, and in turn equals the average correlation in the whole matrix. That is, if all the 
items in a measure are drawn from the domain of a single construct, responses to those 
items should be highly intercorrelated. Low inter-item correlations, in contrast, 
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indicate that some items are not drawn from the appropriate domain and are producing 
error and unreliability. 
Coefficient alpha provides a summary measure of the intercorrelations that exist 
among a set of items. Coefficient alpha routinely should be calculated to assess the 
quality of measure. If alpha is low, this outcome suggests that some items do not share 
equally in the common core and should be eliminated (Churchill and lacobucci, 2002). 
The equivalence measure of reliability for this study has been done to focus on the 
internal consistence or internal homogeneity of the set of statements, which formed the 
statements in the questionnaire into groups as mentioned above. Easterby-Smith et al 
(2002); Robinson et al (1994) as quoted in Al-Mushayt (2000) claimed that the 
reliability coefficient in the order of 0.6 is acceptable. 
The results showed in table 5-4 that the reliability coefficient values are accepted and 
seem to be high with the exception of group two among the external auditors 
perceptions which is also accepted. It is interesting to note that group two is about the 
role of audit committees with the external auditors. 
Table 5-4 The Reliability Analysis-Scale (ALPHA) 
Coefficient alpha Coefficient alpha Coefficient alpha 
Groups value value value 
Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
members 
(1) =8 . 
795 I 
. 
8009 
. 
8475 
items 
(2) =5 . 7015 . 7530 . 6057 
items 
(3) =5 . 9567 . 9157 . 9059 
items 
(4) =6 . 8704 . 7265 . 7409 
items 
(5) =7 . 9449 . 
9184 
. 9076 
items 
125 
Chapter Five: Research Methodology Loughborough University 
Coefficient alpha Coefficient alpha Coefficient alpha 
Groups value value value 
Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
members 
(6) 8 . 8612 . 8665 . 
8242 
items 
Ideally, according to Easterby-Smith et al (2002) who mentioned that tests for validity 
and reliability should be made at the pilot stage of an investigation, before the main 
phase of data collection. This could not be done for the coefficient reliability since the 
requirement for minimum questionnaires is 15 as discussed with Dave Coates 
(statistician in the Business School at Loughborough University), which was not 
available during the pilot study. However, the results shown above indicate that the 
correlations between the statements among groups were accepted. 
The reliability for the scale and items of the instrument used in this study were tested 
to ensure that satisfactory internal consistency was present. This was done by 
constructing some of the questions to collect similar answers or to check the 
correctness of the answers given for each question in the instrument as suggested by 
Wentland and Smith (1993). For example, questions 9 and 11 checked the consistency 
of the respondents in their answers. Questions 14 and 18 did the same. Other examples 
are questions 19,21 and 24. Also, questions 33 and 39. Similarly questions 34 and 38 
achieved the same purpose. 
According to Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (2000: 34) who claimed that a 
measure that is valid is also reliable but the reverse is not necessarily true. 
It should be noted that when the completed questionnaires were received, they were 
checked for correct completion. This process of editing and checking was conducted to 
ensure maximum reliability and validity of the data gathered. 
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5-3-2 Semi-structured interviews 
In addition to the previous method for collecting data, some interviews were held with 
a small sample of audit committee members, internal and external auditors. It was 
already decided that the second appropriate method for collecting data in this research 
is an examination through some interviews to explore in details the effectiveness of 
audit committees in Saudi corporations by these cases. The population was six cases in 
every sample (audit committee members, internal and external auditors). These 
samples have been chosen according to the responses that have been received from the 
respondents, which allowed the researcher to contact them to prepare these interviews. 
The style of the above interviews was semi-structured interviews. In this style the 
respondent is free to speak more in his own words about his evaluation of the 
effectiveness of audit committees. For this reason, the researcher during his pilot study 
used this way in advance with some audit committee members, internal and external 
auditors just to recognise the possibility of succeeding with this method. 
The objective of these interviews is to allow respondents to say what is really on their 
mind without being influenced by suggestions from the researcher, whereas closed 
questions (as in the questionnaire) locked respondents into arbitrarily limited 
alternatives (Foddy, 1999: 127). Moreover, perhaps the most persistent criticism of 
closed questions is that pre-set response options are likely to cause respondents to give 
answers they would not give if they had to provide them for themselves whereas the 
open questions show how a respondent has interpreted the phenomenon. However, as 
Foddy (1999: 152) pointed out that methodologists who have considered the issues 
have tended to settle on the compromise position that "a judicious mix of open and 
closed questions is appropriate. " 
So while piloting the questionnaire, these questions were established to be used at a 
later date. The duration of the interviews was between 30 and 90 minutes. The 
interviewees amongst others included the head of the internal audit department under 
the internal audit category of this study and two partners from one of the biggest 
accounting firms in Saudi Arabia under the external auditors category. 
The questions which were discussed during the pilot study were as following: 
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1) For audit committee members: 
- Are you an executive or non-executive director? 
- After eight years of audit committees in Saudi Arabia, how do you evaluate the 
Saudi experiment? 
- What are the main advantages and disadvantages of audit committees in Saudi 
corporations? 
- Do you think that audit committees have achieved their objectives, and why? 
- What are your recommendations for developing the level of audit committee's 
effectiveness? 
- Do you have anything else you want to add it? 
2) For internal and external auditors: 
- After eight years of audit committees 
in Saudi Arabia, how do you evaluate the 
Saudi experiment? 
- What are the main advantages and 
disadvantages of audit committees in Saudi 
corporations? 
- Do you think that audit committees have achieved their objectives, and why? 
- Do you think that the internal 
(external) auditors have benefited from the 
establishment of audit committees? 
- What are your recommendations 
for developing the level of audit committee's 
effectiveness? 
- Do you have anything else you want to add 
it? 
These questions appeared to be sufficient for the establishment of a comprehensive 
picture of the current practice of audit committees in Saudi Arabia. Any additional 
questions might taken a longer time to complete, which may make the respondents 
reluctant to hold the interviews. 
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5-4 THE RESEARCH POPULATION AND FIELDWORK 
The population is the entire group of organisations, people, events, or things of interest 
that the researcher wishes to investigate. The population frame is a listing of all 
elements in the population from which the sample is to be drawn (Sekaran, 1992). 
Sampling is very important for researchers engaged in survey studies. Sekaran (1992: 
226) defines sampling as "a subgroup or subset of the population. By studying the 
sample, the researcher would be able to draw conclusions that would be generalisable 
to the population of interest. " Moreover, Salant and Dillman (1994) claimed that the 
power of sample surveys is their ability to obtain information from a relatively few 
respondents to describe the characteristics of an entire population. However, Weisberg 
et al (1996: 39) pointed out "if the population we are interested in is so small then we 
can easily interview the entire population. " As well, Salant and Dillman (1994: 53) 
mentioned, "Sampling is not always necessary. When the study population is very 
small, efficiency may not be a big concern. " For this reason, the sample in this study 
would be the entire population of audit committee members and big sample of internal 
and external auditors that will be discussed later. 
The fieldwork started at the beginning of March 2002 and lasted for a period of three 
months and twenty days to the 20 June 2002 with the collection of data from three 
samples, which are related to the audit committees in Saudi corporations. The samples 
are: 1- audit committee members in Saudi corporations, 2- internal auditors in Saudi 
corporations, and 3- external auditors in Saudi Arabia. 
In the beginning of the fieldwork, each audit committee members, internal and external 
auditors received an introductory letter explaining the nature and aim of this study and 
the method to answer questions, a copy of the research tool and a self-addressed 
stamped return envelope. The envelopes were marked with control numbers to enable 
the researcher identify and call those that fail to respond at the specified time. 
Moreover, all the respondents have been told that they can send their responses by fax 
to increase the response rate. This is in line with an earlier study by Al-Moataz (1999) 
that found out that respondents in Saudi Arabia tend to respond more by fax than mail. 
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All individuals were informed that their responses would remain confidential. In 
addition, all respondents were offered a summary of the results upon request. All 
research materials have been prepared and forwarded to the sample following 
Dillman's Total Design Method (TDM) for maximizing response rate and optimising 
response quality (Dillman, 1978,2000; DeZoort, 1997: 214). 1 At the end of the 
questionnaire, the respondent was thanked for the time he spent filling out the 
questionnaire and reminded to mail it back using the self-addressed stamped envelope 
or by the fax that was given. 
An introduction letter was prepared by the researcher's sponsor (Department of 
Accounting in Umm Al-Qura University in Saudi Arabia), which was very useful since 
many respondents mentioned the importance of the letter in their comments. The 
original signature of the Head of department along with the official college stamp was 
placed on the official college paper and attached to every questionnaire. Such a letter is 
very important in the Saudi business environment as Al-Twaijry (2000) mentioned. 
The researcher called the respondents who did not respond after three weeks by phone 
to remind and to encourage them to send their response. The second telephone call to 
the respondents was made six weeks after the questionnaire was first administered. In 
addition, the researcher sent the questionnaire again by fax to all the respondents who 
claimed that they had not received the questionnaire yet. 
The effort to get more responses was made by the researcher after ten weeks to remind 
the respondents and to inform them that they could still respond before the deadline. 
Also, an explanation of the significance of this research to the business field in Saudi 
Arabia was highlighted. 
For the first sample, that is the audit committee members, a list of Saudi corporations 
was obtained from the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce & Industry (2001). 
Dillman's TDM is based on social exchange theory, which suggests that subject participation can be 
improved by increasing involving along parameters related to reward, cost and trust. This proactive 
approach will be taken because the samples are a dispersed and diverse group of individuals who may 
be characterized as an inherently difficult subject pool to access (DeZoort, 1997: 214). 
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According to the above source, there are 94 Saudi corporations of which 68 are listed. 
Therefore, all the 68 listed companies have been chosen in the sample for audit 
committee members. The non-listed companies have not been chosen to be in the 
current study sample for three main reasons: First, these companies are owned by the 
government and their compliance with the requirements of the Ministry of Commerce 
are not as strict as with listed companies. Secondly, the number of non-listed 
companies is 26, which are just 27.5% of all Saudi corporations. Thirdly, other parties 
such as investors, shareholders and others are probably not interested in the 
effectiveness of audit committees among non-listed companies since they cannot own 
any shares in these companies. 
It should be noted that the researcher conducted a survey of the Saudi Corporations by 
telephone during the pilot study stage to ascertain whether these corporations have 
audit committees or not. The researcher discovered that three corporations had no audit 
committees. Also the address and telephone numbers of four corporations that were 
obtained from the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce & Industry (2001) were 
wrong and there was no way to know the correct addresses and numbers. Therefore, 
the available population was 61 corporations. Since the average number of audit 
committee members in a corporation is three, then the total population is 183 
members. Therefore, 183 questionnaires were sent to that audit committee members. 
The responses were 57 responses, out of which 54 were useable responses since it was 
discovered that 3 respondents did not seem to be careful in choosing their answers. 
Some of them chose one selection in all questions including the opposing questions. 
Others left more than 5 questions that signified that he was not interested in 
completing the questionnaire. 
In conclusion, the total percentage of useable responses is 29.5%, which is logically 
reasonable in the social research. It was considered highly satisfactory because 
responding to mail questionnaires has not been a widely accepted practice among 
business firms in Saudi Arabia. This is confirmed by other Saudi researchers for 
example Al-Assaf (1995); Al-Qahtany (1996); and Al-Turki (2002). DeZoort et al 
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(2002) received 27% as a response rate in their studies after two requests among audit 
committee members in the USA and they consider this rate is normal. 
In respect of the second sample, which concerns the internal auditors in Saudi 
corporations, the total number of listed corporations is 68 as noted earlier (Council of 
Saudi Chambers of Commerce & Industry, 2001). Since the number of internal 
auditors in Saudi corporations is unknown and this differs between corporations as Al- 
Twaijry (2000) mentioned during his fieldwork among internal auditors in Saudi 
corporations. The researcher decided to send three questionnaires to every internal 
auditing department in corporations. It has been found during the following up efforts, 
which has been done by the researcher for getting more responses that five of the 
corporations had no internal auditors or has part-time internal auditor and the addresses 
and phone numbers for four corporations that was obtained from the Council of Saudi 
Chambers of Commerce & Industry (2001) were wrong as mentioned earlier. 
Therefore, the available sample was 59 corporations or in other words, 177 internal 
auditors available in this research. The total responses, which have been collected, 
were 57 responses and the useable responses were 55 that represented 31% of the 
available population. 
In respect of the third sample relating to the external auditors, the number of audit 
firms in Saudi Arabia is 106 firms according to the last release on 6-1-2002 by the 
Saudi Organisation of Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA, 2002). The survey, 
which has been done by Al-Moataz (1999) on the audit firms that audit the Saudi 
corporations and those that do not audit, found that at least 16 firms have not audited 
the accounts of Saudi corporations yet because they are small firms and are considered 
not big enough to audit corporations. 
Therefore, the available sample was 90 firms. The researcher sent two questionnaires 
to each audit firm that audits the Saudi corporations for getting more responses. 
Therefore, the questionnaires that have been sent to audit firms were 180. The returned 
responses were 65 responses and the useable responses were 58. The percentage 
response was thus 32.2% of the available population. It should be noted that some of 
the seven respondents, which were deleted from the useable responses, did not audit 
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any corporation and as a result, their questionnaires were useless for the purpose of 
this research. Moreover, it has been found that in about two cases the respondent 
volunteered to photocopy the questionnaire for five copies for his colleagues who audit 
Saudi corporations in an audit firm. Then, the researcher has received more than two 
questionnaires from those audit firms. 
The following table 5-5 presented the total of mailed, responses, usable, and response 
rates for the three sample. 
Table 5-5 Overall response rates for the three samples 
Samples Total mailed Total 
responses 
Usable 
responses 
Response 
rate 
Audit committee members 183 57 54 29.5% 
Internal auditors 177 57 55 31% 
External auditors 180 65 58 32.2% 
The qualitative method was used along with the quantitative method to further support 
and explain the effectiveness of audit committees. Therefore, six interviews were 
conducted from amongst the three samples. These names chosen from the respondents 
who stated they would participate further in the study. This exercise was done in order 
to have their views about the effectiveness and problems that they face and to compare 
their views so as to enrich this research with some recommendations. 
The researcher faced many difficulties in making arrangements for the interviews since 
many audit committee members; internal and external auditors were reluctant to give 
information as a result of the uninterested manner toward the research work. Some of 
the internal auditors required getting a clearance from their board of directors, which 
was very difficult since it takes long time before getting the acceptance. In conclusion, 
six interviews with every sample seem to be a fair number since this method was not 
the main method for collecting data for this research. 
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The data sources has been categorized as being primary data and not secondary data 
because the aim of this research is to take views from the samples about effectiveness 
of audit committees and to have some suggestions from them to improve these 
committees. In addition, there is no way of obtaining data from any source except the 
original source. 
5-5 DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
Although data was analysed after conducting the questionnaire survey, much thought 
was given to the testing and analysis of results during the questionnaire design. 
Normally, the first step in analysis, especially in surveys, is the editing and coding of 
collected data. The researcher has checked the data to make sure it is as accurate as 
possible, consistent with other facts secured, uniformly entered, as complete as 
possible and arranged to facilitate coding and tabulation. The analysis of responses 
was carried out on a personal computer using Statistical Package for Social Science 
(SPSS), a popular statistical software often used in social studies (Bryman and Cramer, 
1997). More details about the data analysis of this study and the different techniques 
and tests carried out are found in the next sections. 
5-6 SUMMARY 
The present section has explained the research approach adopted in this study. It 
presented the factors, which influenced the choice of these techniques and approaches 
and their advantages and disadvantages. It also reported the procedures followed in the 
design and development of the close-ended questionnaire, this study's main collection 
instrument. This study has also used some interviews with the three samples (audit 
committee members, internal and external auditors) since the respondent is free to 
speak more in his own words about his evaluation of the effectiveness of audit 
committees. 
This section also explained how the pilot study was carried out to develop the 
questionnaire and how it was conducted and the benefits that had been gained from 
parties of piloting. Finally, it gives details of the questionnaire fieldwork procedures 
134 
Chapter Five: Research Methodology Loughborough University 
started at the beginning of March 2002 and lasted for a period of three months and 
twenty days to the 20 June 2002 and reports the achieved response rate, which is 
logically reasonable in the social research according to the researchers in this field. 
This chapter presented the second method for collecting data in this research, which 
was an examination through some interviews to explore in details the effectiveness of 
audit committees in Saudi corporations by these cases. The population was six cases in 
every sample (audit committee members, internal and external auditors). These 
samples have been chosen according to the responses that have been received from the 
respondents 
The next section presents in more details the descriptive data analysis of this study and 
the different techniques and tests that will be carried out to achieve its objectives. 
0 
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CHAPTER SIX: DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
6-1 INTRODUCTION 
The last section presented the methodology used in this study. The aim of this section 
is to present and discuss the findings from the mail survey. It also focuses on the 
characteristics of the three types of respondents. Finally, this section also presents a 
descriptive statistical analysis (frequencies, percentages, standard deviations, 
crosstabulations, and the mean values) of the three samples that have been discussed 
in detail in the last section. 
6-2 UTILISATION OF SPSS FOR ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) was used to compute the mean, 
frequency distribution, and other statistical measurements and tests needed in this 
study. The SPSS is a software system for data analysis (Norusis, 1998). SPSS has also 
made it possible to select the most appropriate statistical tools from a comprehensive 
range. It provides tools for data storage and retrieval, data modification and 
programming, report writing, file handling, and finally statistical analysis (Norusis, 
1998). The system version used in this research was version 10.0 which is the standard 
package licensed to Loughborough University at the time. 
6-3 PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BEFORE DATA ANALYSIS 
The development of the survey instrument followed an extensive search of relevant 
literature. Before analysing data collected from the survey, issues related to the 
responses received were investigated first as discussed in the methodology section. 
6-3-1 Data Entry Validity 
As a first step towards the analysis, the researcher transferred data collected from the 
questionnaires into an SPSS file format. All data was reviewed by another person to 
check for entry errors. No data entry errors were found except for a few cells, which 
were found to be blank. Afterwards, the researcher transferred the code numbers from 
the original instruments and the data was then screened and printed for patterns of 
missing values, outliers, and response bias. No serious cases of these conditions were 
found. It was therefore concluded that the data collected was valid for the statistical 
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tests. A decision was made regarding missing values. Questionnaires with missing 
values or answers to more than 5 questions were dropped from the analysis 
completely; but for those with 1 to 5 missing, the questionnaire would be useable if 
the respondents completed it. Therefore, the researcher contacted two internal auditors 
in corporations and an audit committee member whose questionnaire either contained 
5 or less missing responses or significant contradictions to make sure they fully 
understood the questions. This procedure increased the number of valid and completed 
questionnaires significantly. 
6-4 DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
Data description is typically the first step in any data analysis project. Diamantopoulos 
and Schlegelmilch (2000) pointed out that in addition to being an important, self- 
standing activity when a descriptive focus characterizes the analysis objectives, 
descriptive analysis provides a very useful initial examination of the data even when 
the ultimate concern of the investigator is inferential in nature (i. e. involving 
estimation and/or hypothesis-testing). Specifically, the purpose of descriptive analysis 
is to (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (2000: 73): - 
a) Provide preliminary insights as to the nature of the responses obtained, as 
reflected in the distribution of values for each variable of interest. 
b) Help detect errors in the coding process. 
c) Provide summary measures of `typical' or `average' responses as well as the 
extent of variation in responses for a given variable. 
d) Provide an early opportunity for checking whether the distributional 
assumptions of subsequent statistical tests are likely to be satisfied. 
However as Hussey and Hussey (1997: 187) mentioned that "statistics texts 
commonly draw a distinction between: a) exploratory data analysis or descriptive 
statistics, which is used to summarise or display quantitative data, and b) confirmatory 
data analysis or inferential statistics, which involves using quantitative data collected 
from a sample to draw conclusions about a complete population. " 
In this section, descriptive statistics will be done to describe the frequencies of data 
collected and the next section will present the confirmatory data analysis. 
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6-4-1 Frequency Distributions for the samples characteristics 
The starting point in descriptive analysis is the construction of a frequency distribution 
for each variable of interest. This simply shows in absolute or relative (i. e. percentage) 
terms as Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (2000) noted, how often the different 
values of the variable are actually encountered in one's sample. In other words, a 
frequency distribution indicates how `popular' the different values of the variable are 
among the units of analysis. 
6-4-1-1 Audit Committee Members Characteristics 
Table 6-1,6-2,6-3,6-4, and 6-5 indicate the characteristics of 54 audit committee 
members who participated in this study. 
Table 6-1 Qualifications of Audit Committee Members 
Audit Committee Qualifications ---------- Absolute Frequency - --------- Relative Frequency 
(%) 
CPA Qualification 
Yes 8 14.8 
No 46 85.2 
SOCPA Qualification 
Yes 8 14.8 
No 46 85.2 
CA Qualification 
Yes 2 3.7 
No 52 96.3 
CIA Qualification 
No 54 100 
Other Qualifications 
Yes 7 13 
No 47 87 
Educational Qualifications 
Higher School 2 3.7 
Undergraduate in accounting or 19 35.2 
Undergraduate in other subject 4 7.4 
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Audit Committee Qualifications Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency 
(%) 
Postgraduate m accounting or 21 38.9 
Postgraduate in other subject 7 13 
Other 1 1.8 
It can be seen from table 6-1 that only 8 audit committee members have the American 
Certified Public Accountants (CPA) qualification or 14.8% of the total whilst the other 
46 members or 85.2% did not hold this professional certification. The same 
distribution can be found from the table regarding the Saudi Organisation of Certified 
Public Accountants (SOCPA). This result grows concern since McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) found that the companies with no reporting problems were more 
likely to have a CPA on the audit committee than companies that had experienced 
reporting problems. 
Concerning members holding other overseas professional qualifications, only two 
members (3.7%) have the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA) 
certification, seven members (13%) have other qualifications such as the Egyptian 
Certificate of Public Accountants and the certification of Arab Accountants in Jordan, 
whilst no member has the American Certificate of Internal Auditors (CIA). 
These results reveal that the majority of audit committee members did not have 
professional qualifications, which seem to be important in fully understanding the 
procedures and process of financial reporting issues. 
In respect to the educational qualifications, two audit committee members (3.7 %) 
were educated up to the high school level, 19 members (35.2%) have an undergraduate 
degree in accounting and finance, 4 members (7.4%) have an undergraduate degree in 
other subject areas. Audit committee members who have a postgraduate degree in 
accounting or finance are 21 (38.9 %) whilst those members who have both an 
undergraduate and postgraduate degree in accounting and finance are 40 (74.1%). 
This shows that almost every three out of four have a related qualification that enables 
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them to properly fulfill their duties. The table also shows that 7 members (13°/x) have 
a postgraduate certification in other subject areas outside accounting and finance. The 
7 members were actually engineers and this information was obtained orally during 
interviews, which will be discussed later. Finally there was the odd member (1.8`%x) 
whose qualification was obtained from a polytechnic. 
Table 6-2 The Current Job of Audit Committee Members 
Current Job Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency 
CY0 ) 
Chicfexecutive in this company 6 11.1 
Chief executive in other company 10 18.5 
Retired executive 4 7.4 
Non-executive in this company 6 11.1 
Educator 8 14.8 
Self-employed 3 5.6 
Auditor 15 27.8 
Other 2 3.7 
As shown in table 6-2, which is the current job of audit committee members, there is 6 
members (11.1%) are chief executives in the same company, which is an obvious 
violation of the Ministry of Commerce resolution that requires corporations to 
establish audit committees from non-executive directors. According to Menon and 
Williams (1994) who pointed out that the SEC notes that having insiders (chief 
executive in the same company) on an audit committee may be worse than having no 
committee at all. However, it is clear from table 6-2 that 10 members (18.5%) are 
chief executives in other companies, 4 members (7.4%) are retired executives, 6 
members (1 l .1 
%) are non-executives in the same company, 8 members (14.8%) are 
educators, 3 members (5.6%) are self-employed, 15 members (27.8%) are auditors, 
and 2 members (3.7%) are from other backgrounds. 
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Table 6-3 Number of Meetings for Audit Committee Members 
No Meetings During Last Year Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency 
(%) 
Once 4 7.4 
Twice 13 24.1 
Three 9 16.7 
Four 12 22.2 
More than four 16 29.6 
in terms of table 6-3 which is the number of meetings during last year, it is interesting 
to note that 4 members (7.4%) mentioned that they met only once during the year. 
Also, 13 members (24.1%) met only twice during the last year which reflects the same 
problem of the last members. 9 members (16.7%) met three times, 12 members 
(22.2%) met four times, and 16 members (29.6%) met more than four times during the 
last year which in itself is an indication for the best practice of audit committees. 
It can be concluded that only 28 audit committee members (51.8%) - which meet four 
times or more implement the best practice which has been suggested by the 
Treadway Commission (1987); and Blue Ribbon Committee (1999). Interestingly, Xie 
et al (2003) found in their study that individual firm committees met as seldom as 
once during the year and as often as 58 times. 
Table 6-4 Length of Meeting for Audit Committee Members 
Length of Meeting Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency 
(`Yý) 
30 minutes 1 1.8 
1 hour 7 13 
1 hour, 30 minutes 13 24.1 
2 hours 9 16.7 
More than 2 hours 24 44.4 
In respect to the length of meetings during last year, one member (1.8%) mentioned 
that the duration of their meetings was for only 30 minutes, 7 members indicated that 
meetings (13%) lasted for about one hour, 13 members (24.1%) suggested that 
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meetings were for an hour and half, 9 members (16.7%) stated that they met for about 
two hours, and the remaining 24 members meetings (44.4%) indicated that their 
meetings were more than two hours which suggests that their fully attention was being 
given to enable them to fulfil their duties. 
Table 6-5 The Compositions of Audit Committees 
Number of Members Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency 
(%) 
Three 45 83.2 
Four 1 1.9 
Five 7 13 
Seven 0 0 
Other 1 1.9 
Total 54 100% 
Regarding the composition of the audit committees, the most favoured size is a three- 
member committee with 45 members (83.2%) indicating that this was the number in 
the committees, which they served in. 7 members (13%) mentioned that their 
committee was made up of five members and none of the respondents belonged to a 
seven-member committee. However one member (1.9%) mentioned that the number 
of their committee was 4, and another mentioned that the number in their committees 
was 8 members, and both of these are violations of the Ministry of Commerce 
resolution that required audit committees to be composed of an odd number of 
members. 
6-4-2 Crosstabulations for the characteristics of audit committee members 
In the above tables, the characteristics of audit committee members were analysed by 
univariate data. However, if researchers wish to analyse bivariate data they may wish 
to construct a table which is known as a cross tabulation. Although cross tabulations 
can be constructed with any type of quantitative data, they are particularly useful for 
analysing nominal data (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Cross tabulation is one of the 
simplest and most frequently used ways of demonstrating the presence or absence of a 
relationship (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). 
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6-4-2-1 Job * Educational Qualification Crosstabulation 
This Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between the job of audit 
committee members and their educational qualifications. 
Table 6-6 Job * Educational Qualification Crosstabulation 
Educational Qualification 
Job High 
school 
Undergrad 
in Acc 
Undergrad 
in other 
Postgrad 
in Acc 
Postgrad 
in other 
Other Total 
l: xecutlve 111 3 (50"r;, ) 1 (I 6.7"/, ) 
2 X3.3" (_ ) 6 (I I. I'%, ) 
Executive in 
other 
1 (10"/, ) 1 (IO%) 7 (7015) I (10'x, ) Ill 
(18.5%) 
Retired executive 2 (50%) _ 
1 (25'x, ) I (251x, ) 4 (7.4'x4) 
Non-executive in 
_ 
2(33.3%) 
_ 
2 (33.3`x, ) 2 (33.3%) 6 (1 1.1%) 
Academic 
- 
7 (87.5'x, ) 1 (12.5%) 
_ 
8 (14.8%) 
Investor 
_ _ 
3 (100%) 
- - - 
3 (5.6%) 
Auditor 
- 
12 (80%) 
- 
3 (20%) 15 
(27.8(Yo) 
Other 
- 
1 (50%) 
_ 
1 (50%) 
- _ 
2 (3.71x, ) 
Total 2 (3.71x, ) 19 (35.2%) 4 (7.4%) 21 (38.8%) 7 (13%) 1(1.9%) 54 
(100%) 
It can be seen from table 6-6, there is no conspicuous relationship between the job of 
audit committee members and their educational qualifications. However, it can be 
noticed that all members of audit committees who work auditors have qualifications in 
accounting. As well, all investors have no qualifications in accounting. 
6-4-2-2 Job * Number of Meetings Crosstabulation 
This Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between the job of audit 
committee members and their number of meetings. 
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Table 6-7 Job * No Meetings Crosstabulation 
Number of Meetings 
Job Once Twice Three Four More Total 
Executive in 2 
_ 
1 2 1 6 (11.1%) 
Executive in 
other 
1 3 2 I 3 10 (18.5%) 
Retired executive - 
2 2 4 (7.4'%x) 
Non-executive in 
- 
2 1 3 
- 
6 (11.1 %) 
Academic 
- 
1 
- 
2 5 8 (14.8%) 
Investor 
- 
I I I 
_ 
3 (5.6%) 
Auditor 1 6 3 I 4 15 (27.8%) 
Other I 
- 
I 2 (3.7'%, ) 
Total 4 (7.4'%x) 13 (24.1%) 9 (16.7%) 12 (22.2%) 16 (29.6%) 54 (100%) 
It can be seen from table 6-7 that retired executives meet four times or more, which is 
the best practice of audit committee' meetings. Moreover, all members who met once 
were executives and an auditor. Other relationships were normal and there is no 
noticeable relationship worth to be mentioned. 
6-4-2-3 Job * Duration of Meetings Crosstabulation 
This Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between the job of audit 
committee members and the duration of their meetings. 
Table 6-8 Job * Duration of Meetings Crosstabulation 
Duration of Meetings 
Job 30m 60m 90m 120m More Total 
Executive in 2 1 1 2 6 (11.1%) 
Executive in 
other 
2 3 1 4 10 (18.5%) 
Retired executive 4 4 (7.4%) 
Non-executive in 3 
_ 
3 6 (11.1'% 
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Duration of Meetings 
Job 30m 60m 90m 120m More Total 
Academic 
_ _ 
I 1 6 8 (14.8%) 
Investor 1 3 (5.6'%x) 
Auditor 1 2 4 5 3 15 (27.8%) 
Other 
- - - 
1 1 2 (3.7'%x) 
Total 1 (1.9'%x) 7 (13%) 13 (24%) 9 (16.7'%, ) 24 (44.4%) 54 (1011'%ý) 
It can be seen from table 6-8 that all retired executives meet more than two hours, 
which shows performing best practice as recommended by Treadway Commission 
(1987); Cadbury Committee (1992); and Blue Ribbon Committee (1999). As well, 
non-executives; academics; and others meet for an hour and half, which is still not far 
away from the best practice of audit committees. It should be noted that there only one 
participant (auditor) mentioned that his audit committee meets for half an hour, which 
seems to be very short time to fulfil the duties that should be achieved. 
6-4-2-4 Educational Qualification * Number of Meetings Crosstabulation 
This Crosstabulation was used to investigate the relationship between the educational 
qualifications and number of audit committee' meetings. 
Table 6-9 Educational Qualification * No Meetings Crosstabulation 
Educational Number of Meetings 
Qualifications Once Twice Three Four More Total 
lIi, -, h school 2 2 (3.71%. ) 
Undergrad in Ace 2 6 4 1 6 19 (35.2%) 
Undergrad in other _ 
1 2 1 
_ 
4 (7.4'%x) 
Postgrad in Ace 1 5 3 5 7 21 (38.9%) 
Postgrad in other 1 1 _ 
4 1 7 (13%) 
Other 1 1 (1.9'%. ) 
Total 4 (7.4%) 13 (24.1'%, ) 9 (16.7%) 12 (22.2%) 16 (29.60/0) 54 (100'%)) 
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It can be seen from table 6-9 that most members who meet more than four times a year 
have qualifications in accounting. The same point could be found from members who 
meet twice a year. It can be interpreted that 40 of 54 (74.1 %) participants have the 
accountancy qualifications. Other relationships were normal and there is no noticeable 
relationship worth to be mentioned. 
6-4-2-5 Educational Qualification * Duration of Meetings Crosstabulation 
Also, Crosstabulation was used to discover the relationship between the educational 
qualifications and the duration of audit committee' meetings. 
Table 6-10 Educational Qualification * Duration of Meetings Crosstabulation 
Educational Duration of Meetings 
Qualifications 30m 60m 90m 120m More Total 
11 igh school - 
2 2 (3.7'x, ) 
Undergrad in Acc 1 1 6 5 6 19 (35.1%) 
Undergrad in other - 
1 2 
_ 
1 4 (7.4%)) 
Postgrad in Acc 
- 
4 3 4 10 21 (38.9%) 
Postgrad in other - 
1 2 
- 
4 7 (13'%x) 
Other I 1 
Total 1 (1.9%) 7 (13'%x) 13 (24.1°/0) 9(16.7%) 24 (44.3%) 54 (100%) 
It can be seen from table 6-10 that all members who have high school certification and 
other certifications meet for more than two hours; whereas there is only one 
participant (undergraduate in accounting or business) mentioned that he meets for half 
an hour, which seems to be very short time to discharge the responsibilities that should 
be accomplished. On the other hand, all members who have undergraduate or 
postgraduate in accounting or business meet two hours or more, whereas all categories 
shared the last choice that audit committee members meet for more than two hours. 
6-4-2-6 Number of Meetings * Duration of Meetings Crosstabulation 
Finally, Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between number of audit 
committee' meetings and the duration of their meetings. 
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Table 6-11 Number of Meetings * Duration of Meetings Crosstabulation 
Duration of Meetings 
No. Meetings 30m 60m 90m 120m More Total 
Once 1 2 
- 
1 4 (7.4'%x) 
Twice 
- 
1 9 3 13 (24.1 %) 
Three times 
- 
3 3 2 I 9 (16.7%) 
Four times _ - 
1 2 9 12 (22.2%) 
More 
- 
1 
- 
1 14 16 (29.6%) 
Total 1 (1.9%) 7 (13'%) 13 (24.1%) 9 (16.7`%, ) 24 (44.3'%, ) 54 (100%) 
It can be seen from table 6-11 that all participants who meet four times a year, their 
duration was for an hour and half or more. Moreover, all members who meet more 
than four times meet for two hours or more with the exception of one participant. 
Interestingly, there is only one member mentioned that he met for half an hour, and on 
the same time his committee met only once during last year. However, all members 
who meet for more than two hours meet three times or more. 
6-4-1-2 Internal Auditors Characteristics 
Table 6-12 indicates the characteristics of 55 internal auditors in Saudi corporations 
who participate in this study. 
Table 6-12 Characteristics of Internal Auditors 
Internal Auditors Characteristics Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency 
`%O 
Internal Auditing Department 
Yes 45 81.8 
No 10 18.2 
CPA Qualification 
Yes 16 29.1 
No 39 70.9 
SOCPA Qualification 
Yes 5 9.1 
No 50 90.9 
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Internal Auditors Characteristics Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency 
CA Qualification 
Yes 6 10.9 
No 49 89.1 
CIA Qualification 
Yes 4 7.3 
No 51 92.7 
Other Qualifications 
Yes 9 16.4 
No 46 83.6 
Experience 
Less than 5 years 4 7.3 
From 5 to less than 10 years 12 21.8 
From 10 to less than 15 years 21 38.2 
15 years or more 18 32.7 
It can be seen from table 6-12 that 45 internal auditors (81.8) in the Saudi corporations 
sampled in this study had a distinct department for the internal auditing whereas 10 
internal auditors (18.2) mentioned that there was no such department in their work 
place. This question has been asked since the internal audit function occupies a unique 
position and it is important to have formal mechanisms in place to facilitate 
confidential exchanges between the internal auditor and the audit committee as the 
Blue Ribbon Committee noted (1999). 
Concerning professional qualifications, 16 internal auditors (29.1%) have the CPA 
certification, whereas 39 internal auditors (70.9%) do not posses this certification. 
Concerning the Saudi certification (SOCPA), only 5 internal auditors (9.1%) have this 
whereas the remaining 50 (90.9%) do not have it. Similarly 6 internal auditors 
(10.9%) have the British qualification (ACCA) whilst 49 internal auditors (89.1 %) do 
not have it. As for the American certificate of Internal Auditors (CIA), only 4 internal 
auditors (7.3%) have this certification, which is very low percentage for this vital 
certification for internal auditors, whereas 51 internal auditors (92.7%) do not have it. 
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Finally, 9 internal auditors (16.4%) have other qualifications such as the Egyptian and 
Jordan certification, while 46 internal auditors (83.6%) do not have any other 
qualifications. It can thus be concluded that 25 internal auditors (45%) in this study 
have one or more professional qualifications, whereas 30 internal auditors (55%) have 
no such professional qualification. 
In terms of experience, 4 internal auditors (7.3%) have experience of less than 5 years, 
12 internal auditors (21.8%) have experience ranging from 5 years to 10 years, 21 
internal (38.2%) have experience from 10 to 15 years and finally 18 internal auditors 
(32.7%) have experience spanning over 15 years. It can be concluded that the 
respondents who participated in this study have adequate experience since about 70% 
of them have experience of up to 10 years and more. 
6-4-3 Crosstabulations for the characteristics of internal auditors 
In the above table, the characteristics of internal auditors were analysed by univariate 
data. Therefore, cross tabulations, which are bivariate analysis, were used to 
demonstrate some relationship between the characteristics of internal auditors as 
follows. 
6-4-3-1 Experience * SOCPA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between the experience of 
internal auditors and SOCPA qualification. 
Table 6-13 Experience * SOCPA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Experience SOCPA Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 4 - 
4 (7.3%, ) 
5 years to less than 10 years 11 1 12 (21.8%) 
10 years to less than 15 years 18 3 21 (38.2%) 
15 years or more 17 1 18(32.7%) 
Total 50(90.9%) 5(9.1%) 55(100%) 
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It can be seen from table 6-13 that all internal auditors who have an experience for less 
than 5 years have not the SOCPA qualification. However, most other categories do not 
have this qualification. 
6-4-3-2 Experience * CPA Qualification Crosstabulation 
As well, Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between the experience 
of internal auditors and the CPA qualification. 
Table 6-14 Experience * CPA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Experience CPA Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 4 4 (7.3%)) 
5 years to less than 10 years 9 3 12 (21.8%%) 
10 years to less than 15 years 13 8 21 (38.2%) 
15 years or more 13 5 18 (32.7%) ) 
Total 39 (70.9%O) 16 (29.10/0) 55 (100(%) 
As shown in table 6-14 that all internal auditors who have an experience for less than 
5 years have not the CPA qualification. 
6-4-3-3 Experience * CA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Also, Crosstabulation was used to investigate the relationship between the experience 
of internal auditors and the CA qualification. 
Table 6-15 Experience * CA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Experience CA Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 4 - 
4 (7.3'%x) 
5 years to less than 10 years 12 - 
12 (21.8%) 
10 years to less than 15 years 16 5 21 (38.2%) 
15 years or more 17 1 18(32.7% ) 
Total 49 (89.1'%) 6 (10.9%) 55 (100%) 
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It can be seen from table 6-15 that all internal auditors who have experience less than 
10 years have not the CA certification. Other relationships were normal. 
6-4-3-4 Experience * CIA Qualification Crosstabulation 
As well, Crosstabulation was used to examine the relationship between the experience 
of internal auditors and the CIA certification. 
Table 6-16 Experience * CIA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Experience CIA Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 4 
- 
4 (7.3'%x) 
5 years to less than 10 years 11 1 12 (21.8%) 
10 years to less than 15 years 20 I 21 (38.2(YO) 
15 years or more 16 2 18 (32.7%) 
Total 51 (92.7%) 4 (7.3'%)) 55 (100(%) 
It can be seen from table 6-16 that all internal auditors who have experience less than 
5 years have not the CIA certification. Other relationships were normal. 
6-4-3-5 Experience * Other Qualifications Crosstabulation 
Finally, Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between the experience 
of internal auditors and their other qualifications. 
Table 6-17 Experience * Other Qualifications Crosstabulation 
Experience Other Qualifications Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 4 
- 
4 (7.3'%x) 
5 years to less than 10 years 11 1 12 (21.8%) 
10 years to less than 15 years 18 3 21 (38.2%) 
15 years or more 13 5 18 (32.7%) 
Total 46 (83.6%) 9 (16.4%) 55 (100(Yo) 
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It can be seen from table 6-17 that all internal auditors who have experience less than 
5 years have not any other qualifications. It should be noted that whenever experience 
increase, other qualifications also increase. 
6-4-1-3 External Auditors Characteristics 
Table 6-18 indicates the characteristics of 58 external auditors that audit Saudi 
corporations who participated in this study. 
Table 6-18 Characteristics of External Auditors 
External Auditors Characteristics Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency 
CPA Certification 
Yes 15 25.9 
No 43 74.1 
SOCPA Certification 
Yes 18 31 
No 40 69 
CA Certification 
Yes 2 3.4 
No 56 96.6 
CIA Certification 
Yes 2 3.4 
No 56 96.6 
Other Certification 
Yes 9 15.5 
No 49 84.5 
Experience 
Less than 5 years 4 6.9 
From 5 to less than 10 years 13 22.4 
From 10 to less than 15 years 14 24.1 
From 15 years and more 27 46.6 
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It can be seen from table 6-18 that 15 external auditors (25.9%) have the CPA 
certification as against 43 external auditors (74.1%) who do not. As for the local 
qualification, the SOCPA, 18 external auditors (31%) have it whereas 40 external 
auditors (69%) don't. Pertaining to other overseas qualifications, only 2 external 
auditors (3.4%) have the British ACCA, 2 have the CIA certification, while 9 external 
auditors (15.5%) have different professional qualifications such as the Egyptian and 
Jordan certification. It can be concluded that 34 external auditors (59%) have one or 
more professional qualification, whereas 24 external auditors (41%) do not have any 
professional qualification. 
In terms of experience, there is 4 external auditors (6.9%) have an experience of less 
than 5 years, 13 (22.4%) have experience ranging from 5 years to 10 years, 14 (24.1%) 
have experience from 10 to 15 years, and 27 external auditors (46.6%) have 
experience of 15 years or more. It can be concluded that 41 external auditors (70.7%) 
who participated in this study have an experience of 10 years or more. 
6-4-4 Crosstabulations for the characteristics of external auditors 
In the above table, the characteristics of external auditors were analysed by univariate 
data. Therefore, cross tabulations, which are bivariate analysis, were used to 
demonstrate some relationship between the characteristics of external auditors as 
follows. 
6-4-4-1 Experience * SOCPA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between the experience of 
external auditors and the SOCPA qualification. 
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Table 6-19 Experience * SOCPA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Experience SOCPA Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 2 2 4 (6.9'%x) 
5 years to less than 10 years 10 3 13 (22.4(V,, ) 
10 years to less than 15 years 10 4 14 (24.1 (VO) 
15 years or more 18 9 27 (46.6%) 
Total 40 (69'%x) 18 (31%) 58 (100%) 
It can be seen from table 6-19 that half external that have experience for less than 5 
years have the SOCPA certification. However, only one-third of the external auditors 
that have long experience have the SOCPA. It might be since this certification is new 
established in Saudi Arabia - established since 1992. 
6-4-4-2 Experience * CPA Qualification Crosstabulation 
As well, Crosstabulation was used to investigate the relationship between the 
experience of external auditors and the CPA certification. 
Table 6-20 Experience * CPA Qualification Crosstabulation 
Experience CPA Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 4 4 (6.9'%, ) 
5 years to less than 10 years 9 4 13 (22.4%) 
10 years to less than 15 years 9 5 14 (24.11%) 
15 years or more 21 6 27 (46.6%) 
Total 43 (74.1 %0) 15 (25.9%, ) 58 (100'%, ) 
As shown in table 6-20 that all external auditors with experience of less than 5 years 
do not have the SOCPA certification. However, the quantity of external auditors that 
have the SOCPA certification has slightly increased with the increasing of experience. 
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6-4-4-3 Experience * CA and CIA Qualifications Crosstabulation 
Also, Crosstabulation was used to examine the relationship between the experience of 
external auditors with the CA and CIA certifications. It should be noted that the 
Crosstabulation of experience with the CA and CIA have presented with each other 
since both Crosstabulation were similar. 
Table 6-21 Experience * CA and CIA Qualifications Crosstabulation 
Experience CA and CIA Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 4 4 (6.9'%x) 
5 years to less than 10 years 13 _ 
13 (22.4%) 
10 years to less than 15 years 14 _ 
14 (24.1'% 
15 years or more 25 2 27 (46.6%) 
Total 56 (96.6%) 2 (3.4'%x) 58 (100%) 
It can be seen from table 6-21 that all external auditors that have experience for less 
than 15 years have not the CA and the CIA certifications. The only two external 
auditors that have those certifications have experience for 15 years or more. 
6-4-4-4 Experience * Other Qualifications Crosstabulation 
Finally, Crosstabulation was used to explore the relationship between the experience 
of external auditors and other certifications. 
Table 6-22 Experience * Other Qualifications Crosstabulation 
Experience Other Qualifications Total 
0 1 
Less than 5 years 4 
_ 
4 (6.9'%, ) 
5 years to less than 10 years 11 2 13 (22.4%) 
10 years to less than 15 years 11 3 14 (24.1 %) 
15 years or more 23 4 27 (46.6%) 
Total 49 (84.5%) 9 (15.5%) 58 (100%) 
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It can be seen from table 6-22 that all external auditors that have experience for less 
than 5 years have not other certifications. However, the amount of external auditors 
that have the SOCPA certification has slightly raised with the growing of experience. 
6-4-5 Measures of Central Tendency 
A measure of location or central tendency is a convenient way of describing a large 
frequency distribution by means of a single value. The data to be analysed must be at 
least of interval status. The main measures of location in common use are: The mean, 
the midrange, the median and the mode (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
The mean is the most popular measure of central tendency. It is merely the average of 
the data (Kvanli et al, 2000). The mean is defined as the sum of a set of values divided 
by their number; as its computation involves algebraic manipulation of the individual 
data values, the mean is an appropriate measure of central location for metric data only 
(Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 2000: 97). The mean is easy to compute and 
explain, and it has several mathematical properties that make it more advantageous to 
use than the other three measures of central tendency (median - midrange - mode). 
The median of a set of data is the value in the centre of the data values when they are 
arranged from smallest to largest. Consequently, it is in the centre of the ordered array 
(Kvanli et al, 2000). 
i 
The midrange is less popular than the mean and median. It is also severely affected by 
the presence of an outlier in the data. In general: 
Midrange = The smallest value + The largest /2 (Kvanli et al, 2000). Also, the 
midrange in this study if all choices are chosen is three because the aggregate of 
smallest and largest values are six, and by dividing by 2 equals 3. 
The mode of a data set is the value that occurs more than once and the most often, and 
there may be more than one mode if several numbers occur the same (and the largest) 
number of times and there may be no mode if all values occur only once (Kvanli et al, 
2000). The mode in this research will be shown while presenting the frequencies and 
percentages of respondents' data. 
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6-4-5-1 Frequencies and percentages of respondents' audit committee members 
toward the statements in the questionnaire 
The following table 6-23 presents the frequencies and percentages of audit committee 
members toward the researcher's assertions in the questionnaire. It should be noted 
that the number of respondents is 54 audit committee members as discussed earlier, 
and the total of percentages in all field should be 100%. 
It can be seen from table 6-23 that the 37 statements are divided to the six groups that 
are discussed in the methodology section (Corporate governance - The role with the 
external auditors - The role with the internal auditors - The authorities of audit 
committees - The literacy of audit committees - The diligence of audit committees), 
and the other two statements, which measure the effectiveness of audit committees in 
general. All of these statements are ordered from the largest to smallest in every 
group. 
Table 6-23 Frequencies and percentages of respondents audit committee 
members toward the statements in the questionnaire 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Avera 
Statements disagree agree nor agree ge 
disagree 
No % No % No % No % No 
Corporate Governance 3.60 
The audit committee reviews the 2 3.7 1 1.9 20 37 31 57. 4.44 
annual financial statements. 4 
The audit committee monitors 1 1.9 8 14. 23 42. 22 40. 4.22 
corrections made by management 8 6 7 
related to reported deficiencies in the 
independent auditor's management 
letter. 
The audit committee reviews and 1 1.9 8 14. 10 18. 16 29. 19 35. 3.81 
analysis the adequacy and effectiveness 8 5 6 2 
of the internal controls of the company. 
The audit committee reviews and 4 7.4 6 11. 10 18. 14 25. 20 37. 3.74 
analyses the significant changes in 1 5 9 1 
accounting policies. 
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Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Avera 
Statements disagree agree nor agree to 
disagree 
No % No % No %, No '% No %, 
I he audit eonunittee monitors 14 25. 10 18. 15 27. 15 27. 3.57 
corrections made by management 9 5 8 8 
related to reported deficiencies reported 
by the internal auditors. 
The audit committee reviews and 5 9.3 9 16. 10 18. 18 33. 12 22. 3.43 
analyses the accounting estimates and 7 5 3 2 
judgments. 
Beyond meeting legal or other 7 13 9 16. 14 25. 10 18. 14 25. 3.28 
regulatory requirements, the audit 7 9 5 9 
committee serves an important need in 
this company. 
Employees are encouraged to report 18 33. 17 3I. 6 11. 10 18. 3 5.6 2.3 I 
incidents of errors or irregularities to 3 5 1 5 
the audit committee. 
The role with the external 4 01 . 
auditors 
The audit committee nominates the 1 1.9 3 5.5 3 5.5 11 20. 36 66. 4.44 
independent auditors. 4 7 
The audit committee reviews and 1 1.9 7 13 23 42. 23 42. 4.24 
analyses the results of the annual audit 6 6 
by the independent auditors. 
The audit committee reviews and 1 1.8 5 9.3 5 9.3 25 46. 18 33. 4.00 
analyses the scope and activities of the 3 3 
annual audit by the independent 
auditors. 
The audit committee enhances the 3 5.6 5 9.3 11 20. 13 24. 22 40. 3.85 
independence of the external auditors. 4 1 7 
The audit committee evaluates the 7 13 7 13 5 9.3 22 40. 13 24. 3.50 
independent auditors' performance, 6 1 
including determination of 
independence. 
The role with the internal 3 11 . 
auditors 
The audit committee reviews and 9 16. 9 16. 4 7.4 22 40. 10 18. 3.28 
analyses the scope and activities of the 7 7 7 5 
internal auditors. 
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Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Avera 
Statements disagree agree nor agree ge 
j disagree 
No % No % No % No '%O No % 
IIIIC audit conunittee enhances the 10 18. 7 13 5 9.3 22 40. 10 18. 3.28 
independence of the internal auditors. 5 7 5 
The audit committee reviews and 12 22. 6 11. 3 5.6 23 42. 10 18. 3.24 
analyses the internal audit reports, and 2 1 6 5 
The audit committee evaluates the 13 24. 9 16. 3 5.5 19 35. 10 18. 3.07 
internal auditors' performance. 1 7 2 5 
The audit committee reviews the 15 27. 13 24. 7 13 12 22. 7 13 2.69 
appointment and replacement of the 7 1 2 
director of internal auditing. 
The authorities of audit 3.29 
committees 
Non-members attend meetings as 9 16. 1 1.9 4 7.4 24 44. 16 29. 3.69 
required. 7 4 
Audit committee obtains prompt 5 9.3 8 14. 10 18. 19 35. 12 22. 3.46 
responses from management. 8 5 2 2 
Audit committee has ready access to 9 16. 6 1I. 5 9.3 24 44. 10 18. 3.37 
relevant information. 7 1 4 5 
Objectives, responsibilities, and 6 11. 11 20. 7 13 24 44. 6 1 1. 3.24 
authority of the audit committee are 1 4 4 1 
clearly defined in a written statement 
(charter). 
Audit committee has ready access to all 9 16. 8 14. 8 14. 20 37 9 16. 3.22 
levels of management. 7 8 8 7 
The audit committee has little 10 18. 16 29. 10 18. 14 25. 4 7.5 2.74 
authority. 5 6 5 9 
The literacy of audit 3.62 
committees 
Audit committee members have a 1 1.9 2 3.7 7 13 24 44. 20 37 4.11 
sufficient knowledge of the entity's 4 
business. 
Audit committee members have a full 1 1.9 8 14. 8 14. 19 35 18 33. 3.83 
understanding of the purpose and 8 8 2 3 
responsibilities of the audit committee. 
Audit committee members are able to 3 5.5 7 13 9 16. 22 40. 13 24. 3.65 
bring up and mediate problems. 7 7 1 
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Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Avera 
Statements 
disagree agree nor agree ge 
disagree 
No % No % No % No "/ No "/ 
Audit committee mcmbcrs hav e ability 4 7.4 4 7.4 13 24. 22 40. 11 20. 3.59 
to ask probing questions. I 7 4 
Audit committee members have 4 7.4 8 14. 12 22. 22 40. 8 14. 3.41 
knowledge of auditing practice. 9 2 7 8 
Audit committee members are carefully 7 13 7 13 11 20. 15 27. 14 25. 3.41 
selected. 4 8 8 
Audit committee members have 4 7.4 8 14. 16 29. 17 31. 9 16. 3.35 
knowledge of accounting practice. 8 6 5 7 
The diligence of audit 3,44 
committees 
Audit committee members are 4 7.4 4 7.4 4 7.4 20 37. 22 40. 3.96 
independence from management. 1 7 
Meetings between the audit committee 3 5.6 3 5.6 4 7.4 36 66. 8 14. 3.80 
and the independent auditors are 7 7 
typified by open and frank dialogue. 
Agenda and related material are 6 11. 2 3.7 9 16. 27 50 10 18. 3.61 
provided to members ahead of 1 7 5 
meetings. 
Audit committee members have 4 7.4 8 14. 15 27. 21 38. 6 1I. 3.31 
sufficient time to devote committee's 8 8 9 1 
affairs. 
The audit committee meets frequently 3 5.5 15 27. 7 13 21 88. 8 14. 3.30 
enough. 8 9 8 
The audit committee meets long time 10 18. 15 27. 12 22. 16 29. 1 1.9 2.69 
enough to carry out the mandate of the 5 8 2 6 
committee. 
The other two statements 
The audit committee is effective. 5 9.3 10 18. 14 25. 20 37 5 9.3 3.19 
The audit committee accomplishes very 15 27. 16 29. 12 22. 9 16. 2 3.7 2.39 
little. 8 6 2 7 
It can be seen from table 6-23 in respect to the first group, which is on corporate 
governance, that 51 members - 31 + 20 (94.4%) - agree that audit committees are 
adequately performing the task of reviewing the annual financial statements. The 
second statement on whether or not members agree that the audit committee monitors 
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corrections made by management related to reported deficiencies in the independent 
auditor's management letter showed that 45 members (83.3%) agreed that this was 
being done, 8 members were indifferent whilst only one member (1.9%) disagreed that 
this was being done. 
Regarding the third statement in this group, 35 members (64.8%) agreed with the 
statement that audit committees reviews and analysis the adequacy and effectiveness 
of the internal controls of the company, whereas 9 members (16.7%) disagreed. The 
level of agreement decreases gradually in the remaining statements. For instance, the 
eighth statement about employees being encouraged to report incidents of errors or 
irregularities to the audit committee showed that only 13 members (24.1%) agreed, 
while 35 members (64.8%) disagreed with the statement. 
In respect to the second group, which relates to the role of audit committees with the 
external auditors, the agreement among respondents toward the first statement about 
nominating the independent auditors by audit committees is clear since 47 members 
(87.1%) agreed that audit committees carry out this job. The remainder of statements 
declines regularly but not similar to the first group. For example, the statement 
relating to evaluating the independent auditors' performance by audit committees 
achieved the least order still has the agreement of 35 members (64.7%). 
Concerning the statements in the third group, which is the role of the internal auditors, 
the agreement toward these statements is obviously reduced. Regarding the first 
statement, which is about reviewing and analysing the scope and activities of the 
internal auditors, it gained the agreement of 32 members (59.2%), whereas 18 
members (33.4%) disagreed that audit committees carry out this job. The other 
statements are not far away in terms of responses from the above statement. It should 
be noted that the statement that related to reviewing the appointment and replacement 
of the director of internal auditing achieved the agreement of 19 members (35.2%), 
while 28 members (51.8%) disagreed with this statement. 
In respect to the statements of the fourth group which deals with the authority of audit 
committees, the agreement among respondents toward non-members attending 
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meetings as required are 40 members (74%), whereas 10 members (18.6%) disagreed 
that audit committees fulfill this task. The responses to the remaining statements 
fluctuate between 31 members (57.4%) agreed, 13 members (24.1%) disagreed and 29 
members (53.7%) agreed; 17 members (31.5%) disagreed. However, the last statement 
that related to the authority of audit committees, 18 members (33.4%) disagreed that 
audit committees have little authority, whereas 26 members (48.1%) agreed that the 
authority of audit committees are little. It should be noted that since this statement was 
written in the questionnaire in contrary phrasing the researcher coded the responses for 
this statement in opposing technique. 
In respect to statements of the fifth group, which is the literacy of audit committees, 
the frequencies of respondents fluctuate between 44 members (81.4%) agreed for the 
first statement that audit committee members have a sufficient knowledge of entity's 
business, 3 members (5.6%) disagreed and 26 members (48.2%) agreed for the last 
statement that audit committee members have knowledge of accounting practice, 12 
members (22.2%) disagreed toward this statement. 
About statements of the last group, which is the diligence of audit committees, the 
agreement of respondents toward the diligence of audit committees seems to be 
similar except the last statement that audit committees meet long enough to carry out 
the mandate of the committee since 17 members (31.5%) agreed that audit committees 
are doing that, whereas 25 members (46.3%) disagreed about carrying out this job by 
audit committees. 
The other two statements, which have been placed in the questionnaire to measure in 
general the effectiveness of audit committees, the agreement between respondents 
differs much between these two statements. The first statement that audit committees 
are effective got the acceptance of 25 members (46.3%), and 15 members (27.8%) 
disagreed with this statement. The other statement about the accomplishments of audit 
committees showed that 31 members (57.4%) agreed that audit committees 
accomplishes very little, whereas only 11 members (20.4%) disagreed with this 
statement. 
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In accordance with established principles in designing questionnaires, the last 
statement was worded in an opposite manner to the preceding statements. An 
agreement to this question would mean the exact opposite and vice versa. Therefore 
in collating the results of the questionnaires, if the respondent chose strongly agree, 
the relevant code is not scale 5, but scale 1. This way has been applied according to 
researchers in methodology of research such as Spector (1994) who claimed that 
negatively worded items could reduce bias in answering. 
6-4-5-2 Frequencies and percentages of respondents' internal auditors toward the 
statements of questionnaire 
Table 6-24 presents the frequencies and percentages of internal auditors in Saudi 
corporations toward the statements of the questionnaire. It should be noted that 
number of respondents is 55 internal auditors as discussed earlier, and the total of 
percentages in all field should be 100%. All of these statements are ordered from the 
largest to smallest in every group. 
Table 6-24 Frequencies and percentages of respondents' internal auditors toward 
the statements of questionnaire 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Aver 
disagree agree nor agree age 
Statements disagree 
No % No % No % No T% No % 
Corporate Governance 3.65 
The audit committee monitors 1 1.8 10 18.2 21 38.2 23 41.8 4.20 
corrections made by management 
related to reported deficiencies in the 
independent auditor's management 
letter. 
The audit committee reviews and 3 5.5 4 7.3 7 12.7 24 43.6 17 30.9 3.87 
analyses the significant changes in 
accounting policies. 
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Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Aver 
Statements 
disagree agree nor agree age 
disagree 
No % No 0% No % No % No % 
The audit committee reviews and 2 3.6 7 12.7 7 12.7 19 34.5 20 36.5 3.87 
analyses the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the internal controls of 
the company. 
The audit committee reviews the 6 10.9 5 9.1 4 7.3 8 -32.7 2 -40 3.82 
annual financial statements. 
The audit committee monitors 2 3.6 9 16.4 6 10.9 22 40 16 29.1 3.75 
corrections made by management 
related to reported deficiencies reported 
by the internal auditors. 
Beyond meeting legal or other 4 7.3 5 9.1 15 27.3 17 30.8 14 25.5 3.58 
regulatory requirements, the audit 
committee serves an important need in 
this company. 
The audit committee reviews and 6 10.9 7 12.7 13 23.6 22 40.1 7 12.7 3.31 
analyses the accounting estimates and 
judgments. 
Employees are encouraged to report 13 23.6 11 20 12 21.8 14 25.5 5 9.1 2.76 
incidents of errors or irregularities to 
the audit committee. 
The role with the external 4.13 
auditors 
The audit committee nominates the 4 7.3 4 7.3 13 23.6 34 61.8 4.40 
independent auditors. 
The audit committee reviews and 2 3.6 4 7.3 27 49.1 22 40 4.25 
analyses the results of the annual audit 
by the independent auditors. 
The audit committee enhances the 1 1.8 2 3.6 9 16.4 24 43.6 99 34.6 4.05 
independence of the external auditors. 
- The audit committee evaluates the ] 1.8 5 9.1 3 5.5 29 52.7 17 30.9 4.02 
independent auditors' performance, 
including determination of 
independence. 
The audit committee reviews and 1 1.8 6 10.9 5 9.1 26 47.3 17 30.9 3.95 
analyses the scope and activities of the 
annual audit by the independent 
auditors. 
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Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Aver 
Statements 
disagree agree nor agree age 
disagree 
No % No % No °/ No I%, No IN, 
The role with the internal 3.53 
auditors 
The audit committee enhances the 3 5.5 9.1 9 16.4 20 36.4 18 32.7 3.82 
independence of the internal auditors. 
The audit committee reviews and 4 7.3 7 12.7 7 12.7 3 -41.8 14 25.5 3.65 
analyses the internal audit reports, and 
findings. 
The audit committee reviews and 2 3.6 11 20 7 12.7 23 41.8 12 21.9 3.58 
analyses the scope and activities of the 
internal auditors. 
The audit committee evaluates the 6 10.9 12 21.8 8 14.6 12 21.8 17 30.9 3.40 
internal auditors' performance. 
The audit committee reviews the 8 14.5 13 23.6 9 16.4 11 20 14 25.5 3.18 
appointment and replacement of the 
director of internal auditing. 
The authorities of audit 3 97 . 
committees 
objectives, responsibilities, and 3 5.5 9 16.4 21 38.1 22 40 4.13 
authority of the audit committee are 
clearly defined in a written statement 
(charter). 
Non-members attend meetings as 1 1.8 3 5.5 7 12.7 2 -40 22 40 4.11 
required. 
Audit committee obtains prompt 
- - 
2 3.6 11 20 22 40 20 36.4 4.09 
responses from management. 
it committee has ready access to 2 3.6 3 5.5 6 10.9 23 41.8 21 38.2 4.05 
relevant information. 
Audit committee has ready access to all 1 1.8 7 12.7 8 14.6 16 29.1 23 41.8 3.96 
levels of management. 
The audit committee has little 2 3.6 10 18.2 13 23.6 20 36.4 10 18.2 3.47 
authority. 
The literacy of audit 3.92 
committees 
Audit committee members have a 7 12 7 2ý 40 26 47.3 4.35 
sufficient knowledge of entity's 
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Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Aver 
Statements 
disagree agree nor agree age 
disagree 
No % No % No % No %%, No 
husiness. 
Audit committee members have a full 
- - 
1 1.8 10 18.2 22 40 22 40 4.18 
understanding of the purpose and 
responsibilities of the audit committee. 
Audit committee members are able to 
_ - 
1 1.8 12 21.8 27 49.1 15 27.3 4.02 
bring up and mediate problems. 
Audit committee members have ability 
_ - _ - 
19 34.5 20 36.4 16 29.1 3.95 
to ask probing questions. 
it committee members are carefully 2 3.6 5 9.1 14 25.5 15 27.3 19 34.5 3.80 
selected. 
Audit committee members have 
- - 
10 18.2 14 25.5 20 36.3 11 20 3.58 
knowledge of auditing practice. 
Audit committee members have 
- _ 
10 18.2 14 25.5 21 38.1 10 18.2 3.56 
knowledge of accounting practice. 
The dilit ence of audit 3.82 
committees 
Audit committee members are I 1.8 4 7.3 6 10.9 17 30.9 27 49.1 4.18 
independence from management. 
Meetings between the audit committee 
_ - 
3 5.5 7 12.7 28 50.9 17 30.9 4.07 
and the independent auditors are 
typified by open and frank dialogue 
Agenda and related material are 1 1.8 4 7.3 5 9.1 30 54.5 15 27.3 3.98 
provided to members ahead of 
meetings. 
The audit committee meets frequently 
- - 
9 16.4 6 10.9 29 52.7 11 20 3.76 
enough. 
The audit committee meets long time 
- 
8 14.5 10 18.3 29 52.7 8 14.5 3.67 
enough to carry out the mandate of the 
committee. 
Audit committee members have 2 3.6 10 18.2 20 36.4 18 32.7 5 9.1 3.25 
sufficient time to devote committee's 
affairs. 
The other two statements 
The audit committee is effective. 3 5.5 19 34.5 24 43.6 9 16.4 3.71 
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Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Aver 
Statements 
disagree agree nor 
disagree 
agree age 
o N 'ý 
/, No "/0 No '% No % No '%o 
The audit committee accomplishes very 8 14.5 16 29.1 11 20 16 29.1 4 7.3 2.85 
little. 
It can be seen from table 6-24 about statements of the first group which is on corporate 
governance that the agreement that audit committees monitor corrections made by 
management related to reported deficiencies in the independent auditor's management 
letter are 44 internal auditors (80%), whereas only one respondent disagreed with this 
statement. The reminder of statements fluctuate between 41 (74.5) internal auditors 
agreeing that audit committees reviews and analyses the significant changes in 
accounting policies, 7 internal auditors (12.8%) disagreed, and 19 respondents 
(34.6°/0) agreed toward the last statement that employees are encouraged to report 
incidents of errors or irregularities to the audit committees, 34 internal auditors 
(43.6°/0). 
With respect to statements of the role of audit committees with the external auditors, 
the agreement of respondents toward these statements is relatively high. Forty-seven 
internal auditors (85.4%) agreed that audit committees carry out the nomination of the 
independent auditors, whereas only four responses (7.3%) disagreed that audit 
committees perform this task. The relative high agreement persists until the last 
statement that audit committees review and analyses the scope and activities of the 
annual audit by the independent auditors because 43 (78.2%) respondents agreed with 
practice by audit committees, while only 7 (12.7%) respondents disagreed with their 
performance. 
Concerning statements of the role of audit committees with the internal auditors, the 
agreement of internal auditors toward these statements has moderately decreased. The 
agreement among internal auditors for the five statements consecutively is: 38 
(69.1%), 37 (67.3%), 35 (63.7%), 29 (52.7%), and 25 (45.5%). Whereas, the 
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disagreement among internal auditors for the five statements consecutively is: 8 
(14.6%), 11 (20%), 13 (23.6%), 18 (32.7%), 21 (38.1%). 
About statements of the authorities of audit committees, the agreement among internal 
auditors varies between 43 (78.1%) agreed, 3 (5.5%) disagreed for the first statement 
which is objectives, responsibilities, and authority of the audit committee are clearly 
defined in a written statement (charter), and 30 (54.6%) agreed, 12 (21.8%) disagreed 
with the last statement about the authority that audit committees have. 
With respect to statements of the literacy of audit committees, whereas no internal 
auditor disagreed with the first statement that audit committee members have a 
sufficient knowledge of the entity's business, 48 (87.3%) agreed, there is 10 internal 
auditors (18.2%) disagreed on the last statement that audit committee members have 
knowledge of accounting practice, 31 (56.3%) agreed that audit committees have this 
literacy. 
The statements of the sixth group which is the diligence of audit committees, fluctuate 
between 44 internal auditors (80%) in agreement that audit committee members are 
independent from management, 5 (9.1%) disagreed, and 23 internal auditors (41.8%) 
agreed that audit committee members have sufficient time to devote to the 
committee's affairs, while 12 (21.8%) disagreed. 
The other two statements achieved more agreement among internal auditors than audit 
committee members. The agreement of the statement of general effectiveness of audit 
committees is 33 internal auditors (60%) agreed with this statement, whereas only 3 
respondents (5.5%) disagreed. About accomplishments of audit committees, 24 
internal auditors (43.6%) agreed that they accomplish very little, while 20 respondents 
(36.4%) disagreed. However, 11 respondents (20%) were indifferent. 
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6-4-5-3 Frequencies and percentages of respondents' external auditors toward 
the statements in the questionnaire 
Table 6-25 presents the frequencies and percentages of external auditors of Saudi 
corporations toward the statements of the questionnaire. It should be noted that 
number of respondents is 58 external auditors as discussed earlier, and the total of' 
percentages in all field should be 100%. All of these statements are ordered from the 
largest average to smaller in every group. 
Table 6-25 Frequencies and percentages of respondents' external auditors 
toward the statements of questionnaire 
Statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
O/ 
/O 
Disagree 
No ý% 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
No I % 
Agree 
U/ 
U 
Strongly 
agree 
No I U/ý 
Aver 
age 
Corporate Governance 3.20 
The audit committee reviews the 2 3.5 10 17.2 5 8.6 23 39.7 18 31 3.78 
annual financial statements. 
The audit committee monitors 1 1.7 11 19 10 17.2 26 44.9 10 17.2 3.57 
corrections made by management 
related to reported deficiencies in 
the independent auditor's 
management letter. 
The audit committee monitors 4 6.9 7 12.1 13 22.4 26 44.8 8 13.8 3.47 
corrections made 
by management 
related to reported deficiencies 
reported by the 
internal auditors. 
The audit committee reviews and 4 6.9 12 20.7 6 10.3 29 50 7 12.1 3.40 
analyses the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the internal 
controls of the company. 
The audit committee reviews and 4 6.9 18 31 7 12.1 16 27.6 13 22.4 3.28 
analyses the significant changes in 
accounting policies. 
The audit committee reviews and 5 8.6 17 29.3 16 27.6 13 22.4 7 12.1 3.00 
analyses the accounting estimates 
and judgments. 
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Statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Aver 
age 
disagree 
No % No % No % No '%u No '%o 
13cvond meeting legal or other 
regulatory requirements, the audit 
4 6.9 17 29.3 15 25.9 ýO 34. ti 2 3.4 x. 98 
` 
committee serves an important 
need in this company. 
Employees are encouraged to 
report incidents of errors or 
20 34.5 18 31.1 13 22.4 5 8.6 2 3.4 2.16 
irregularities to the audit 
conmmittee. 
le with th t Th l e ro e ex erna 
3.31 
auditors 
The audit conunittce nominates the 2 3 
independent auditors. 
.4 6 10.4 12 20.7 24 41.4 14 24.1 3.72 
The audit committee reviews and 
analyses the results of the annual 
3 5.2 9 15.5 11 19 30 51.7 5 8.6 3.43 
audit by the independent auditors. 
The audit committee enhances the 
independence of the external 
3 5.2 9 15.5 23 39.7 17 29.3 6 10.3 3.24 
auditors. 
The audit committee reviews and 3 5 2 
analyses the scope and activities of 
. 77 29.3 15 25.9 18 31 5 8. G 3,09 
the annual audit by the 
independent auditors. 
audit committee evaluates the Th 4 6 9 e 
independent auditors' 
. 15 25.9 15 25.9 20 34.4 4 6.9 3.09 
performance, including 
determination of independence. 
ith th i t l l e n ew erna The ro 
2.97 
auditors 
The audit committee reviews and 3 5 2 
analyses the internal audit reports, 
. 13 22.4 12 20.7 25 43.1 5 8.6 3.28 
and findings. 
The audit committee evaluates the 
internal auditors' performance. 
4 6.9 15 25.9 16 27.6 
1 
, 2 3.4 3.03 
dit committee enhances the Th 4 6 - e au .9 14 24.1 21 36.2 16 2 7. 3 5.2 3. 00 
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Statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Aver 
age 
No % No % No % No % No '%o 
endence of the internal nde p i 
auditors. 
The audit committee reviews and 2 
analyses the scope and activities of 
the internal auditors. 
3.4 20 34.5 15 25.9 20 34,5 ] 17 2.97 
The audit committee reviews the 7 
appointment and replacement of 
the director of internal auditing. 
12.1 2l 36.2 20 34.5 8 13.8 2 3.4 2.60 
h i i f or t The aut es o audit 
committees 
3.33 
Audit committee has ready access 
to relevant information. 
] 1.7 6 10.3 17 29.3 27 46.6 12.1 3.57 
embers attend meetin s g as Non-m 
required. 
] 1.7 5 8.6 18 31 29 50.1 5 8.6 3.55 
Audit committee has ready access 
to all levels of management. 
1 1.7 12 20.7 10 17.2 9 50.1 6 10.3 3.47 
Audit committee obtains prompt 
responses from management. 
_ - 
13 22.4 23 39.7 18 31 4 6.9 ` 3.22 
res onsibilities and i 2 p , ves, Object 
authority of the audit committee 
are clearly defined in a written 
statement (charter). 
3.4 13 22.4 19 32.8 19 32.8 5 8.6 3.21 
ommittee has little dit 7 c The au 
authority. 
12.1 16 27.6 10 17.2 20 34.5 5 8.6 3.00 
f di au The literacy o t 
committees 
3.08 
. 
Audit committee members have a 
sufficient knowledge of entity's 
business. 
10 17.2 13 22.4 27 46.6 8 13.8 3.57 
members have a itt ee . Audit comm 
full understanding of the purpose 
and responsibilities of the audit 
committee. 
mbers are abl t i 
16 27.6 15 25.9 25 43.1 2 3.4 3.22 
ee me e t Audit comm 14 24.1 24 41.4 19 32.8 1 1.7 3.12 
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i ý 
Statements 
to hrino up and mediate problems. 
Strongly 
disagree 
0/ 
/0 
Audit committee members have 
ability to ask probing questions. 
Audit committee members have 
knowledge of accounting practice. 
iud committee members are 
carefully selected. 
, audit committee members 
have 
knowledge of auditing practice. 
The diligence of audit 
committees 
\1cctings between the audit 
committee and the independent 
auditors are typified by open and 
frank dialogue. 
Agenda and related material are 
provided to members ahead of 
meetings. 
Audit committee members are 
independence from management. 
The audit committee meets long 
time enough to carry out the 
mandate of the committee. 
The audit committee meets 
frequently enough. 
Audit committee members have 
sufficient time to devote 
committee's affairs. 
The other two statements 
The audit committee accomplishes 
very little. 
1.7 
1.7 
12.1 
3.4 
1.7 
1.7 
6.9 
Disagree 
0 
20 
25 
0 
34.5 
43.1 
14 
24 
16 
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41.4 
15.5 
13.8 
27.6 
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Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
No % 
21 
II 
21 
15 
17 
28 
14 
36.2 
19 
36.2 
25.9 
29.3 
48.3 
24.1 
Agree 
II 
18 
11 
14 
27 
17 
18 
`%0 
19 
31 
19 
24.1 
46.6 
29.3 
31 
Strongly 
agree 
'%0 
H. 6 
5.2 
x. c, 
5.2 
6.9 
6.9 
10.4 
Aver 
age 
2.98 
2.95 
2.88 
2.86 
3.09 
3.41 
3.26 
3.10 
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A cursory look at the results from table 6-25 when compared to the previous two 
tables seems to indicate that the external auditors responses have a much lower 
average that the other two samples. 
On corporate governance, the agreement among external auditors toward the first 
statement that audit committees review the annual financial statements is 41 (70.7%) 
agreeing that audit committees carry out this duty, whereas 12 external auditors 
(20.7%) disagreed. The agreement for the remaining statements fluctuate between 36 
external auditors (62.1%) in favour that audit committees monitor corrections made by 
management related to reported deficiencies in the independent auditor's management 
letter, while 12 (20.7%) disagreed; and the last statement that employees are 
encouraged to report incidents of errors or irregularities to the audit committee is only 
7 external auditors (12%) agreed, 38 (65.6%) disagreed. 
Concerning statements of the role of audit committees with the external auditors, the 
agreement among external auditors for the five statements consecutively is: 38 
(65.5%); 35 (60.3%); 23 (39.6%); 23 (39.6%); and 24 (41.3%), whereas the 
disagreement consecutively is: 8 (13.8%); 12 (20.7%); 12 (20.7%); 20 (34.5%); and 
19 (32.8%) disagreed that audit committees fulfill these tasks. 
With respect to statements of the role of audit committees with the internal auditors, 
the agreement between external auditors is the least in comparison with other groups. 
For example, the agreement for the five statements consecutively is: 30 (51.7%); 23 
(39.6%); 19 (32.8%); 21 (36.2%); and 10 (17.2%). Whereas the disagreement between 
external auditors for these statements is: 16 (27.6%); 19 (32.8%); 18 (31%); 22 
(37.9%); and 28 (48.3%). 
Concerning statements regarding the authority of audit committees, while the first 
statement, which is audit committees, have ready access to relevant information 
achieved agreement of 34 external auditors (58.7%) that audit committees have these 
access, whereas 7 respondents (12%) disagreed. The last statement that audit 
committees have little authority, 25 external auditors (43.1%) agreed toward this 
statement, and 23 (39.7%) disagreed. 
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With respect to statements of the literacy of audit committees, the agreement among 
external auditors for each of the seven statements in succession is: 35 (60.4%); 27 
(46.5%); 20 (34.5%); 16 (27.6%); 21 (36.2%); 16 (27.6%); and 17 (29.3%). The 
disagreement among respondents is: 10 (17.2%); 16 (27.6%); 14 (24.1%); 21 (36.2%); 
26 (44.8%); 21 (36.2%); and 26 (44.8%). 
About statements of the diligence of audit committees, the first statement, which 
posits that meetings between the audit committees and the independent auditors are 
typified by open and frank dialogue, achieved the agreement of 31 respondents 
(53.5%), whereas 10 (17.2%) disagreed. The last statement that audit committee 
members have sufficient time to devote committee's affairs achieved the agreement of 
14 (24.2%), while the disagreement is 23 respondents (39.6%), and 21 (36.2%) were 
indifferent. 
The other two statements, which evaluate effectiveness in general somewhat, differ. 
The first statement that audit committees are effective attained the agreement of 16 
external auditors (27.6%), and similarly 19 respondents (32.7%) disagreed that audit 
committees are effective. The second statement, which related to the accomplishments 
of audit committees achieved the agreement of only 3 external auditors (5.1%), 
whereas 46 (79.4%) of them disagreed with the statement which reflects the 
disagreement of external auditors about the current accomplishments of audit 
committees at the present time. 
6-4-5-4 A comparison of groups and statements' means and standard deviations 
between the three samples 
The last tables (6-23,6-24,6-25) presented number of frequencies and percentages of 
the five choices (strongly disagree - disagree - neither agree nor disagree - agree - 
strongly agree) for the three samples separated (audit committee members - internal 
auditors - external auditors). It might be appropriate; to present the mean values for 
the 39 statements of three samples in one table and this is shown in table 6-26 with the 
standard deviation to facilitate the comparison between them. 
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Standard deviation has been used for the purpose of this descriptive data since Hussey 
and Hussey (1997: 214) pointed out 
The mean and the standard deviation go together since they both use all the 
items. The mean gives the centre of the distribution of data and the standard 
deviation gives a measure of the spread of the distribution. The most important 
reason for using the standard deviation as a measure of spread is that it is related 
to a very common theoretical frequency distribution called the normal 
distribution. One important feature of the standard deviation is that if you have a 
normal distribution, 68.26 per cent of all your observations will fall within one 
standard deviation (1 S) of the mean. If you take two standard deviations, 95.4 
per cent of your observations will be covered. 
Also the standard deviation is used to examine whether the distribution of current data 
is normal or not since Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (2000); Hussey and Hussey 
(1997) pointed out that a distribution is normal if the following is true: 
" The mean +1 standard deviation will give you the middle 68.3% of the data 
" The mean +2 standard deviations will give you the middle 95.4% of the data 
" The mean +3 standard deviations will give you the middle 99.7% of the data. 
The last requirement is applied to the current data (it can be tested by using tables: 6- 
23 or 6-24 or 6-25 with table 6-26). As Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) 
pointed out that a parametric test is a statistical test based on several assumptions 
about the parameters of the population from which the sample was drawn. Among the 
most important ones are the assumptions that (1) the observations must be drawn from 
a normally distributed population and (2) the variables are measured on at least an 
interval scale. 
However, as Hussey and Hussey (1997: 225) mentioned, "If normality cannot be 
assumed, a large sample size will ensure that the sampling distribution of the means is 
approximately normal. " The sample of this study is very 
large since the researcher 
sent questionnaires to the most of population (audit committee members, internal 
auditors, and external auditors), which has been discussed earlier in methodological 
chapter. 
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Table 6-26 The mean values and standard deviations for statements of the three 
samples 
Audit committee 
Statements members 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Internal auditors 
Mean Standard 
External auditors 
Mean Standard 
Corporate Governance 3.60 
. 74 3.65 
"" " ""`"ý"" 
. 75 3.20 
uG v lit t lull 
. 79 
The audit committee reviews and 3.74 1.28 3.98 1.1 1 3.28 1.31 
analyses the significant changes in 
accounting policies. 
The audit committee reviews the annual 4.44 . 
86 3.82 1.35 3.78 1,17 
financial statements. 
The audit committee reviews and 3.43 1.27 3.31 1.18 3,00 1,17 
analyses the accounting estimates and 
judgements. 
The audit committee monitors corrections 4.22 . 
77 4.20 
. 
80 3.57 I. 04 
made by management related to reported 
deficiencies in the independent auditor's 
management letter. 
The audit committee reviews and 3.81 1.13 3.87 1.16 3.40 1.15 
analyses the adequacy and effectiveness 
of the internal controls of the company. 
The audit committee monitors corrections 3.57 1.16 3.75 1.16 3.47 1.10 
made by management related to reported 
deficiencies reported by the internal 
auditors. 
Employees are encouraged to report 2.31 1.27 2.76 1.32 2.16 1.11 
incidents of errors or irregularities to the 
audit committee. 
Beyond meeting legal or other regulatory 3.28 1.37 3.58 1.18 2.98 1.03 
requirements, the audit committee serves 
an important need in this company. 
The role with the external 4.01 . 73 4.13 . 65 3 31 66 . . 
auditors 
The audit committee reviews and 4.00 . 99 3.95 1.01 3.09 1.08 
analyses the scope and activities of the 
annual audit by the independent auditors. 
The audit committee evaluates the 3.50 1.34 4.02 . 
95 3.09 1.08 
independent auditors' performance, 
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Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
Statements members 
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard 
deviation deviation deviation 
including determination of independence. 
The audit committee reviews and 4.24 
. 
82 4.25 
. 75 3,43 
-]. (-)3 
analyses the results of the annual audit by 
the independent auditors. 
The audit committee nominates the 4.44 . 96 4.40 . 91 3.72 I. 06 
independent auditors. 
The audit committee enhances the 3.85 1.22 4.05 
. 91 3.24 1 01 
independence of the external auditors. 
The role with the internal 3.11 1.33 3.53 1.10 2.98 
, 86 
auditors 
The it committee reviews and 3.28 1.39 3.58 1.15 2.97 
. 
95 
analyses the scope and activities of the 
internal auditors. 
The audit committee reviews the 2.69 1.43 3.18 1.43 2.60 99 
appointment and replacement of the 
director of internal auditing. 
The audit committee reviews and 3.24 1.47 3.65 1.21 3.28 1.07 
analyses the internal audit reports, and 
findings. 
The audit committee enhances the 3.28 1.41 3.82 1.16 3.00 1.01 
independence of the internal auditors. 
The audit committee evaluates the 3.07 1.50 3.40 1.41 3.03 1.03 
internal auditors' performance. 
The authorities of audit 3.29 1.02 3.97 
. 65 3.34 . 65 
committees 
The audit committee has very little 2.74 1.25 3.47 1.10 3.00 1.21 
authority. 
Audit committee has ready access to 3.37 1.36 4.05 1.03 3.57 
. 
90 
relevant information. 
Audit committee has ready access to all 3.22 1.36 3.96 1.12 3.47 
. 
99 
levels of management. 
Objectives, responsibilities, and authority 3.24 1.23 4.13 
. 
88 3.11 1.00 
of the audit committee are clearly defined 
in a written statement (charter). 
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Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
Statements members 
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard 
deviation deviation deviation 
Audit conunittee obtains prompt 3.46 1.25 4.09 
. 84 3.72 . 
88 
responses from management. 
Non-members attend meetings as 3.69 1.37 4.11 96 3.55 
required. 
The literacy of audit committees 3.62 . 99 3.92 74 3 08 78 . . . 
Audit committee members have a 4.1 1 
. 
90 4.35 
. 
70 3,57 
, 
94 
sufficient knowledge of entity's business. 
Audit committee members are able to 3.65 1.15 4,02 
. 
76 3.12 80 
bring up and mediate problems. 
Audit committee members have a full 3.83 1.1 1I 4.18 
. 80 3.22 90 
understanding of the purpose and 
responsibilities of the audit committee. 
Audit committee members have 3.35 1.15 3.56 1.00 2.95 1.02 
knowledge of accounting practice. 
Audit committee members have 3.41 1.14 3.58 1.01 2.86 1.00 
knowledge of auditing practice. 
Audit committee members have ability to 3.59 1.12 3.95 
. 80 
-298 98 
ask probing questions. 
Audit committee members are carefully 3.41 1.35 3.80 1.13 2.88 1.13 
selected. 
The diligence of audit 3.44 . 
80 3.82 
. 72 3.09 . 63 
committees 
Audit committee members are 3.96 1.21 4.18 1.02 3.10 1.13 
independence from management. 
Audit committee members have sufficient 2.69 1.15 3.25 
. 99 2.84 . 85 
time to devote committee's affairs. 
Agenda and related material are provided 3.61 1.17 3.98 
. 
91 3.26 
. 
85 
to members ahead of meetings. 
Meetings between the audit committee 3.80 . 
96 4.07 
. 
81 3.41 
. 
90 
and the independent auditors are typified 
by open and frank dialogue. 
The audit committee meets frequently 3.30 1.19 3.76 . 
96 2.90 
. 
91 
enough. 
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Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
Statements members 
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard 
deviation deviation deviation 
The audit committee meets long time 3.31 1.10 3.67 . 
90 3.05 85 
enough to carry out the mandate of the 
committee. 
The other two statements 
The audit committee accomplishes very 2.39 1.17 2.85 1.21 1.97 . 88 
little. 
The audit committee is effective. 3.19 1.13 3.71 . 
81 2.97 
. 
88 
It is clear from table 6-26 that the agreement among internal auditors is almost more 
than the two other samples. External auditors are the least sample in agreement. 
Concerning the first group, which is on corporate governance as mentioned above the 
mean for groups is: 3.60 among audit committee members, 3.65 among internal 
auditors, and 3.20 among external auditors. It is interesting to note that the statement 
which related to employees are encouraged to report incidents of errors or 
irregularities to the audit committee has achieved small means between the three 
samples that obviously show the lack of access to information that audit committees 
need to carry out their responsibilities. 
With respect to the role of audit committees and the external auditors, there is clear 
differences between the three samples toward the mean of group since the agreement 
of audit committee members and internal auditors for statements in this group is 
apparently higher than those of the external auditors. There is also an obvious 
distinction on the first statement between audit committee members and internal 
auditors on the one hand and external auditors on the other hand that audit committees 
review and analyse the scope and activities of the annual audit by the independent 
auditors. There are also the same differences in other statements. However, this group 
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has the highest mean value for the first two samples whereas it is the second mean for 
external auditors. 
Relating to the role of audit committees with the internal auditors, it is clear from the 
table that this group achieved the lowest mean value for the three samples. It should be 
noted that the mean value of the statement that the audit committees review the 
appointment and replacement of the director of internal auditing consecutively is 2.69, 
3.18, and 2.60 for audit committee members, internal and external auditors. These low 
means do not coincide with the recommendations by most academic writers as 
indicators for the best practice. 
Concerning to the authorities of audit committees, it is clear from table 6-26 that audit 
committee members give the least agreement for the statements in this group in 
comparison to the other two samples. This disagreement has been indicated with the 
statement that audit committees have very little authority, which returned a mean of 
2.74, whereas the mean among internal and external auditors is 3.47 and 3.00 
respectively. It should also be noted that this statement has been coded in opposite 
way since this statement has been phrased in different way to test the validity of 
respondents as suggested during the pilot study. 
With respect to the literacy of audit committees, it is clearly presented from the table 
that external auditors give low agreement toward statements in the group, whereas 
internal auditors give high agreement more than other samples. It is interesting to note 
that the mean of external auditors towards the statement that audit committee members 
have knowledge of auditing practice seems to be low which pay attentions to the level 
of required literacy of audit committees to carry out their responsibilities. 
The last group, which is the diligence of audit committees, persists on giving the most 
agreement toward statements among internal auditors followed by audit committee 
members and then external auditors. However, the mean that audit committee 
members have sufficient time to devote to the committee's affairs has the lowest in 
comparison to the other two samples. This is more like an admission by audit 
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committee members that they do not give sufficient time to tend to the committee's 
matters. 
The other two statements that evaluate effectiveness in general, there are akin to be 
consensus between the three samples that the accomplishments of audit committees 
are very little. It should be noted that this statement has been coded in opposing way 
since this statement has been phrased in different way, which is accepted in research 
methods in the social sciences. The other statement that audit committees are effective 
achieved a mean of less than 3 among external auditors 2.97, and slightly close to 3 
among audit committee members 3.19, whereas it achieved high agreement among 
internal auditors of 3.71. 
The next section will discuss parametric statistics such as ANOVA test, which is the 
appropriate test when wanting to investigate whether three (or even more) population 
means are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one mean is different from 
the others. Note that the alternative hypothesis does not indicate which groups may 
differ, only that the groups are not all the same; additional analysis is necessary to 
identify where the identified differences exist. However, to address this question we 
need to run a multiple comparison tests, which pinpoint exactly between which groups 
the differences exist. The particular multiple comparison procedure applied is called 
the Scheffe test (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 2000: 187-190). 
In addition, t-test for one sample will be done whether differences between a sample 
toward the six groups in this study are significant or not. These tests are valuable to 
draw conclusions about the research hypothesis. 
6-5 SUMMARY 
A total of 167 questionnaires were received back from the three samples that this 
study is divided into viz: 54 audit committee members, 55 internal auditors in Saudi 
corporations, and 58 external auditors. Data was analysed using SPSS, which is a 
statistical package for social science studies. Where applicable, descriptive statistics 
(frequencies, percentages, standard deviations, and mean values) were used in 
analysing and presenting the results. 
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Several observations can be made from the results presented in this chapter. First, it 
appears that audit committee members do not have sufficient professional 
certifications, and there is an obvious violation of the Ministry of Commerce 
resolution that requires corporations to establish audit committees from non-executive 
directors. Regarding internal auditors, only 4 internal auditors (7.3%) have the CIA 
certification, which is a very low percentage for this vital certification for internal 
auditors. It can be concluded that only 25 internal auditors (45%) in this study have 
one professional qualification or more, whereas 30 internal auditors (55%) have no 
professional qualification whatsoever. Also, 34 external auditors (59%) have one 
professional qualification or more, whereas 24 external auditors (41%) do not have 
any. 
With respect to mean values, the agreement toward statements in the questionnaire 
among internal auditors is the highest in comparison with the other two samples, 
whereas the agreement among external auditors is clearly the lowest in comparison 
with other two samples. 
The earlier descriptive results need confirmation by using other inferential statistics or 
confirmatory data analysis such as ANOVA test, and t-test that will be discussed in 
next section. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DATA ANALYSIS PART II: 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS & DISCUSSION 
7-1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objectives of this study are: 
1) To evaluate the effectiveness of audit committees in Saudi corporations; 
2) To explore whether there are differences in the perceptions of the three 
samples comprising of audit committee members, internal auditors, and 
external auditors; 
3) To establish whether the agreement between each respective sample towards 
the statements is significant or not. In other words, are there any areas of 
agreement across the three samples (audit committee members, or internal 
auditors, or external auditors) on whether audit committees in Saudi Arabia 
are effective or not. 
The last section focused on the descriptive characteristics of each of the samples that 
participated in the study. It also discussed measures of central tendency such as the 
mean and standard deviation of the statements and groups covered in this research 
based on the data collected. This section continues with the analysis of the responses 
and tests, the hypotheses proposed in the last section. It consists of two main parts: 
1- Definitions of statistical terms and procedures used to test and analyse the 
responses. 
2- Testing the hypotheses and discussion of the results. 
7-2 DISCUSSION OF STATISTICAL ISSUES AND RESULTS 
The following section will define some of the statistical terms and discuss the types of 
tests used in this study. 
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7-2-1 A general approach to hypothesis testing 
There are five distinct steps associated with formulating and testing a hypothesis. 
These steps according to Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (2000: 136) are as 
follows: 
1. Formulate the null and alternative hypotheses. 
2. Specify the significance level. 
3. Select an appropriate statistical test. 
4. Identify the probability distribution of the test statistic and define the region 
of rejection. 
5. Compute the value of the test statistic from the data and decide whether to 
accept or reject the null hypothesis. 
In traditional significance testing, it is not the experiment hypothesis that is directly 
tested but its negation, which is known as the null hypothesis (Ho) of no relationship 
between the two variables being examined (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; Kinnear and 
Gray, 2000). The p-value of a statistic such as t or F (or some other test statistic) is the 
probability, assuming that H. is true, of obtaining a value at least as extreme as the 
one actually obtained. Should the p-value be small, this is taken as evidence against 
the Ho, because a value that extreme is unlikely (though possible) under Ho. H. is 
rejected if the p-value is less than a small criterion probability known as the 
significance level (Kinnear and Gray, 2000). 
It is usually set at a probability or p level of 0.05 or five times out of a hundred. When 
the p-value of a statistic is less than the significance level, the value of the statistic is 
said to be significant. The conventional probability or p-value for deciding that a 
result is not due to chance has been set as equal to or less than 0.05 or five times out 
of a hundred. If we are willing to accept a 5% chance of making an error, we can 
construct a 95% confidence interval (Weisberg et al, 1996; Cramer, 1998). If the 
probability is less than 0.05, then it is thought unlikely to have been due to chance. If, 
on the other hand, the probability level of an outcome is above 0.05, then that result is 
statistical non-significant in the sense that it is considered likely that it could have 
been due to chance (Cramer, 1998). In other words, the p-value is the probability that 
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the null hypothesis is true. If the p-value is less than 0.05, we would say the result is 
significant at the 0.05 level (Weisberg et al, 1996). 
Should the p-value be larger than the significance level, Ho is accepted. This does not 
mean that it is actually true: it only means that the evidence is insufficient to justify a 
rejection. To sum up (Kinnear and Gray, 2000: 149) posit that: 
1. if the p-value is greater than 0.05, H. is accepted and the result is not 
significant; 
2. if the p-value is equal or less than 0.05 but greater than 0.01, H. is rejected 
and the result is significant beyond the 5 per cent level; 
3. if the p-value is less than 0.01, H. is rejected and the result is significant 
beyond the 1 per cent level. 
There is always the possibility of reaching the wrong conclusion. There are two 
different errors that can be made. We may reject the null hypothesis when it is, in fact, 
true. This is referred to as a Type 1 error. It occurs when we think there is a difference 
between our groups, where there is really none. We can minimise this possibility by 
selecting an appropriate alpha level (the two levels often used are 0.05, and 0.01) 
(Pallant, 2001: 172). 
There is also a second type of error that can be made called a type 2 error. This occurs 
when we fail to reject a null hypothesis when it is, in fact, false (that is, believing that 
the groups do not differ, when in fact they do). These two errors are inversely related. 
As we try to control for a Type 1 error, we actually increase the likelihood that we 
will commit a Type 2 error (Pallant, 2001: 173). 
7-2-2 The statistical tests used in this research 
A statistical test is simply a technique, which can be used to test a particular 
hypothesis. There is little doubt that the selection of an appropriate statistical test is 
the most difficult and frustrating step in hypothesis testing. The reason is, as 
Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (2000) mentioned, that there are so many of them. 
As discussed in the last section (descriptive data analysis), when the mean values of 
the groups and statements were presented among each sample of this study (audit 
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committee members, internal auditors, and external auditors). The next step is to 
establish the level of significance between each of the samples in relation to the 
statements in the questionnaire. 
7-2-2-1 The One-Sample t-Test 
This test is used to determine if the mean of a sample is similar to that of the 
population (Cramer, 1998). The one-sample t-test computes the difference between 
the sample mean and the hypothesized value. Also, t-test takes into account the 
sample size, as well as the likely variability in the population (using the standard 
deviation of the sample as an estimate), and determines whether the sample is likely to 
have come from a population whose mean value it exceeds (Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch, 2000). The t distribution has a shape very much like the normal 
distribution, except that extreme values are slightly more likely (Weisberg et al, 
1996). 
The model underlying a t-test assumes that the data have been derived from normal 
distributions with equal variance. Computer simulations have however shown that 
even with moderate violations of these assumptions, one may still safely proceed with 
a t-test, provided the samples are not too small, do not contain outliers (atypical 
scores), and are of equal (or nearly equal) size (Kinnear and Gray, 2000: 151). Very 
small samples <30 should be avoided in any case, because the test would have 
insufficient power to reject Ho. The power of a statistical test is the probability that Ho 
will be rejected if it is false (Kinnear and Gray, 2000: 151). Weisberg et al (1996) also 
asserted that the degree of freedom for at distribution is the sample size minus 1. In 
significant testing and for establishing confidence intervals, researchers use the t 
distribution for the appropriate degree of freedom instead of the normal distribution. 
However, Churchill and lacobucci (2002) pointed out if the variable is highly skewed 
in the parent population, the appropriate procedure depends on the sample size. If the 
sample is small, the t-test is inappropriate. If the sample is large, the normal curve 
could be used for making the inference, provided that the following two assumptions 
are satisfied (Churchill and lacobucci, 2002: 679): 
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1- The sample size is large enough so that the sample mean is normally 
distributed because of the operation of the Central-Limit Theorem. The greater 
the degree of asymmetry in the distribution of the variable, the larger the 
sample size needed to satisfy this assumption. 
2- The sample standard deviation is a close estimate of the parent population 
standard deviation. The higher the degree of variability in the parent 
population, the larger the size of the sample that is needed to justify this 
assumption. 
The following table presents the results of t-test that has been run among the three 
samples namely audit committee members, internal auditors, and external auditors to 
determine if the difference between those respondents from the middle, which is 
number 3 is significant or not. 
Table 7-1 Result of the t-test among a sample for the three samples of the study 
Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
Statements members 
Mean t- P Std Me t- P Std Me t- P Std 
value Val Err an value val Err an value val Err 
ue or ue or ue or 
Corporate eovernance 
The audit committee reviews and 3.74 4.264 ** . 17 3.87 5.850 ** . 
15 3.28 1.606 
. 
114 . 17 
analyses the significant changes in . 
000 
. 000 
accounting policies. 
The audit committee reviews the 4.44 12.32 ** . 12 3.82 4.500 . 18 3.78 5.048 . 15 
annual financial statements. . 
000 
. 
000 
. 000 
The audit committee reviews and 3.43 2.469 *. 01 . 
17 3.31 1.935 . 058 . 16 3.00 . 
000 1.00 
. 
15 
analyses the accounting estimates 
7 0 
and judgements. 
The audit committee monitors 4.22 11.68 ** . 
10 4.20 11.086 
. 11 3.57 4.147 . 
14 
corrections made by management . 000 . 000 . 000 
related to reported dcliciencics in 
the independent auditor's 
management letter. 
The audit committee reviews and 3.81 5.28 . 
15 3.87 5.601 ** 
. 16 3.40 2.618 *. 01 . 
15 
analyses the adequacy and . 000 . 
000 1 
effectiveness of the internal 
controls of the company. 
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Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
Statements members 
Mean t- P Std Me t- P Std Me t- P Std 
value val Err an value val Err an value va l Err 
ue or ue or ue or 
The audit committee monitors 3.57 3.64 ** . 
16 3.75 4.773 ** 
. 
16 3.47 3.236 
. 
14 
corrections made by management . 
001 
. 
000 
. 
002 
related to deficiencies reported by 
the internal auditors. 
Employees are encouraged to 2.31 -3.961 . 
17 2.76 -1.329 . 189 . 
18 2.16 - . 
15 
report incidents of errors or . 000 5.822 . 
000 
irregularities to the audit 
committee. 
Beyond meeting legal or other 3.28 1.495 . 
141 
. 
19 3.58 3.652 
. 16 2.98 -. 127 . 
899 
. 
14 
requirements, the audit committee . 001 
serves an important need in this 
company. 
The role with the external 
auditors 
The audit committee reviews and 4.00 7.419 . 13 3.95 6.958 . 
14 3.09 
. 608 . 
546 
. 
14 
analyses the scope and activities of . 000 . 
000 
the annual audit by the 
independent auditors. 
The audit committee evaluates the 3.50 2.737 . 
18 4.02 7.928 
. 
13 3.09 
. 
608 
. 546 . 14 
independent auditors' . 008 . 000 
performance, including 
determination of independence. 
The audit committee reviews and 4.24 11.08 *+ . 11 4.25 12.393 . 10 3.43 3.194 . I3 
analyses the results of the annual . 000 . 000 . 002 
audit by the independent auditors. 
The audit committee nominates the 4.44 11.00 . 
13 4.40 11.348 
. 12 3.72 5.221 . 14 
independent auditors. . 000 . 000 . 000 
The audit committee enhances the 3.85 5.133 . 
17 4.05 8.583 
. 12 3.24 1.813 . 075 . I3 
independence of the external . 000 . 000 
auditors. 
The role with the internal 
auditors 
The audit committee reviews and 3.28 1.465 . 149 . 19 
3.58 3.753 ** 
. 16 2.97 -. 275 . 784 . 13 
analyses the scope and activities of . 
000 
the internal auditors. 
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Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
Statements members 
Mean t- P Std Me t- P Std Me t- P Std 
value val Err an value val Err an value val Err 
ue or ue or ue or 
The audit committee reviews the 2.69 -1.623 . 110 . 
19 3.18 
. 
944 
. 
349 
. 19 2.60 -3.05 . 
13 
appointment and replacement of . 003 
the director of internal auditing. 
The audit committee reviews and 3.24 1.207 . 
233 
. 
20 3.65 4.028 
. 
16 3.28 1.959 
. 
055 
. 
14 
analyses the internal audit reports, . 000 
and findings. 
The audit committee enhances the 3.28 1.451 . 153 . 19 3.82 5.248 . 16 3.00 . 000 1.00 . 13 
independence of the internal . 000 0 
auditors. 
The audit committee evaluates the 3.07 . 
362 
. 
719 
. 
20 3.40 2.105 *. 04 
. 
19 3.03 
. 
256 
. 799 . 
13 
internal auditors' performance. 0 
The authorities of audit 
committees 
The audit committee has very little 2.74 -1.528 . 
132 
. 
17 3.47 3.178 
. 15 3.00 . 
000 1.00 
. 16 
authority. . 
002 0 
Audit committee has ready access 3.37 1.995 . 051 . 19 4.05 7.623 . 
14 3.57 4.812 
. 
12 
to relevant information. . 
000 
. 000 
Audit committee has ready access 3.22 1.205 . 234 . 18 3.96 6.372 . 15 3.47 3.563 . 13 
to levels of management. . 
000 
. 
001 
Objectives, responsibilities, and 3.24 1.441 . 
155 
. 
17 4.13 9.467 
. 12 3.21 1.569 . 
122 
. 13 
authority of the audit committee . 000 
are clearly defined in it written 
statement (charter). 
Audit committee obtains prompt 3.46 2.712 ** . 
17 4.09 9.576 11 . 11- 3.22 1.941 . 057 . 12 
responses from management. . 009 . 
000 
Non-members attend meetings as 3.69 3.672 . 19 4.11 8.604 . 13 3.55 4.994 . 11 
required. . 001 . 000 . 000 
The literacy of audit 
committees 
Audit committee members have a 4.11 9.030 ** . 
12 4.35 14.261 ** 
. 
12 3.57 4.616 ** 
. 
12 
sufficient knowledge of entity's . 000 . 000 . 
000 
business. 
Audit committee members are able 3.65 4.135 . 16 4.02 9.969 . 10 3.12 1.154 . 253 . 10 
to bring up and mediate problems. . 000 . 000 
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Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
Statements members 
Mean t- P Std Me t- P Std Me t- P Std 
value val Err an value vat Err an value val Err 
ue or ue or ue or 
Audit committee members have a 
full understanding of the purpose 3.83 5.508 ** . 15 4.18 11.016 ** . 
11 3.22 1.898 
. 
063 
. 12 
and responsibilities of the audit . 
000 
. 000 
committee. 
Audit committee members have 3.35 2.245 *. 02 . 
16 3.56 4.198 
. 
13 2.95 -. 388 . 
700 
. 13 
knowledge of accounting practice. 9 . 000 
Audit committee members have 3.41 2.623 *. 01 . 16 3.58 4.261 ** . 14 2.86 - . 298 . 13 
knowledge of auditing practice. 1 . 
000 1.051 
Audit committee members have 3.59 3.872 ** . 15 3.95 8.730 ** . 11 2.98 -. 134 . 
894 
. 
13 
ability to ask probing questions. . 000 . 000 
Audit committee members are 3.41 2.213 *. 03 . 18 3.80 5.256 . 15 2.88 -. 817 . 
417 
. 15 
carefully selected. 1 . 000 
The diligence of audit 
committees 
Audit committee members are 3.96 5.836 ** . 
17 4.18 8.593 i 3.10 
. 694 . 
490 
. 
15 
independence from management. . 000 . 
000 
n 
Audit committee members have 2.69 -2.018 * . 
16 3.25 1.916 
. 
061 
. 13 
2.84 - . 
172 
. 11 
sufficient time to devote to . 
049 1.383 
committee's affairs. 
Agenda and related materials are 3.61 3.831 ** . 16 3.98 . 
978 7.978-- -**- ** 
. 
12 3.26 2.319 *. 02 
. 11 
provided to members ahead of' . 000 . 000 4 
meetings. 
Meetings between the audit 3.80 6.101 . 13 4.07 9.783 . 11 3.41 3.505 . 12 
committee and the independent . 
000 
. 000 . 
001 
auditors are typified by open 
dialogue. 
The audit committee meets 3.30 1.827 . 
073 
. 
16 3.76 5.890 
. 
13 2.90 -. 864 . 
391 
. 12 
frequently enough. . 000 
The audit committee meets long 3.31 2.111 * . 15 
3.67 5.520 12 3.05 
. 465 . 643 . 11 
time enough to carry out the . 
040 
. 
000 
mandate of the committee. 
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Audit committee Internal auditors External auditors 
Statements members 
Mean t- P Std Me t- P Std Me t- P Std 
value val Err an value val Err an value val Err 
ue or ue or ue or 
The other two statements 
The audit committee accomplishes 2.39 -3.831 ** . 
16 2.85 -. 893 . 
376 
. 16 1.97 - 
** 
. 
12 
very little. . 
000 8.974 . 000 
The audit committee is effective. 3.19 1.200 . 
235 
. 
15 3.71 6.500 ** 
. 
11 2.97 -. 299 . 766 . 12 
. 000 
** Significant at . 01 
* Significant at . 05 
Discussion 
From table 7-1 in relation to the eight statements of the first group, which is on 
corporate governance, it can be seen that the audit committee members significantly 
agreed with the first six statements. This implies that audit committees in the view of 
audit committee members carry out their responsibilities in relation to corporate 
governance. This view is not surprising as DeZoort (1997) pointed out that as a 
corporate governance mechanism, audit committees monitor management, the 
external auditor, and the internal auditor in an effort to protect shareholders' interests. 
Similarly, Jenkins and Robinson (1985) stated that the primary function of the audit 
committee is overseeing the financial reporting and disclosures prepared by 
management. 
However, the results from the last two statements in this group (corporate governance) 
are quite different. The statement relating to whether employees are encouraged to 
report incidents of errors or irregularities to the audit committee recorded a significant 
disagreement amongst the audit committee members. This shows the weakness of 
audit committees in this regard from the perspective of the audit committee members. 
Also, the last statement that audit committees serve an important need in companies 
beyond meeting legal requirements was insignificant. 
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From the perspective of the second sample, the internal auditors, there is generally 
more agreement than the other two samples as discussed in the last chapter. Six 
statements significantly achieved the agreement of internal auditors including the last 
statement relating to the legal requirements, which was strongly significant in their 
view whereas it was not significant in the eyes of the audit committee members. The 
first statement that was insignificant related to the reviewing and analysing the 
accounting estimates and judgements by audit committees. The other insignificant 
statement, which gained the consensus of the three samples, related to encouraging 
employees to report incidents of irregularities to audit committees. This result shows 
that the role of audit committees is not clear enough for the parties close to audit 
committees in corporations. There is also an inherent weakness in the resolution of the 
Ministry of Commerce (1994), which fails to specify and describe in succinct terms 
the main or essential duties of audit committees. 
In terms of the third sample, the external auditors, they significantly agreed with four 
statements namely to review the annual financial statements, monitoring 
management's responses toward the management letter, reviewing the effectiveness 
of the internal control, and monitoring management's corrections toward weaknesses 
noted in the internal auditors report. All of these statements achieved a similar level of 
agreement with the previous two samples. This results is consistent with the 
recommendations of many writers such as Jenkins and Robinson (1985); Apostolou 
and Strawser (1990); Verschoor (1993). 
However, there were three statements that were insignificant. These statements are: 
reviewing and analysing the changes in accounting policies, reviewing and analysing 
the accounting estimates (which was also insignificant in the view of the internal 
auditors), and servicing an important need to meeting legal requirements in companies 
(which was also insignificant in the view of audit committee members). In addition, 
the statement relating to encouraging employees to report incidents of irregularities to 
audit committees showed a significant disagreement amongst the external auditors 
and this was the same view of audit committee members. 
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It can be concluded that while corporate governance is one of the main functions of 
audit committees, there are some weaknesses that audit committees do not fulfil their 
assumed responsibilities in the perceptions of the three study samples, especially the 
view of external auditors. In contrast, this assessment clearly varies with the internal 
auditors. These results appear to be consistent with the survey that was conducted by 
Porter and Gendall (1998), which was across four samples in New Zealand (external 
auditors, internal auditors, chairpersons of corporate entities, and financial statement 
users). 
With respect to the second group of statements, which is on the role of audit 
committees with the external auditors, it is interesting to note that all the five 
statements achieved a significantly high level of agreement with the samples of audit 
committee members and internal auditors. This result is consistent with the resolution 
of the Ministry of Commerce in Saudi Arabia (1994) that only concentrated on the 
role of audit committees with the external auditors whilst neglecting other 
responsibilities or duties that should normally be carried out by audit committees in 
every company. 
However, the last result differs with the external auditors. Three-fifths of the 
statements in this group were insignificant. The first insignificant statement related to 
reviewing and analysing the scope and activities of the annual audit by the 
independent auditors that achieved a mean of 3.09, which is not enough to get the 
significant result. The second insignificant statement related to evaluating the 
independent auditors' performance, including determination of independence. The last 
insignificant statement was that audit committees enhance the independence of the 
external auditors, which demonstrate that external auditors in general are not satisfied 
with the role of audit committees with the external auditors. These results again show 
that the main thrust of the resolution of Ministry of Commerce (1994) was only to 
focus on the current duty of audit committees in relation to the external auditors. 
Concerning the statements of the third group, which is the role of audit committees 
with the internal auditors, it is surprising to note that no statement in this group was 
significantly agreed to amongst audit committee members. Conversely, four 
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statements in this group achieved the significant agreement amongst the internal 
auditors. This result as mentioned earlier indicates that internal auditors in this study 
perceive the position of audit committees to be effective. The fifth statement, which 
was insignificant amongst internal auditors, related to reviewing the appointment and 
replacement of the director of internal auditing by audit committees. This statement 
was also significantly disagreed amongst the sample of external auditors. 
With respect to external auditors, the results shown were interesting when compared 
with that of the internal auditors. Four-fifths of the statements were insignificant in 
the group on the role of audit committees with the internal auditors. The last one 
significantly disagreed as stated above. This insignificant result about the role of audit 
committees with the internal auditors in view of audit committee members and 
external auditors is inconsistent with the duties that were suggested by Wolnizer 
(1995), Woodlock and Claypool (2001) and the results of Porter and Gendall (1998). 
The current result emphasises the current practice of audit committees in Saudi Arabia 
towards the role of internal auditors in companies. This result is not dissimilar with 
the findings of Al-Twaijry (2000) that have been conducted to add knowledge of the 
nature and practice of internal audit in Saudi Arabia. His study concludes suggest that 
the internal audit function is failing to fulfil its potential to add value to Saudi Arabian 
companies. 
The last results which related to the weakness of the role of audit committees with the 
internal auditors, bring to the fore the concern mentioned by Apostolou and Strawser 
(1990) who claimed that the requirement for private meetings between the internal 
auditors and the audit committee should allow any significant findings to be 
communicated without fear of reprisal from corporate management. 
With respect to statements of the fourth group, which is on the authority of audit 
committees, the results were extremely mixed. With respect to the audit committee 
members, the first four statements were insignificant, while the other two statements 
were significantly agreed. It is interesting to note that the statement relating to the 
overall authority of audit committees did not achieve the agreement of members 
significantly. 
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Other statements that were insignificant are: audit committees have ready access to 
relevant information, audit committees have ready access to levels of management, 
and responsibilities of the audit committees are clearly defined in a charter. The 
findings of the last result is highly important since the source of this result are the 
original part involved in the effectiveness of audit committees. However, these results 
are inconsistent with the recommendations of Bull and Sharp (1989) and Rittenberg 
and Nair (1994) who mentioned the importance of open lines of communication that 
must exist between audit committees and those in the company who can provide them 
with information. 
Concerning the sample of internal auditors, all the six statements were significantly 
agreed by them that audit committee's discharge their duties. This result is consistent 
with the earlier views of the internal auditors that audit committees are usually 
effective in fulfilling their duties. 
According to the results of the third sample, which is on the authority of the audit 
committees, the responses are varied. Half of the statements were insignificant, 
whereas the other three statements were significantly agreed. Noticeably, the external 
auditors significantly agreed two statements, whereas they were not by members of 
the audit committees. This seems to be in contrast to the fact that they regard their role 
in general to be more effective than external auditors as previously discussed. These 
statements are that audit committees have ready access to relevant information, and 
audit committees have ready access to all levels of management. On the other hand, 
the audit committee members significantly agreed to the statement that audit 
committees obtained prompt responses from management, whilst it was not by the 
external auditors. This seems to be a fair evaluation by the audit committee members 
because they are the principal party concerned. 
With respect to statements on the literacy of audit committees, both audit committee 
members and internal auditors significantly agreed with all the seven statements in 
this group. Nevertheless, the significance was high at a level of 0.01 by internal 
auditors, whereas three statements were significant at a 
level of 0.05 at audit 
committee members. This result is consistent with the recommendations of Bull and 
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Sharp (1989), Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and Davidson and Ebersole (2000: 43) 
who pointed out that the audit committee's understanding of accounting matters and 
internal controls over financial reporting (its financial literacy) is strongly related to 
their effectiveness. 
The views of the external auditors were very different; six-sevenths of the statements 
were insignificant. It can thus be concluded that external auditors consider the literacy 
of audit committee niembers to be very poor. This is because most of the statements 
relating to the literacy of audit committees such as the knowledge in accounting, 
auditing, and personal characteristics were not significant according to the perception 
of the sample of external auditors. 
The last result by external auditors is inconsistent with the qualities needed for audit 
committee service that were suggested by Bull and Sharp (1989), Davidson and 
Ebersole (2000) and Windram and Song (2000). 
The result from the last group, which is on the diligence of audit committees, is now 
discussed. Concerning the audit committee members, respondents significantly agreed 
to four-sixths of the statements. These statements were about the independence of 
members, the agenda, meetings, and duration of these meetings. However, one 
statement was significantly disagreed by the respondents that members have sufficient 
time to devote committee's affairs. Similarly, the last statement was insignificant for 
the other two samples, which means that all samples significantly agreed that audit 
committees do not dedicate enough of their time to the affairs of companies. The other 
statement, which was insignificant in the view of audit committees, was that members 
meet frequently enough. This evidence from members of audit committees 
demonstrates that there is a clear deficiency in both lack of time for audit committees 
and lack of time to devote to the committee's affairs. 
The internal auditors significantly agreed to five out of the six statements in this 
group. This result is not unexpected since internal auditors seem to agree that audit 
committees are effective in general. 
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As for the external auditors, four-sixth of the statements were insignificant. 
Interestingly, one of these insignificant statements that members of audit committees 
are independent from management may lend credence to the possibility of this 
perception especially as Davidson and Ebersole (2000) noted that there is a strong 
relationship between the audit committee's independence from management and its 
effectiveness in overseeing the company's financial reporting process. Also 
Verschoor (1993) pointed out that independence from management is widely 
recognised as an important characteristic of effective audit committees. 
With respect to the other two statements relating to assessment of the effectiveness of 
audit committees in general, it is clear from the first statement relating to the 
accomplishments of audit committees, which did not achieve the agreement of any of 
the three samples. The audit committee's accomplishments seem to be questionable in 
view of the audit committee members and external auditors opinions. The internal 
auditors were neutral about the benefits of audit committees. The consensus of the 
three samples toward this statement may be a justification for those who argue that 
audit committees in Saudi Arabia need more attempts and time to represent their 
accomplishments to the stakeholders in general. 
Concerning the result of the second statement, which is that audit committees are 
effective. This statement was insignificant in view of both audit committee members 
and external auditors. It should be noted that audit committee members assessed 
effectiveness in the context of relating it to fulfilling the duties. On this, as Lee and 
Stone (1997: 98) mentioned, actual effectiveness was impossible to observe. 
On the other hand, the internal auditors significantly agreed about the last statement. 
This might appear to be strange since this sample did not agree about the audit 
committee accomplishments. It can be interpreted that internal auditors evaluate audit 
committees as effective but they think that these accomplishments still need sometime 
to be apparent. 
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7-2-2-2 Summary of results of the t-test in view of audit committee members 
To conclude the t-test and present it in other way, table no 7-2 summaries results Oft- 
test in view of audit committee members as follows: 
Table 7-2 Summary of the t-test results in v ievw, of audit committee members 
Groups Significantly Significantly insignificant Significantly Significanth Total 
agreed at agreed at at 0.05 disagreed at disagreed at 
0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 
Corporate governance 5 1 1 1 - K 
The role with the external 5 - - - - 5 
auditors 
The role with the internal - - 5 - - 5 
auditors 
The authorities of audit 2 - 4 - - 6 
committees 
The literacy of audit 4 3 - - - 7 
committees 
The diligence of audit 3 1 1 - 1 6 
committees 
The other two statements - - 1 1 - 2 
Total 19 5 12 2 1 39 
As shown in table 7-2, there are 19 statements (48.7%) that were highly significantly 
agreed to at a significance level of 0.01 by audit committee members. 5 statements 
(12.8%) were significantly agreed to at a level of 0.05, whereas 12 statements (30.8%) 
were insignificant. However, two statements (5.1%) were highly significantly 
disagreed at level 0.01, while only one statement (2.6%) was significantly disagreed at 
level 0.05. In other words, 24 statements (61.5%) were significant in the views of the 
members of audit committees. The remaining 15 statements (38.5%), did not achieve 
the agreement of the members significantly. 
Theoretically, all statements should have been significantly agreed to by the 
respondents since these statements have been adopted from best practice of audit 
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committees. This would have provided a reasonable assurance that audit committees 
are effective in fulfilling their duties. 
The results of the last category relating to the role of audit committees with internal 
auditors, authorities of audit committees, and the other two statements are a source of 
growing concern over the role of audit committees in Saudi corporations especially 
when we consider that the last perception are from members of audit committees 
themselves. 
7-2-2-3 Summary of results of the t-test in the view of internal auditors 
Table no 7-3 summaries results oft-test in view of internal auditors as follows: 
Table 7-3 Summary of the t-test results in view of internal auditors 
Groups Significantly Significantly Insignificant Significantly Significantly Total 
agreed at agreed at at 0.05 disagreed at disagreed at 
0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 
Corporate governance 6 - 2 8 
The role with the external 5 - - 5 
auditors 
The role with the internal 3 1 1 _ _ 5 
auditors 
The authorities of audit 6 6 
committees 
The literacy of audit 7 7 
committees 
The diligence of audit 5 - 1 - _ 6 
committees 
The other two statements 1 - 1 - _ 2 
Total 33 1 5 - - 39 
It can be seen from table 7-3 that most statements were significantly agreed by the 
internal auditors. Thirty-three statements (84.6%) were significantly agreed at level 
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0.01; only one statement (2.6%) was significantly agreed at level 0.05. Furthermore, 
five statements (12.8%) were insignificant at 0.05, whereas no statement was 
insignificantly disagreed at level neither 0.01 nor 0.05. This result demonstrates that 
internal auditors evaluate audit committees as a very high level of cifcctivcness in 
fulfilling their duties among Saudi corporations. 
7-2-2-4 Summary of results of the t-test in view of external auditors 
Table 7-4 summaries results oft-test in view of external auditors as follows: 
Table 7-4 Summary of the t-test results in view of external auditors 
Groups Significantly Significantly Insignificant Significantly Significantly Total 
agreed at agreed at at 0.05 disagreed at disagreed at 
0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 
Corporate governance 3 1 3 1 - 8 
The role with the external 2 - 3 - - 5 
auditors 
The role with the internal - - 4 1 - 5 
auditors 
The authorities of audit 3 - 3 - - 6 
committees 
The literacy of audit 1 - 6 - - 7 
committees 
The diligence of audit 1 1 4 - - 6 
committees 
The other two statements - - 1 1 - 2 
Total 10 2 24 3 - 39 
As shown in table 7-4,10 statements (25.6%) were significantly agreed at level 0.01 
in the view of external auditors, while 2 statements (5.1%) were significantly agreed 
at level 0.05. Interestingly, 24 statements (61.6%) were insignificant at level 0.05, 
whereas 3 statements (7.7%) were significantly disagreed at level 0.01. It can be 
concluded that only 12 statements (30.8%) were significantly agreed, whereas 27 
statements (69.2%) were either insignificant or significantly disagreed at various 
levels by the external auditors. 
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These results are inconsistent with Porter and Gendall (1998) findings that external 
auditors generally agree that audit committees fulfil their duties effectively. However, 
one of the objectives of the survey of (Porter and Gendall, 1998) was to ascertain the 
respondents' views on the attributes of audit committee members and of audit 
committee per se which help to ensure, or enhance, the effectiveness of audit 
committees. The differences in views that are found in this study are however similar 
to the results of Kalbers (1992a) who found that external auditors often rate audit 
committees significantly lower than audit committee members on the responsibilities, 
attributes, and effectiveness of audit committees. 
The varying results across the three samples thus gives a cause for concern over the 
role of audit committees in Saudi corporations especially when we consider that the 
last view perception is from the external auditors, who are independent from 
management. 
7-2-2-5 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) has long enjoyed the status of being the most used 
statistical technique in psychological research. The popularity and usefulness of this 
technique can be attributed to two sources (Howell, 1997: 299): 
First, the analysis of variance, like t, deals with differences between or among 
sample means; unlike t, it imposes no restriction on the number of means. 
Instead of asking whether two means differ, we can ask whether three, four, 
five, or k means differ. The analysis of variance also allows us to deal with two 
or more independent variables simultaneously, asking not only about the 
individual effects of each variable separately but also about the interacting 
effects of two or more variables. 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a technique that resolves the shortcoming of the 
t-test. It examines the means of subgroups in the sample and analyses the variances as 
well (Babbie and Halley, 1998: 170). It has the distinct advantage of being applicable 
when more than two means are being compared. Although ANOVA would not 
normally be applied when there are only two means, it is best illustrated using a 
familiar example (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002: 698). 
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Norusis (1998) claimed that a statistically significant F ratio tells you only that it 
appears unlikely that all population means are equal. It does not tell you which groups 
are different from each other. Usually when you have rejected the null hypothesis, you 
want to pinpoint exactly where the differences are. To do this, you must use multiple 
comparison procedures. The reason for not using many t tests is that when you make 
many comparisons involving the same means, the probability increases that one or 
more comparisons will turn out to be statistically significant, even when all the 
population means are equal. This is known as the multiple comparison problem. 
When you use a multiple comparison procedure (ANOVA), you can be more 
confident that you are finding true differences (Norusis, 1998). 
However, these comparisons need to be specified, or planned, before you analyse the 
data. Some caution needs to be exercised with this approach if you intend to specify a 
lot of different comparisons. Planned comparisons do not control for the increased 
risks of Type 1 errors. A Type 1 error involves rejecting the null hypothesis (e. g., 
there are no differences among the samples), when it is actually true. In other words 
there is an increased risk of thinking that you have found asignificant result when in 
fact it could have occurred by chance. The Scheffe test is the most cautious method 
for reducing the risk of a Type 1 error (Pallant, 2001: 174-175). Bryman and Cramer 
(1997); Cramer (1998) pointed out that the Scheffe test would be briefly outlined. 
This test is the most conservative in the sense that it is least likely to find significant 
differences between groups or, in other words, to make a Type 1 error (i. e. accepting a 
difference when there is no difference). It is also exact for unequal number of subjects 
in the groups. Further, Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (2000: 190) after 
describing many of multiple comparison tests stated, "stick to the commonly used 
Scheffe and Tukey-b tests and you cannot go wrong. " 
For this reason, Scheffe test has been conducted to compare the means between every 
two groups to identify if there are any significant differences between these groups. 
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Table 7-5 ANOVA test for the six groups between the three samples in the stud' 
(1) Audit (2) (3) 
Groups committee Internal External F Scheffe Test 
members auditors auditors 
M S. D. M S. D. M S. D. Value Sig Results Sig 
Corporate 3.60 . 74 3.65 . 75 3.20 . 79 5.812 . 004 1=2 . 957 
governance 1>3 
. 024 
2>3 
. U10 
The role with 4.01 . 
73 4.13 
. 
65 3.31 
. 66 24.103 . 
000 1=2 
. 620 
external auditors 1>3 000 
2>3 
. 000 
The role with 3.11 1.33 3.53 1.10 2.98 . 
86 3.755 
. 
025 1=2 
. 
150 
internal auditors 1=3 . 812 
2>3 
. 033 
Authorities of 3.29 1.02 3.97 . 
65 3.34 
. 65 12.968 . 000 2>1 . 000 
audit committees 1=3 . 947 
2>3 
. 
000 
Literacy of audit 3.62 . 
99 3.92 
. 74 3.08 . 
78 14.449 
. 
000 1=2 
. 183 
committees 1>3 
. 
004 
2>3 
. 000 
Diligence of audit 3.44 . 80 3.82 . 72 3.09 . 63 14.465 . 000 2>1 . 025 
committees 1>3 
. 
039 L- i 
2>3 
. 000 
The incan difference is significant at the. 05 level. 
It can be seen from table 7-5 regarding the first group on corporate governance that 
there is no significant difference in the perception of audit committee members and 
internal auditors toward this group. In this case we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
and conclude that audit committee members and internal auditors are likely to have 
similar evaluation towards the group of corporate governance. 
However, there is significant difference in the perception of audit committee members 
and external auditors. The associated p-value of . 024 signals that it is very unlikely to 
find such a value if the null hypothesis is true. We therefore reject our null hypothesis 
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and conclude that audit committee members and external auditors are likely to have 
different evaluation towards the group of corporate governance. The same result could 
be found between internal and external auditors. The associated p-value of . 010 
signals that the null hypothesis must be rejected and conclude that internal auditors 
significantly are likely to give more agreement than external auditors toward the 
group of corporate governance. 
As shown in table 7-5 regarding the second group, which is on the role of audit 
committees, the findings are similar across the three samples as with the group of 
corporate governance. There is no significant difference in the perception between 
audit committee members and internal auditors toward this group, whereas a highly 
significant difference has been found between audit committee members and external 
auditors. This means that the members evaluate the role of audit committees with the 
external auditors significantly more than external auditors. Another difference in 
views has also been found between internal and external auditors. As mentioned 
earlier, internal auditors as anticipated evaluate the role of audit committees with 
external auditors significantly more than external auditors. 
With respect to the third group, which is the role of audit committees with internal 
auditors, there is no significant difference between the perception of audit committee 
members and internal auditors in evaluating this role. Also, audit committee members 
and external auditors were significantly indifferent in their perception of the role of 
audit committees with internal auditors. In this case the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and we can conclude that audit committee members and internal auditors, 
audit committee members and external auditors are likely to have indifferent 
evaluation towards the group on the role of audit committees with internal auditors. 
However, there is a significant difference between internal and external auditors 
towards the role of audit committees with internal auditors. Whereas the mean value 
for this group was 3.53 in the view of internal auditors, it was only 2.98 in the view of 
external auditors. 
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Regarding the fourth group, which is on the authority of audit committees, internal 
auditors have a significantly different view with from the other two samples. There is 
a significant difference between internal auditors on one side with audit committee 
members and external auditors on the other. Internal auditors as usual evaluate the 
authority of audit committees significantly more than others. 
On the other hand, there is no significant difference between audit committee 
members and external auditors in evaluating the authority of audit committees. In this 
case there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that audit 
committee members and external auditors are likely to have an indifferent evaluation 
toward the group of authority of audit committees. 
With respect to the group of literacy of audit committees, the study found that there is 
no significant difference between audit committee members and internal auditors. 
However the ANOVA test shows that there is a significant difference between 
external auditors with both of audit committee members and internal auditors. While 
external auditors evaluate the literacy of audit committees at a mean of 3.08, members 
of audit committees evaluated this literacy as 3.62, whilst the internal auditors 
returned a mean of 3.92. It can be concluded that external auditors are likely to have a 
dissimilar evaluation with both audit committee members and internal auditors toward 
the group of literacy of audit committees. 
Concerning the last group, which on the diligence of audit committees, there are 
significant differences between the three samples. While internal auditors evaluate 
this group significantly more than the other two samples, audit committee members in 
turn assess this group significantly more than external auditors. In this case the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected and we can conclude that members of audit committees, 
internal auditors, and external auditors are likely to have differing views toward the 
diligence of audit committees. 
It can be concluded that in 18 pair comparisons, 12 comparisons (66.7%) were 
significant. On the other hand, there were 6 comparisons (33.3%) that were 
insignificant. The views of audit committee members and internal auditors were 
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significantly indifferent in 4 cases from 6, which represent 66.7%, whereas they were 
significantly different in 2 cases (33.3%). In both cases, which they were dissimilar, 
internal auditors evaluated the two groups significantly more than audit committee 
members. 
The views of audit committee members and external auditors were significantly 
different in four cases from 6, which represent 66.7%, whereas they were significantly 
indifferent in two cases (33.3%). In all cases that they were different, audit committee 
members assessed the four groups significantly more than external auditors. 
Interestingly, in all six pair comparisons, the views of internal auditors and external 
auditors were significantly different. Internal auditors evaluated the role of audit 
committees in all groups' highly more than external auditors. 
7-2-2-6 T-test for unrelated means of characteristics of respondents 
This test is used to determine if the means of two unrelated samples differ. It does this 
by comparing the difference between the two means with the standard errors of the 
difference in the means of different samples. This test compares the means of the two 
samples, such as the mean job satisfaction of male and female workers in a work 
survey (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). T test have been run to investigate whether some 
characteristics such as experience or qualifications have an effect on the perception of 
the samples in this study. 
The key to which situation to use lies in the first two columns labelled Levene's Test 
for Equality of Variances which is a test for the homogeneity of variance assumption 
of a valid t-test. Provided the test is not significant (p > 0.05), the variance can be 
assumed to be homogeneous and the-Equal Variances line of values for the t-test can 
be used (Kinnear and Gray, 2000: 160; Pallant, 2001: 179). Thus: 
" If p>0.05, then the homogeneity of variance assumption has not been 
violated and the normal t-test based on equal variance (Equal variances 
assumed) is used. 
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" If p<0.05, then the homogeneity of variance assumption has been violated 
and the normal t-test based on equal variances should be replaced by one 
based on separate variance estimates (Equal variances not assumed). 
7-2-2-6-1 The difference between members who are holders of SOCPA and not 
holders 
The t-test was run to recognise if there is a significant difference between participants 
who have the professional qualifications and those who have not. As mentioned 
earlier, audit committee members who have the SOCPA qualification are 8, whereas 
46 members do not have this qualification. Table 7-6 shows results of the t-test to 
compare means between the last two categories in all six groups of the study 
(corporate governance, the role with the external auditors, the role with the internal 
auditors, the authorities of audit committees, the literacy of audit committees, and the 
diligence of audit committees). 
Table 7-6 t-test to compare means between members who have SOCPA and 
members who have not 
SOCPA N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
G1 0 46 3.68 1.959 . 
055 
1 8 3.14 
G2 0 46 4.10 2.319 *. 024 
1 8 3.48 
G3 0 46 3.16 . 656 . 515 
1 8 2.83 
G4 0 46 3.34 . 863 . 392 
8 3.00 
G 46 3.72 1.738 . 088 
1 8 3.07 
G6 0 46 3.52 1.643 . 107 
1 8 3.02 
It can be seen from table 7-6 that there is only one significant difference between 
means of members of audit committees that have the SOCPA certification and those 
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who do not. This significant difference was in the second group, which is on the role 
of audit committees with the external auditors. Whereas the mean value of members 
who have SOCPA was 3.48, the mean value of members who do not have it was 4.10. 
It should be noted that the non-members of SOCPA evaluated the per florma lice of 
audit committees more than the members. 
7-2-2-6-2 The difference between CPA members and non CPA members 
The t-test was also run to examine if there are any differences between holders of 
CPA and others. 
Table 7-7 t-test to compare means between CPA members and non-CPA 
members 
__ ýCPA N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
G10 46 3.60 -. 159 . 874 
1 8 3.64 
G2 0 46 4.05 1.079 . 285 
1 8 3.75 
G3 0 46 3.12 . 083 . 
935 
1 8 3.08 
G4 0 46 3.41 1.526 . 
167 
1 8 2.56 
G5 0 46 3.50 -2.188 *. 033 
1 8 4.30 
G6 0 46 3.51 1.038 . 331 
1 8 3.04 
As shown in table 7-7 there is only a significant difference between the CPA holders 
and non-holders in the fifth group on the literacy of audit committees. Members who 
have the CPA certification significantly evaluated literacy of audit committees more 
than those who do not. 
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7-2-2-6-3 The difference between members who are holders of professional 
qualifications and others 
Finally a t-test was run to examine if there is a significant difference between holders 
of any of the professional qualifications such as SOCPA, CPA, CA and other 
members who have no such professional qualifications. 
Table 7-8 t-test to compare means between members who hold professional 
qualifications and non-holders 
Qualifications N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
G10 36 3.69 -1.308 . 
197 
1 18 3.42 
G2 0 36 4.17 -2.448 *. 018 
1 18 3.68 
G3 0 36 3.19 -. 605 . 548 
1 18 2.96 
G4 0 36 3.53 -2.647 011 
1 18 2.80 
G5 0 36 3.60 . 276 . 784 
1 18 3.67 
G6 0 36 3.60 -1.838 . 078 
1 18 3.13 
Table 7-8 shows that there are two significant differences between members of audit 
committees who have professional qualifications and others who do not have such 
qualifications. These significant differences were in the second group, which is on the 
role of audit committees with the external auditors, and in the fourth group, which is 
on the authority of audit committees. Interestingly, in both cases members of audit 
committees who do not have professional qualifications assesses significantly the 
performance of audit committees more than others who have such qualifications. 
It can be concluded that in 24 comparisons, there are only 4 (16.67%) comparisons 
that have significant differences between members of audit committees who have one 
or more professional qualifications and other members who have no professional 
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qualifications. Hence, there is no extraordinary effect of holding a professional 
qualification in evaluating the effectiveness of audit committees by members of audit 
committees. 
7-2-2-6-4 The difference between internal auditors who are CPA members and 
non members 
The t-test was run to recognise if there is any significant difference between internal 
who hold the CPA certification and others. 
Table 7-9 t-test to compare means between internal auditors who have CPA and 
those who do not 
------------- CPA N Mean 
-------- T ---- Sig (2-tailed) 
ýýi G10 39 3.63 -. 262 . 794 
1 16 3.69 
G2 0 39 4.15 . 
252 
. 
802 
1 16 4.10 
FG 30 39 3.40 -1.346 . 184 
16 3.84 
G4 0 39 3.93 -. 835 . 408 
1 16 4.06 
GS 0 39 3.95 . 400 . 691 
1 16 3.86 
G6 0 39 3.85 . 401 . 690 
1 16 3.76 
As shown in table 7-9, there is no significant difference in the views of internal 
auditors who have the CPA certification and their colleagues who do not. 
7-2-2-6-5 The difference between internal auditors who have a department for 
internal auditing and others 
The t-test was also used to explore if there are significant differences in views 
between internal auditors who work in a formal department for internal auditing and 
other internal auditors who have no such separate department. 
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Table 7-10 t-test to compare means between internal auditors who have 
departments for internal auditing and others 
Department N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
(; 1 0 10 3.86 -1.006 . 319 
1 45 3.60 
G2 0 10 4.36 -1.225 . 
226 
1 45 4.08 
G3 0 10 3.80 -. 862 . 392 
1 45 3.47 
G4 0 10 3.97 . 016 . 987 
1 45 3.97 
G5 0 10 4.36 -2.938 008 
1 45 3.82 
G6 0 10 4.00 -. 872 . 387 
1 45 3.78 
As shown in table 7-10, there is only one significant difference in views between 
internal auditors who work in departments of internal auditing and other internal 
auditors. This significant difference is in the fifth group, which is about the literacy of 
audit committees. Internal auditors who work without departments of internal auditing 
assessed significantly more the literacy of audit committees than their colleagues who 
work in departments for internal auditing. 
7-2-2-6-6 The difference between internal - auditors who are holders of 
professional qualifications and non holders 
Finally a t-test was run to examine if there are any significant differences between 
internal auditors who have professional qualifications and other internal auditors who 
have no such qualifications. 
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Table 7-11 t-test to compare means between internal auditors who have 
professional qualifications and others 
Qualifications N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
GI 0 30 3.57 . 846 . 401 
1 25 3.74 
G2 0 30 4.23 -1.248 . 218 
1 25 4.02 
G3 0 30 3.39 . 986 . 329 
1 25 3.69 
G4 0 30 3.96 . 176 . 861 
1 25 3.99 
G5 0 30 3.90 . 266 . 792 
1 25 3.95 
G6 0 30 3.96 -1.546 . 128 
1 25 3.66 
It can be clearly seen from table 7-11, there is no significant difference between 
internal auditors who have professional qualifications and those who do not have such 
qualifications. It can be concluded that out of 36 comparisons, only 2 (5.56%) had 
significant differences. Therefore, the effect of having a professional qualifications or 
working under different structures in internal auditing has little influence in evaluating 
the effectiveness of audit committees by internal auditors. 
7-2-2-6-7 The difference between external auditors who are holders and non- 
holders of the SOCPA certification 
As with the other samples, a t-test was also run to study if there are any significant 
differences in views between the third sample of external auditors who have the 
SOCPA certification and their colleagues who are not similarly certified. 
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Table 7-12 t-test to compare means between external auditors who have SO('PA 
qualification and others 
SOCPA N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
GtU 40 3.24 . 
497 621 
1 18 3.13 
G2 0 40 3.31 -. 065 . 
948 
1 18 3.32 
G3 0 40 3.09 1.521 
. 
134 
1 18 2.72 
(; 4 0 40 3.50 3.081 *. 003 
1 18 2.97 
GS 0 40 3.20 1.726 . 090 
1 18 2.83 
G6 0 40 3.23 2.443 *. 018 
1 18 2.81 
Table 7-12 shows that there are two significant differences in this category. These 
differences were in the fourth and sixth groups, which is on the authorities of audit 
committees and the diligence of audit committees. In both cases, non-holders of the 
SOCPA certification significantly evaluated the effectiveness of audit committees 
more than holders of this certification. 
7-2-2-6-8 The difference between external auditors who are CPA holders and 
non- holders 
The t-test was again ºun to explore whether there are significant differences in views 
between external auditors who have the CPA and those that do not. 
Table 7-13 t-test to compare means between external auditors who have CPA 
qualification and others 
CPA N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
G1 0 43 3.30 1.354 . 192 
1 15 2.92 
G2 0 43 3.40 1.823 . 074 
1 15 3.05 
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CPA N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
G3 0 43 3.02 . 
706 
. 
483 
1 15 2.84 
G4 0 43 3.35 . 326 . 745 
1 15 3.29 
G5 0 43 3.16 1.262 . 
212 
1 15 2.87 
G6 0 43 3.12 . 725 . 473 
1 15 3.01 
Table 7-13 shows that there is no significant difference in views between external 
auditors who have the CPA certification and their colleagues that are not similarly 
qualified. However, there is a slight difference, although not significant, between the 
two parties in the second group, which is the role of audit committees with external 
auditors. As usual, non-CPA holders consider the effectiveness of audit committees 
more than the holders. 
7-2-2-6-9 The difference between external auditors who are holders and non- 
holders of professional qualifications 
Finally a t-test was run to investigate if there are significant difference in views 
between external auditors who have professional qualifications and other external 
auditors who have no such professional qualifications. 
Table 7-14 t-test to compare means between external auditors who have 
professional qualifications and others 
Qualifications N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
ii G10 24 3.26 -. 422 . 674 
1 34 3.17 
G2 0 24 3.39 -. 757 . 452 
1 34 3.26 
G3 0 24 3.01 -. 257 . 798 
1 34 2.95 
G4 0 24 3.53 -2.015 *. 049 
1 34 3.20 
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Qualifications N Mean T Sig (2-tailed) 
G5 0 24 3.23 -1.226 225 
1 34 2.98 
G6 0 24 3.23 -1.302 . 201 
1 34 3.00 
It can be clearly seen from table 7-14 that there is only one significant difference in 
views between external auditors who have professional qualifications and their 
colleagues who do not have any professional qualification whatsoever. 't'his 
significantly difference was in the fourth group, which is on the authority of' audit 
committees. As mentioned earlier, non-holders of professional qualifications 
significantly evaluated the authority of audit committees more than holders of' these 
qualifications. 
It can thus be concluded that out of 30 comparisons, only 5 (16.67%) had significant 
differences. Therefore, it appears that having a professional qualification has little 
effect on evaluating the effectiveness of audit committees by external auditors. 
It should be noted that due to the small number of respondents in some categories, t- 
tests were not carried out, as the differences would probably not be significant. 
7-2-2-7 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for unrelated means of characteristics of 
respondents 
As mentioned earlier, the analysis of variance deals with differences between or 
among sample means, it imposes no restriction on the number of means. Instead of 
asking whether two means differ, we can ask whether three, four, five, or k means 
differ. For this reason, an ANOVA test was run to investigate whether there are 
significant differences between means of different characteristics of audit committee 
members, internal and external auditors such as job, no meetings, and duration of 
meetings. In addition the Scheffe test, which is a type of Post Hoc Test, was run to 
explore where the significant differences were. This test (Scheffe) is the most 
conservative in the sense that it is least likely to find significant differences between 
215 
Chapter Seven: Testing the Hypothesis & Discussion Loughborough University 
groups or, in other words, to make a Type 1 error (i. e. accepting a differcnce when 
there is no difference) (Pallant, 2001: 174-175). 
7-2-2-7-1 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different jobs of audit 
committee members 
The ANOVA test was run to explore the differences between different jobs of audit 
committee members, which are in eight categories such as (executive, non-executive, 
academics... etc) as presented in the last chapter. 
Table 7-15 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different jobs of audit 
committee members 
Groups F Sig Means Differences 
between 
. 
jobs 
Sig 
Group 1 4.470 . 
001 2 (3.20) 
3 (4.66) 
5 (3.13) 
3>2 
3>5 
*. 042 
*. 037 
Group 2 1.934 . 
086 
- 
Group 3 2.289 . 044 
Group 4 3.388 . 
005 4(4.00) 
5(2.10) 
4>5 *. 048 
Group 5 1.048 . 
412 
- 
Group 6 2.932 . 013 
It can be seen from table 7-15, there are three significant differences in views between 
the different roles of audit committee members. There are two significant differences 
in the first group, which is on corporate governance. In the first significant difference, 
the retired executives evaluated the role of audit committees in corporate governance 
more than executives in other companies. The other significant difference in this 
group was between the retired executives and academics. The former significantly 
assessed the role of audit committees in corporate governance more than the latter. It 
can be interpreted that retired executives as presented in tables 6-7 and 6-8 in the last 
216 
Chapter Seven: Testing the Hypothesis & Discussion Loughborough University 
chapter meet four times or more in a year. Further, they met for more than two hours 
during the year covered in this study. 
The last significant difference was in the fourth group, which is on the authority of 
audit committees. Non-executives significantly evaluated this role more than the 
academics. It can be concluded that in 336 comparisons (7 comparisons *8 jobs *6 
groups), there were only three 3 significant differences. 
7-2-2-7-2 ANOVA test to explore the differences between the various educational 
qualifications of audit committee members 
Also the ANOVA test was run to investigate whether there are significant differences 
between the different educational qualifications of audit committee members, which 
are in five categories (higher school, undergraduate in accounting or finance, 
undergraduate in other subject, postgraduate in accounting or finance, and 
postgraduate in other subject). It should be noted that the other educational 
qualification which would have fell in the sixth category was ignored because it was 
statistically irrelevant as there was only one respondent. 
Table 7-16 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different educational 
qualifications of audit committee members 
Groups F Sig Means Differences between Sig 
participants 
Group 1 2.853 . 034 
1 (4.63) 1>3 *. 041 
3 (3.38) 
4(3.29) 1 >4 *. 01 1 
5 (3.93) 5>4 *. 037 
Group 2 1.198 . 324 
Group 3 2.622 . 046 2 (3.52) 2>4 *. 010 
4 (2.45) 
5 (3.63) 5>4 *. 037 
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Groups F Sig Means Differences between Sig 
participants 
Group 4 2.939 . 030 1 (4.17) 1>4 
*. 049 
4 (2.75) 
2(3.55) 2>4 *. 010 
3 (3.92) 3>4 *. 029 
Group 5 1.073 . 380 
Group 6 2.495 . 
055 2 (3.75) 2>4 *. 005 
4 (3.05) 
It can be seen from table 7-16, there were 9 significant differences in views in respect 
of the various educational qualifications of audit committee members. In the first 
group on corporate governance, there were 3 significant differences. The first was 
between members that have a high school qualification and members who are 
graduates. Those who had a high school education significantly evaluated the role of 
audit committees in corporate governance more than others. Also, the high school 
members significantly evaluated this role more than their colleagues who had a 
postgraduate degree in accounting or business. In the sane vein, members who had 
their postgraduate degree in other subjects evaluated this role more than their 
postgraduate colleagues in accounting or business. 
In the third group on the role of audit committees with internal auditors, there were 2 
significant differences between graduate members in accounting or business with 
postgraduates' members in accounting or business. The graduates assessed the role of 
the audit committees with internal auditors more than their colleagues who had a 
postgraduate degree. The other significant difference was between those 
postgraduates' members who have a degree in accounting or business and 
postgraduates in other subjects who evaluated that role of audit committees more than 
postgraduates in accounting or business. 
There were 3 significant differences in the fourth group, which is on the authority of 
audit committees. The first difference was between high school members and 
members that have a postgraduate degree in accounting or business. Also, there were 
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differences between graduate members in accounting or business with postgraduates 
in the same subject. The last difference was between the postgraduates in accounting 
or business and graduates in other subject. In all three significant differences, 
members that have a postgraduate degree in accounting or business evaluated the 
authority of audit committees less than other parties. 
Finally, there was a significant difference in the sixth group on the diligence of audit 
committees. Members that were graduates in accounting or business significantly 
evaluated the diligence of audit committees more than their colleagues who had it 
postgraduate degree in the same subject. It should be noted that in 8 differences cases, 
postgraduate holders of degrees in accounting or business evaluated the effectiveness 
of audit committees significantly less than the other parties. This demonstrates that the 
members who had a postgraduate degree in accounting or business have a negative 
perception about the role of audit committees in Saudi corporations. 
7-2-2-7-3 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different the number of 
meetings of audit committee members 
An ANOVA test was also run to investigate whether there are significant differences 
between the different numbers of meetings of audit committee members, which are in 
five categories (once - twice - three times - four times - and more). 
Table 7-17 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different no. Meetings 
of audit committee members 
Groups F Sig Means Differences between 
participants 
Sig 
Group 1 3.614 . 
012 2 (3.25) 
4(4.14) 
4>2 *. 043) 
L Group 2 . 480 . 
750 
_ 
Group 3 1.819 . 140 
Group 4 2.321 . 070 
Group 5 2.594 . 048 _ 
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Croups F Sig Means Differences between 
participants 
Sig 
L (Group 6 1.528 . 
209 
_ 
As shown in table 7-17, there was only one significant difference between members 
that held different number of meetings. The only significant difference was in the first 
group on corporate governance. Members that met four times significantly evaluated 
the role of audit committees in corporate governance more than members that met 
only twice. This result seems to be normal since members that net flour times attach a 
higher importance to the role and effectiveness of audit committees. 
7-2-2-7-4 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different duration of 
meetings of audit committee members 
The ANOVA test was similarly run to investigate whether there are significant 
differences between audit committee members that have different duration in the time 
of their meetings, which are four categories after ignoring a category (half an hour), 
which contained only one member. 
Table 7-18 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different duration of 
meetings of audit committee members 
Groups F Sig Means Differences between Sig 
participants 
Group 1 4.382 . 008 
2 (3.02) 52 *. 023 
5 (3.94) 
Group 2 . 
726 . 
541 
- 
Group 3 3.874 . 
015 2(l. 74) 5>2 *. 015 
5 (3.51) 
Group 4 . 
339 . 797 - 
Group 5 8.534 . 000 2 (2.35) 3>2 *. 033 
3 (3.55) 
5(4.11) 5>2 000 
Group 6 . 
572 . 
636 
_ 
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It can be seen from table 7-18, there were 4 significant differences between members 
of audit committee members that have different duration of meetings. In the first 
group on corporate governance, members that met for more than two hours 
significantly evaluated this more than members that net for just an hour. In the third 
group, which is on the role of audit committees with internal auditors, members that 
met for more than two hours significantly evaluated this role more than members that 
met for only one hour. 
There were 2 significant differences in the fifth group, which is on the literacy of 
audit committees. Members that met for an hour and half significantly evaluated this 
role more than members that met for an hour. Also members that met for more than 
two hours evaluated the same role more than others that net for an hour. 
it should be noted that whenever members meet for longer times, they evaluate the 
effectiveness of audit committees more than others that meet for a lesser duration. 
7-2-2-7-5 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different experiences of 
internal auditors 
An ANOVA test was run to examine the differences between internal auditors that 
have different levels of experiences. The total categories for internal auditors were 
four. 
Table 7-19 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different experiences 
of internal auditors 
----- Groups 
---- -------- F - Sig Means ---------------- --- Differences between 
participants 
Sig 
Group 1 2.602 . 062 
Group 2 1.244 . 304 
Group 3 2.293 . 089 
Group 4 . 785 . 
508 
Group 5 1.671 . 
185 
- - 
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Groups F Sig Means Differences between 
participants 
Sig 
Group 6 
II 
1.135 . 344 - 
It can be seen from table 7-19, there is no significant difference between participants 
of internal auditors that have several experiences. This shows that there is no effect of, 
variety of experience among internal auditors on the evaluating the effectiveness of 
audit committees. It can be concluded that all different experiences of internal 
auditors have no significant difference in views. 
7-2-2-7-6 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different experiences of 
external auditors 
Similarly the ANOVA test was run to examine the differences between external 
auditors that have different experiences. The total categories for external auditors 
were four. 
Table 7-20 ANOVA test to explore the differences between different experiences 
of external auditors 
Groups F Sig Means Differences between 
participants 
Sig 
Group 1 . 505 . 680 
it Group 2 . 292 . 
831 
Group 3 
li . 
449 . 
719 
- - 
Group 4 . 
229 . 
876 
- - 
Group 5 . 788 . 506 - - 
Group 6 . 558 . 
645 
As shown in table 7-20, there is no significant difference between external auditors 
that have different experiences. This result seems to be similar to that of the internal 
auditors', which found that there is no effect of variety of experience among internal 
auditors on evaluating the effectiveness of audit committees. 
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7-3 SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYSIS 
The main objectives of this study were to evaluate the effectiveness of audit 
committees by comparing actual practice with best practice. The other objective was 
to identify whether there are significant differences between the three samples toward 
the six groups of this study. To achieve these objectives, the t-test has been run among 
audit committee members, internal auditors, and external auditors to determine if the 
difference between those respondents from the neutral (which is number 3) was 
significance or not. Concerning audit committee members, the groups related to the 
role of audit committees with internal auditors, authorities of audit committees, and 
the other two statements are an area of growing concern over the role of audit 
committees in Saudi corporations especially since we know that this perception are 
from members of audit committees themselves. 
About internal auditors, the result demonstrates that internal auditors hold audit 
committees in high regard and they perceive them to have a very high level of 
effectiveness in fulfilling their duties among Saudi corporations. The last perception is 
however inconsistent with the perception of external auditors who evaluate audit 
committees lower than the other two samples. 
The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was run to investigate whether there are 
differences between the three samples toward evaluating audit committees. It has the 
distinct advantage of being applicable when more than two means are being 
compared. Usually when rejecting the null hypothesis, the exact areas of differences 
need to be exactly pinpointed. To do this, multiple comparison procedures, which 
were used in this study includes the Scheffe test. It was found that in 18 pair 
comparisons, 12 comparisons (66.7%) were significant. 
The views of audit committee members and internal auditors were not significantly 
different in 4 cases from 6, which represent 66.7%. In both cases that they were 
dissimilar, internal auditors evaluated the two groups significantly more than audit 
committee members. This result seems to be inconsistent with the results of Kalbers 
(1992b) who found that internal auditors rated audit committee effectiveness 
significantly lower than the audit committee members. 
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The views of audit committee members and external auditors were significantly 
different in four cases from 6, represent (66.7%). In all cases that were different, audit 
committee members assessed the four groups significantly more than external 
auditors. Interestingly, in all six pair comparisons, the views of internal auditors and 
external auditors were significantly different. Certainly internal auditors evaluated the 
role of audit committees in all groups more highly than external auditors. Also a t-test 
was run to investigate whether some characteristics such as experience or 
qualifications had an effect on the perception of the samples in this study. 
Finally the ANOVA test was run to investigate whether there are significant 
differences between means of different characteristics of audit committee members, 
internal and external auditors such as job, no meetings, and duration of meetings. It 
can be concluded that there is no numerous effect of characteristics of the three 
samples on the direction of evaluating the effectiveness of audit committees. 
The next chapter presents the interviews that have been held with 18 interviewees 
divided equally between the three samples (audit committee members, internal and 
external auditors). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE INTERVIEWS 
8-1 INTRODUCTION 
In addition to the questionnaire discussed in the previous chapter, a number of 
interviews were held with audit committee members, internal and external auditors. 
This seemed to be an appropriate method for collecting data to evaluate the 
effectiveness of audit committees in Saudi corporations. Six cases in each sample 
(audit committee members, internal and external auditors) were picked. These samples 
have, been chosen according to the responses that have been received from the 
respondents, which consented to the researcher contacting them further. The objective 
of these interviews was to allow respondents to further develop their views, whereas 
closed questions (as in the questionnaire) locked respondents into arbitrarily limited 
alternatives (Foddy, 1999: 127). Perhaps the most persistent criticism of closed 
questions - that were used in the questionnaire - is that pre-set response options are 
likely to cause respondents to give answers they would not give if they had to provide 
them for themselves whereas the open questions show how a respondent has 
interpreted the phenomenon. However, as Foddy (1999: 152) pointed out, 
rnethodologists who have considered the issues have tended to settle on the 
compromise position that a judicious mix of open and closed questions is appropriate. 
Therefore, this method was adopted to gain an insight into the views of the 
respondents about the effectiveness of audit committees as well as the problems they 
face in carrying out their responsibilities. Finally, the use of this method will also 
snake it possible to compare between their views so as to enrich this research with 
some recommendations. 
Hussey and Hussey (1997: 156) suggest unstructured and/or semi-structured 
interviews are an appropriate method when: 
It is necessary to understand the construct that the interviewee uses as a basis 
for his or her opinions and believes about a particular matter or situation; 
One aim of the interview is to develop an understanding of the respondent's 
`world' so that the researcher might influence it, either independently or 
collaboratively (as might be the case with action research). 
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Since researches among audit committees (except the study of Al-Twaijry et al, 2002 
that was published in October 2002 which obtained information in Saudi Arabia in 
late 1998 through the use of interviews conducted with academics, external and 
internal auditors) in Saudi Arabia have still - to my knowledge - not been conducted 
to evaluate this experiment and to study the current practice for audit committees, this 
study tries to explore these issues by conducting some interviews. 
The questions, which were designed earlier, are as follows: 
1) For audit committee members: 
- Are you an executive or non-executive director? 
- After eight years of audit committees 
in Saudi Arabia, how do you evaluate the 
Saudi experiment? 
- What are the main advantages and 
disadvantages of audit committees in Saudi 
corporations? 
Do you think that audit committees have achieved their objectives, and why? 
What are your recommendations for developing the level of audit committee's 
effectiveness? 
Do you have anything else you want to add it? 
2) For internal and external auditors: 
After eight years of audit committees in Saudi Arabia, how do you evaluate the 
Saudi experiment? 
What are the main advantages and disadvantages of audit committees in Saudi 
corporations? 
Do you think that audit committees have achieved their objectives, and why? 
Do you think that the internal (external) auditors have benefited from the 
establishment of audit committees? 
What are your recommendations for developing the level of audit committee's 
effectiveness? 
Do you have anything else you want to add it? 
These questions appeared to be sufficient for the establishment of a comprehensive 
picture of the current practice of audit committees in Saudi Arabia. Any additional 
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questions might taken a longer time to complete, which may make the respondents 
reluctant to hold the interviews. It should be noted that 18 interviews were held 
equally between audit committee members, internal and external auditors. The 
interviewees were selected from a non-random sample and conducted in April and 
May 2002 based on the result of the responses received from respondents in the 
questionnaire. The duration of the interviews was between 30 and 90 minutes. The 
interviewees amongst others included the head of the internal audit department under 
the internal audit category of this study and two partners from one of the biggest 
accounting firms in Saudi Arabia under the external auditors category. 
8-2 THE INTERVIEWS WITH AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
With respect to whether the interviewee was an executive or non-executive director, 
members A, D, E, and F are non-executive members from the board of directors. 
Interestingly, Member B was an executive director in the same company where he was 
an audit committee member. This is an obvious violation of the Ministry of Commerce 
resolution that requires corporations to establish audit committees from non-executive 
directors. According to Menon and Williams (1994), they pointed out that the SEC 
notes that having insiders (chief executive in the same company) on an audit 
committee may be worse than having no committee at all. Finally, member C is an 
academic in department of accounting at one of Universities in Saudi Arabia. 
Regarding the evaluation the Saudi experiment, member A stated that audit 
committees seem to be unsuccessful, and B considered that audit committees had not 
being as successful as expected. Because of the differences in practice between Saudi 
Arabia and the USA and UK: "the resolution of establishing audit committees in Saudi 
Arabia was considered to be a false attempt to imitate the practice in those countries. " 
However, member C agreed that this experiment was useful and has helped many 
companies in financial and accounting matters. Moreover, members D and E saw it as 
a pioneering experiment and that the shareholders should feel safe with it. Finally, 
member F thought that he could not say that audit committees were successful since 
they required further powers in order to be effective and the resolution had not been 
implemented sufficiently. 
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Regarding the advantages of the audit committees, member A said that "audit 
committees are without advantages because they are not awe-inspiring. " Also, 
member B mentioned that there were no tangible benefits from audit committees. On 
the other hand, member C claimed that these committees enlighten the board of 
directors on financial and accounting matters. Moreover, "they make management and 
the board of directors behave better and make the external auditors more serious when 
they audit companies. " Furthermore, internally problems can be identified early before 
publishing the financial reports. Member D asserted that audit committees enhanced 
the independence of external and internal auditors, and improved the performance of 
board of directors. The view of member E was not dissimilar from previous members. 
Finally, member F claimed that audit committees did not do anything except nominate 
external auditors. The final decision was for the board of directors since the report of 
audit committees was just a recommendation. 
Regarding the disadvantages of audit committees, member A mentioned a number of 
weaknesses in the current practice. He claimed that his committee meets at most twice 
and usually only once a year. As well, "the committee comprises the Chief Executive 
Director and other executive directors. They meet to discuss when and how to replace 
the furniture", said member A. "The major problem is that the resolution of 
establishing audit committees was made without careful consideration. " Member A 
continued, "the decisions of audit committee are not influential i. e. they do not have 
sufficient authority. Usually the audit committee flatters and uses their personal 
judgements when they detect irregularities or violations. Another weakness was that 
the resolution concentrated on the board of directors. Even non-executives cannot 
ignore the policies of executives. " 
Member B (the executive) criticised the resolution of the Ministry of Commerce 
(1994) because there were no standards or charters with which to compare the practice 
of his committee. Member B also believed that "members of audit committees view 
themselves as investigators to control the management. " He claimed that "the 
background of some members is poor and they have been chosen on the basis of 
patronage. " There was no plan or charter for members as suggested by researchers, 
which made the duties of audit committees unorganised. Therefore, "the 
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implementation of audit committees is jumbled. " The main problem member B 
mentioned was that boards of directors in corporations were not qualified to fulfil this 
important role. 
Member C pointed out "there are many bureaucratic procedures since members of 
audit committees are from board of directors. More significantly many members are 
from fields that are outside accounting. " It should be noted that the resolution of 
Ministry of Commerce (1994) required the members of audit committees to have 
appropriate qualifications in accounting or finance. Member D stated that "duties that 
have been assigned by the Ministry of Commerce are very limited in spite of the fact 
that some committees do more things than others and some meet from 10-12 times a 
year and the durations are for 6-8 hours. " 
According to member E, he was concerned that uncertainty about the responsibilities 
of audit committees was one of their problems as well as lack of accountability from 
the Ministry of Commerce. He asked "how can committees perform their tasks if we 
know that many board of directors meet once or twice a year and their reports are 
prepared in advance? " 
Finally, member F said "the remote distance, which is between companies and 
members of audit committees is a big problem (he lived in Riyadh and was a member 
of audit committee in Madinah more than 700 km away). Moreover, most members of 
audit committees are from board of directors of the same company, which means that 
everything is still as it was before. " 
Regarding the achievement of audit committees, member A stated: "audit committees 
did not achieve anything because they are not different from the executive directors in 
companies. " Member A concluded that "audit committees are just rubber-stamps. " 
Member B shared the previous member's view and he "cannot find any real 
accomplishment of audit committees. " 
On the other hand, member C claimed that audit committees have achieved their 
objectives because the important thing is that the audit process is carried out with all 
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seriousness. Prior to audit committees, appointment of auditor was for the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM), which had no knowledge about the process of the selection 
of external auditor. Therefore, the present situation made a positive difference. 
Member D argued that audit committees achieved most of their objectives and the 
most important goal was to give confidence to shareholders and investors. 
Concerning member E who claimed that "there are some companies that achieved the 
aim of audit committees since they met more than four times a year for a long time 
and their commitment was clearly seen and is ideal. However, there are some 
companies that have done nothing. " Therefore, the success of audit committees is 
variable between the companies since the resolution of Ministry of Commerce did not 
explain how audit committees should fulfil their duties. 
Member F stated "the idea of audit committees is excellent but the current practice is 
not as expected because these duties have been entrusted to unqualified members. 
They have been nominated according to the personal relationships and favouritism. " 
With respect to the recommendations of the participants, member A suggests that a 
work plan for audit committees (charters and agendas) should be established for a 
whole year since members spent very little time with the company and they did not 
know much about what was happening in the company. Member A considered that the 
proposal for the external auditor to be rotated after three years as decided by Ministry 
of Commerce, was a very short time. He continued, "members should have sufficient 
accounting knowledge and experience but many members have qualifications in 
history or geography therefore; everything is controlled by board of directors. If 
executive directors were in the position for a long term, they might consolidate their 
positions and even carry out responsibilities as if the company belongs to them. " 
Member B confessed that there were clear concerns from the organisers of the auditing 
profession in Saudi Arabia but before establishing any resolution they should have 
explained and spread the awareness and knowledge to all sectors that were interested 
in these resolutions. Further, more members of audit committees needed full training 
and orientation to be qualified for their jobs. 
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Member C suggested that all members of audit committees should be qualified in 
accounting or business and that should be a key recommendation. Also, he proposed 
"reducing the bureaucratic procedures and the business routine since it is just time 
consuming. " Finally, he recommended regular meetings between audit committee 
members and board of directors to carry out their responsibilities as required. 
Member D suggested "Saudi corporations should utilise the service of qualified and 
fully experienced personnel that are available in the private sectors by appointing them 
to audit committees. " Also, "members should be from a wide variety of backgrounds. " 
Member D concentrated on the role of board of directors when they nominate 
members of audit committees. If board of directors were interested in having good 
corporate governance in their companies they would nominate qualified members and 
give them sufficient authority. He stated "reasonable transparency should be shown by 
corporations when financial reports are issued. " Interestingly member D said that "he 
is a member of three audit committees and in all these companies there is a very clear 
charter and all responsibilities are explained. " 
Member E recommended that all audit committees should issue reports about their 
activities during the previous year. This report should be published with the annual 
financial reports. Also, he advocated that the way of nomination of audit committee 
members should be more open and justified. Moreover, all educational and 
professional qualifications should be clearly explained and sent to the Ministry of 
Commerce to keep in their records since many audit committees do not comply with 
these regulations. Member E also suggested that the Ministry of Commerce "should 
undertake to control the corporations as opposed to other parties, otherwise they 
should delegate other party such as SOCPA or any other else to follow up the 
resolution of the Ministry of Commerce (1994) for establishing audit committees in 
Saudi corporations and this party should issue a report about the compliance of these 
companies with the previous resolution. " This compliance report could be used when 
companies seek to have loans from banks or any other lenders. "These loans will not 
be given unless this party issues a positive report about audit committees in these 
companies. " 
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Finally, member F suggested that members of audit committees should be from the 
large shareholders since the current regulation meant that shareholders only had to 
have 20 shares to be members of audit committees. "In Saudi Arabia, the nominal rate 
for shares usually is 100 SR; so 20 shares (2000 SR) enable shareholders to be 
members of audit committees. The capital of most corporations reaches 1000 SR 
million. In the Annual General Meeting when shareholders vote, the owners of a lot of 
shares are equal with the owners of little shares, which is totally unfair. " Member F 
believes that audit committee members should own much more than 20 shares as 
required in the present regulation. 
Regarding final comments, member A thought that audit committees "should 
comprise a variety members such as shareholders, auditors, academics, and 
businessmen. Board of directors ought to be outside audit committees. " The Ministry 
of Commerce should have produced a clear and exhaustive mechanism before 
publishing the resolution. It was pointed out it was brought in too early. 
Member C was satisfied with the achievement of audit committees on the basis of his 
membership of 3 audit committees. Also, the impression member D gave about audit 
committees was very positive since he thought his three audit committees were doing 
well. 
Member E suggested that the role of external auditors should be expanded to include 
review of the reports of board of directors so as to establish the level of compliance 
with companies act and to detect weak performance of boards. "This expansion of the 
role of external auditors would contribute to highlighting that auditors are not 
responsible when failure or bankruptcy happens in the future. " 
Finally, member F stated that "he did not like to see too many checks and controlling 
factors, which might prove a weighty hindrance on corporations. Individuals within 
corporations would perhaps find themselves repeating routine procedures 
unnecessarily". In brief, he thought audit committees did not discharge their duties as 
expected. "I think that the resolution for establishing audit committees in Saudi Arabia 
was an imitation of that in the USA and the UK despite the massive cost for its 
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establishment. In some committees, they tend to increase their meetings to have more 
salaries. However, unless these committees have the desire to work elicctively and 
become close to companies, their effectiveness will be an illusion. " 
The views of audit committee members can be concluded in the löllowing table: 
Table 8-1 Summary of the views of audit committee members 
Question Member Member Member Member Member Member 
A B C D E F 
Status Non- Executive Academic Non- Non-executive Non- 
executive executive executive 
)Evaluation Unsuccessful Not as Useful Excellent Excellent Cannot 
expected say 
successful 
Advantages Without No tangible Enlighten the Enhanced Similar to Only 
advantages benefits boards - reduce independence member I) nominate 
personal -- improve external 
relationship - performance auditors 
make auditors of boards 
more serious - 
detect problems 
early 
Disadvantages Scarcity of No charter Bureaucracy - no The Obscurity in Remote 
meetings - - viewed as knowledge in resolution responsibilities distances 
comprise of investigators accounting limits the - no between 
CED and - no duties accountability companies 
other knowledge - scarcity of and 
directors -- no - chosen on meetings members 
authority - personal - 
flatter when relationship comprised 
irregularities - boards of boards' 
were found - are not members 
concentrating qualified 
on boards 
Accomplishments Nothing - 
Nothing Enhance audit Gives Some achieved Not as 
just rubber process - good confidence and some no, it expected 
stamps choice for to other depends on because 
auditors parties members members 
are not 
qualified 
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Question Member 
A 
Member 
B 
Member 
C 
Member 
D 
Member 
_E 
Member 
F 
Recommendations Charter and Awareness Qualifications in Qualified Pt hlish report Menibci:, S 
agenda - for all accounting or and about activities should be 
knowledge parties - business - reduce experienced changed the from big 
and training for bureaucracy - members - way of sharchold- 
qualifications members more meetings variety nomination ers 
in accounting between members - members 
members and authority - transparency 
boards of transparency control from 
directors the Ministry or 
SOCPA 
AnN, thing else Members _ 
Satisfied with its Satisfied F? xpand the role No need 
must not be contribution as with its of auditors to to many 
from board of working in 3 contribution review board of controller 
directors - companies as working directors parties 
clear in 3 reports AC in SA 
mechanism companies are 
for AC incitation 
to IIK, 
USA 
desire to 
work 
stay near 
companies 
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8-3 THE INTERVIEWS WITH INTERNAL AUDITORS 
Internal auditor A claimed that this experiment was still in its early stages and more 
time was needed to evaluate it. He considered that actual practice could be divided 
into two main categories: 1- Banks, 2- other corporations. "I think audit committees in 
banks are much better than other corporations but as mentioned earlier it is too early to 
evaluate this new system after only eight years. " The reason that audit committees in 
banks are better than others is because in banks there are double control parties, which 
are the Ministry of Commerce and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). The 
organiser of this resolution need to ensure that audit committees are achieving their 
objectivities and not merely filling a legal vacuum. Also, shareholders had little 
knowledge about the audit committees, which were supposed to be working of their 
behalf. 
Internal auditor B mentioned that "this experiment is excellent, the committee in our 
company comprises the head of internal auditing department, one person from the 
financial management department, another from the budgets and reports department 
and the last one from the human resources department. Their task is to send 
information about the financial variances to the board of director. " Also, they have to 
respond to the enquires of the external auditor. This is the presumed duty, but in the 
actual practice "audit committee members are dependent on the management and 
therefore might be not be inclined to do any thing against the management so as to 
keep their jobs. " 
Internal auditor C again mentioned that this experiment was still in its early stages and 
the outputs of these committees were not clear. He considered that "their role was very 
limited; they just concentrate on nominating the external auditor. There is an obvious 
failure in the performance of their duties since they only meet twice a year. " 
Internal auditor D thought, the existence of audit committees was a positive benefit. 
However, the assessment depends on many factors, and "there are many differences 
between companies in the actual practice. The role of internal auditing in applying the 
objectives of the committees is important since they can help audit committees in 
discharging their duties. As well, the success of a committee depends on the skills and 
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abilities of the team of internal auditors because it is key in respect of the effectiveness 
of audit committees. " 
Internal auditor E indicated that "the resolution was a good idea, but we need to make 
many changes such as the charter, required qualifications in accounting and expertise, 
to move from this excellent idea to the best practice. Actually, there is an apparent 
inadequacy in practice, which really affects the operation of these committees. " 
Finally, internal auditor F thought "this experiment is not success because audit 
committees are not concerned with the system of internal controls. Also, the low or 
absence of interaction between the audit committees and the internal auditors is a 
significant problem. " In addition, the resolution did not explain the duties and 
responsibilities of audit committees. So, "they only nominate the external auditors. " 
With respect to the advantages of audit committees, internal auditor A mentioned "the 
benefits of audit committees are very little since the process of nominating external 
auditors is actually valueless. " Internal auditor B considered that audit committees 
report financial variance to the board of directors, "which is a valuable role. " 
Internal auditor C claimed that since the committee did not work well, and it was 
difficult to find any advantages. "Theoretically, these committees have many benefits 
if you have a good committee, which is able to control the management. However, 
because this committee is not interested in any matter except the nomination of 
external auditor, so they are concerned with just this small area. It should be noted that 
before audit committees, management was controlling the process of selecting the 
external auditors. When they feel satisfied with the external auditor, he will have the 
long extension for unlimited time. " 
Internal auditor D pointed out that "the scope of auditing for internal auditors was 
enhanced. However, the audit committee was not interfere with day-to-day working of 
internal auditors. They usually review the reports in general. " Internal auditor E 
believed that the significance of auditing was increased after the resolution of audit 
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committees. "The concept of auditing became a vital issue to many companies 
immediately after the creation of audit committees. " 
Finally, internal auditor F stated that "establishing audit committees makes the process 
of nominating the external auditors objective. Also, the comments of external auditors 
are carefully reviewed by the audit committee. The presence of the audit committee 
has given confidence and assurance to the shareholders since they have selected this 
committee. The capability of management has been increased since they are 
accountable. At last, audit committees give confidence to the national economy as a 
whole. " 
Regarding the disadvantages of audit committees, internal auditor A mentioned that 
"the authority of these committees is very little because they are not independent 
enough. The appointment of members to these committees is by the nomination of the 
board of directors according to personal relationships. " As a result, "how can audit 
committees control the management? Shareholders are responsible for this problem 
since they have no idea about business and also since they do not attend to the Annual 
General Meeting. The major difficulty is that an audit committee member is not 
qualified enough to feed back the internal auditor. " 
Interestingly, internal auditor B claimed that "the report of the audit committee goes to 
Chief Executive Director who can modify the contents of this report. Also, the 
information that audit committees receive is not complete since some information 
might be kept from them. The audit committee in this company meet twice a year 
when four times is the minimum number that should be held for meetings. Usually, 
members are not qualified and they have no accounting or financial knowledge except 
some of them. There is no communication 
between shareholders and the committee. 
To be honest, the objectives for establishing audit committees have not been achieved 
yet since we are still far from the best practice. Members should be independent in 
order to be bold in making their decisions. " Finally, 
internal auditor B thought audit 
committee members should be rotated to ensure their 
independence. "This is because 
some members serve for eight years, which is very 
long time. " 
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Internal auditor C pointed out that "at present, the independence of the committees is 
relative because they were nominated by the board of directors. There was some 
conflict between the committee and management since it happens occasionally, and 
this leads to misunderstanding and not interaction between them. Management feels 
that committees are controlling them. " Therefore, "they may put some restrictions on 
the activities of audit committees. Sometimes, management recommends to board of 
directors that audit committees should be restricted and the board agrees to this 
recommendation. " Moreover, "there is no sufficient concern from the board of 
directors in nominating specialists to the audit committee. In most cases, there are no 
adequate specialists in accounting to be appointed as members, which is one of the 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of audit committees. " 
Internal auditor D claimed that "many members of audit committees, who are also 
members of the board of directors, have no knowledge or qualifications in business. 
They are only there because they are rich or wealthy. The task of the external auditor 
is specialised and; so members of audit committees have no ability to follow them. " 
This person thought the knowledge they have will be minimal. 
Internal auditor E pointed out that he knew many audit committee members none of 
whom were specialists in accounting or business and they were members on the board 
of directors. "One of those members is a specialist 
in one of the pure sciences, so you 
can imagine which criteria they are 
looking for when they nominate an external 
auditor. Low fees are the most 
important criteria for audit committee members when 
they nominate an audit firm. " 
Finally, internal auditor F mentioned that "there is no specific role for audit 
committees with respect to internal auditors. 
Also, the committee in one company was 
established in 1997, which meant a 
delay of three years to comply with the resolution 
published in 1994. They are concentrating their efforts on nominating the external 
auditor. There is also no guideline on 
how audit committee carries out their 
responsibilities such as charter or a guidebook. 
After all, members are not qualified 
enough or specialists in the area of auditing, and they are also not committed 
full-time 
to the responsibilities of the company. " 
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With respect to whether audit committees achieved their objectives, internal auditor A 
did not believe that audit committees achieved their aims for many reasons: 
"inadequate number of qualified members, lack of awareness about the purposes of 
audit committees, lack of members' independence. Also, little knowledge about an 
entity's business (firm-specific knowledge) is one of the problems that face audit 
committees. " 
Internal auditor B mentioned that "the goals of audit committees have not been 
achieved yet. " Similarly, internal auditor C agrees that "the objectives were not clear. " 
On the other hand, internal auditor D claimed that "audit committees have moderately 
achieved their objectives since they carry out an important role in protecting the 
shareholders' interests overall. " 
In addition, internal auditor E supported the previous view because he believes that 
"audit committees attained some of their aims but not all. " The last participant F 
points out that "audit committees achieved many objectives particularly in nominating 
external auditors and reviewing their comments. " 
With respect to the benefit to the internal auditors of the development of an audit 
committee, internal auditor A mentioned that "theoretically, audit committees should 
help the internal auditors in two main fields: 1- enhance their independence; 2- 
develop their positions by making sure that the management looks into the points of 
weaknesses that internal auditors discover. In fact, the last two benefits are restricted 
since audit committees are not qualified enough to 
be helpful to internal auditors. " 
Internal auditor B pointed out that "audit committees added something new to internal 
auditing, which is the interaction with the 
board of directors. In the past, they were 
only interacted with the management. Also, the role of 
internal auditors has increased 
dramatically. However, the independence matter is still continuing since an internal 
auditor is dependent on the chief executive 
director in all affairs. " 
Internal auditor C claimed that "the internal auditors did not benefit from the 
establishment of audit committees as expected. 
The internal auditors are actually 
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influenced and pressured by management, therefore management restrain internal 
auditors from raising any subject related to management. " Internal auditor D 
maintained that "independence did not change because it was not present. However, 
the awareness of the role of internal auditors has risen since there are many seminars 
and regular sessions and courses in companies about the role of internal auditors. " All 
of these activities have been taken place after the establishment of audit committees. 
"I mean it has advanced the role of internal auditors by informing internal auditors on 
how they realise the risks inside companies and how they detect it. " Similarly, the role 
of internal auditors "has changed from reviewing invoices to participating in putting 
strategy and plans of companies together. Also, internal auditors were able to follow 
up the operations of companies as a whole. To sum up, there has been big change in 
the manner of thinking about the role of internal audit and audit committees inside 
companies. " 
Internal auditor E pointed out that "in spite of audit committees existing since 1996 in 
the company where I work, they did not realise the significance of the role of internal 
auditors. " Therefore, "I was assigned as an internal auditor in 2002. Also, all reports 
that I prepared were sent directly to the general manager and the head of the board of 
directors. There is no legal need to send reports to the audit committee. " 
Finally, internal auditor F claimed that "audit committees achieved some of their 
objectives related to nomination of the external auditor and reviewing his comments. 
However, they are still in the early stages in respect of relating to internal control and 
auditing. I think internal auditors did not benefit from existing audit committees until 
now. " 
With respect to the recommendations of internal auditors, internal auditor A suggested 
that "a supervisory party should exist to ensure the full independence of audit 
committees and to ensure that they are comply with the legal requirement in order to 
be sure that the member should not be a member of the executive board of directors. " 
However, "we have to distinguish between the controls in banks, which is better than 
others since there is another control party, which is the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency. " For this reason, the Ministry of Commerce should perform the supervisory 
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role as recommended or the job should be entrusted to another institution that can do it 
in reality. Also, "I would suggest that since most of the current members do not have 
accounting or financial competence, it would be better if others such as external 
auditors participate in these committees. " 
Internal auditor B pointed out that "members should update their knowledge by 
reading the specialist journals and periodicals in accounting and auditing from the 
USA and the UK, AICPA releases, and the publications of the large auditing firms. " 
Moreover, "members must be completely independent, so their reports should be sent 
to the board of directors. " 
Internal auditor C suggested that "members should be carefully selected from 
specialists in accounting and auditing. Also, wide authority should be given to audit 
committees, and management should be prevented from putting obstacles in the way 
of audit committees. Audit committees should, as well, undertake the responsibility of 
choosing/changing the head of internal auditing to ensure his independence. In many 
companies, there are some outside members, which is very positive for their 
independence. Also, those outside members are usually qualified for their duties. " 
Internal auditor D recommended that "internal auditors should be independent and 
they should be fully associated with the audit committees. Also, members should 
increase their effort in order to attend more meetings; spend more time in the 
companies. Remuneration that is paid to members should be increased so as to give 
them more incentive to increase their efforts. " 
Internal auditor E suggested a closer relationship between audit committees and 
internal auditors to facilitate sharing views about important matters in companies and 
to discuss about the problems that the internal auditor might identify. "I highly 
recommend that an expert in accounting and auditing who is financially literate 
should be one of the members of the audit committee. 
" Finally, internal auditor F 
suggested that the existing responsibilities as well as roles of audit committees "should 
be made known to the public so that they will be informed about what audit 
committees are doing on their behalf. Also, members should be specialists in 
I 
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accounting and auditing area instead of the current situations whereby those who have 
no knowledge about financial statements are members of audit committees. " 
With respect to any final thoughts, internal auditor A adds, "we cannot deny that the 
auditing profession has significantly developed in Saudi Arabia. However, there 
should be clear criteria and charters for the working of audit committees and internal 
auditing. This is still lacking and there are no standards or guidance on how audit 
committees and internal auditing should work together. " Internal auditor A also 
believed that "it was too early to evaluate audit committees since they were 
established only 8 years ago. Internal auditing as a legal requirement in Saudi 
corporations has been required for more than 20 years and still at the present moment; 
it has not been applied well yet. Hence, audit committees need more time to bring out 
their effectiveness clearly. " Internal auditor B did not add anything further. 
Internal auditor C stresses the independence of internal auditors and their connection 
with audit committees. "Audit committees need to strive harder to reach the required 
level of competence. The main problem is that, in many cases, general managers are 
engineers so they usually adopt the views of chief financial officer even if this is in 
conflict with the views of the internal auditor, which might lead to frustration of 
internal auditor. The general manager should understand that audit committees did not 
come to terminate his job and future but they have come to help him in managing the 
company. " Internal auditor E claimed that "the experiment is still in the early stages 
since 8 years are not sufficient time to achieve all objectives. " Internal auditors D, and 
F did not add anything. 
The views of internal auditors can be concluded in the following table: 
l 
f 
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Table 8-2 Summary of the views of internal auditors 
Loughborough Univcrsitv 
Questions Internal Internal Internal Internal Internal Internal 
A B C D E h 
Evaluation Still in their Excellent - good Still in the I'o, 
iti\e (food idc; i Inuicccfiii 
infancy - there is job in this beginning - no optimistic - but needs no concern 
difference company - sonic clear outputs - dissimilar in more to be about internal 
between banks courtesy from limited role - the actual best practice controls lack 
and others - members little meetings practice apparent in the 
shareholders lack in resolution 
have no idea practice 
about AC 
Advantages Little benefits Reporting Did not work Enhanced Give Give 
financial well - role of importance objectivity to 
variances to the concentrating internal to the the nomination 
boards on nomination auditing in auditing of auditors 
auditors - general concept in comments of' 
enhanced companies auditors taken 
auditor place giving 
independence confidence to 
shareholders 
Disadvantages Little authority - Members 
have Independence Members Members are No clear role 
insufficient no independence varies - no have no not qualified with internal 
independence - - members do cooperation knowledge -110 auditors - 
selection of not know much with or qualifications concentrating 
members for a about companies management - qualifications in accounting in nomination 
personal - few meetings - management in business -- or business - auditors no 
relationship - members are not restrictions interested in interested in charter 
shareholders do qualified - no members - increasing selecting the members are 
not help communication members are their wealth cheapest not qualified 
themselves - with not qualified auditor enough - 
members are not shareholders - members do 
qualified no rotation for not devote 
members enough of their 
time to the 
companies 
Accomptishme- Non because not Not yet 
Not clearly Moderately Achieved Achieved in 
qualified seen achieved in some nomination 
"Its members - lack protection objectives auditors and 
of awareness and shareholders' but not all review their 
independence - interests comments - no 
little knowledge achievements 
in company's in internal 
business auditors role 
Do internal Slightly 
Make internals No benefit as Internals No because Still in the 
link with board expected have no late beginning in 
auditors of directors - because independence realisation internal 
fit? increase role of internals have - increase about role of auditing role bene internal auditors no the internal 
independence awareness auditing -- no 
and role of role with 
internal internals 
auditing 
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Questions Internal 
A 
Internal 
B 
Internal 
C 
Internal 
D 
Internal 
E 
Internal 
I" 
Recommenda Supervisory Reading Members Enhance Close I ransparency 
party to assure periodicals and should be independence relationship about existing bons independence releases in selected from of internals with AC brought 
and other legal accounting - specialists - - members internals -- in specialists 
requirements - enhance the select outside should increase in accounting 
increase literacy independence - members - devote more literacy of and auditing 
of members members should increase the time and members 
be rotated authority have more 
meetings - 
remuneration 
should he 
increased 
Anything else Criteria (charter) Too early to Enhance Too early to 
for the work of evaluate AC independence evaluate AC 
AC and internal since 8 years not of internals - since 8 years 
auditing enough increase not enough 
efforts of AC 
to improve the 
internals 
8-4 THE INTERVIEWS WITH EXTERNAL AUDITORS 
Regarding the evaluation of the audit committee experiment, external auditor A 
assumed that "audit committees should have roles of more than just the nomination of 
the external auditors since this job is routine and it does not need these committees. 
Therefore, audit committees have a very important role as a liaison between the 
management and the external auditor. " "I would say that some companies do not have 
audit committees which is non compliance with the resolution of the Ministry of 
Commerce. " External auditor B mentioned that "usually after any decision, a report 
should be made to show how they 
fulfil the requirements except the resolution for 
establishment of the audit committees. It 
is not compulsory for audit committees to 
issue any report about their activities during the last year. " In the view of external 
auditor B "the Ministry of Commerce should 
issue further regulations and guidance in 
order to improve the effectiveness of audit committees and to check that Saudi 
corporations are complied with the regulations. 
" 
External auditor C pointed out that audit committees were an idea which was good to 
help companies and the systems of control in these companies but transferring this 
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idea to the actual practice had not yet been realised. "I think the major problem has to 
do with the members since most of them are not practitioners and might not be 
qualified and/or have enough background on how they should carry out their 
responsibilities. " In addition, "the way of nominating the members is identified as one 
of the problems. There seems to be preference for the nomination of members who 
would not cause trouble. " External auditor D also claimed that "the appointment of 
members of audit committees is only a response for the resolution of the Ministry of 
Commerce but companies did not to derive any benefit from these committees. Yes, 
the situation now is clearly better than before the resolution but the actual practice in 
non-financial companies is not as was expected. " 
External auditor E said: "I cannot definitely evaluate all audit committees. However, 
there are many members that are very brilliant, enthusiastic and also highly qualified. 
Then these committees are excellent indeed. In some companies, the opposite is the 
case as a result of unqualified members and lack of knowledge in accounting that 
might threaten the activities of the organisation. Overall, the success of the experiment 
is average. " Finally, external auditor F pointed out that "many audit committees do not 
comprehend much of what they should do. The main objective for these committees in 
the actual practice is to find the cheapest price for external auditors whereas; the 
external auditor should be selected according to 
his quality and experience. " 
Regarding the advantages of audit committees, external auditor A mentioned that "the 
advantages of audit committees were more 
in theory than in reality because the 
committees have little authority. 
The only advantage is the nominating of the external 
auditor. " 
External auditor B claimed that "the only advantage from the existing audit 
committees is nominating the external auditor 
instead of the board of directors. " 
External auditor C, as well, mentioned the same answer and added that "audit 
committees draw the management's attention to the weaknesses that are 
discovered in 
the company. In addition, the discussion between the audit committee and the external 
auditor regarding the 
financial statements seems to be useful. " 
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External auditor D pointed out that there were no clear advantages from audit 
committees that could be seen in actual practice since their achievements were not 
obvious. External auditor E identified "the contribution that audit committees achieved 
as being derived from bringing in many expert members. Also, many audit committees 
have qualified members who have high educational and professional qualifications in 
accounting and finance. " Finally, external auditor F mentioned that "audit committees 
reduced the level of interaction between companies and the external auditors since 
they work as a liaison between the management and external auditors. Additionally, 
external auditors were able to talk to audit committees on any problem that arose. 
However, the situation in Banks is very different since these Banks spend millions in 
training their staff to be highly qualified. In addition, the strong supervision from 
SAMA makes the situation in Banks different from other companies. " 
With respect to the disadvantages of audit committees, external auditor A claimed that 
audit committees in actual practice 
do not protect the shareholder's interests from the 
possibility of the dominance of management. 
The process of the nomination of audit 
committees has an obvious problem, which 
is that nomination comes from the board 
of directors. "This mechanism seems to 
be fraught with problems since it does not 
ensure the independence to audit committees. 
" Also, the committees have little 
authority. On the other 
hand, "the powers that are given to the board of directors are 
very extensive since there are sometimes 
huge expenses without any written 
documents, which are accepted by the board of directors and the external auditor can 
do nothing about these cases. " 
External auditor B asked, "Are the members of audit committees professionals? The 
answer is: not as a result of resolution of 
the Ministry of Commerce (1994) relating to 
the requirement of the qualifications of audit committee members that cannot be 
interpreted clearly": "it is preferable to have appropriate qualifications in this field. " 
-There is no clear programme for the members to follow such as a charter, which is 
very important 
for their working. Unfortunately, most Saudi corporations have no 
departments for internal auditing, such as is available in the developed countries, 
which makes control 
in these companies to be difficult. " 
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External auditor C pointed out that "the background of the members is not in the field 
of accounting or finance. Also, their meetings seem to be insufficient and there is no 
follow up from the members for their reports. I would say that the systems for internal 
auditing in companies are very weak and the members of audit committees are not 
full-timers; so it is difficult for them to do what is expected. However, there are many 
members that have the desire to work hard but they find many difficulties to discharge 
their responsibilities. Also, the remuneration is insufficient. " 
Interestingly, external auditor D mentioned that he "engaged with one corporation and 
he never see any audit committee member during the whole year. " 
In addition, external auditor E stated that "many audit committee members are very 
old so they do not want or cannot adapt to modern techniques. " Finally, external 
auditor F claimed "the insufficient knowledge in accounting issues is the main 
weakness of audit committees. Also, there is little respect for the members of audit 
committees from the company's staff. " 
With respect to the achievement of audit committees, external auditor A claimed that 
"there is strong pressure on the external auditor to issue a clean report maybe when it 
should not be issued 
but the committee does not have the sufficient power to resist this 
matter. " In addition, external auditor B mentioned that "the only achievement for audit 
committees was the nomination of the external auditor according to the policy of low- 
balling (the least audit fees). " Also, external auditor C thought that "the objectives of 
establishing the audit committees 
have not yet been achieved since there is no 
authority and charter. 
" External auditor D stated similar answer. 
On the other hand, external auditor E thought that audit committees "achieved about 
60% of their objectives, this is the average and it increases in some companies or also 
decreases in others. " Finally, external auditor F pointed out that the audit committees 
did not achieve their objectives ,I mean companies did not benefit from audit 
committee members as a result of their 
lack of accounting knowledge. " 
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Regarding to the benefit of audit committees to the external auditors, external auditor 
A points out that "external auditors benefited from audit committees through increased 
responsibilities since the external auditor is also requested to meet with the audit 
committee in addition to his meetings with the management. " External auditor B 
claimed that he does not feel any difference for the external auditors. Similarly, 
external auditor C stated the same answer since "these committees cannot be relied 
upon; therefore, the external auditors should use the same procedures that they used 
before. " As well, external auditor D feels that "there is no obvious contribution of 
audit committees to the external auditors since 
he did not see any of members during 
the last year. " 
External auditor E mentioned that he worked in Saudi corporations for about 11 years, 
and he did not see an effective 
department of internal auditing. About the external 
auditors, this differs between companies. 
In some companies, "there is exchange of 
views and knowledge between the committee and the auditor, whereas there is nothing 
in other companies. " External auditor F maintained that "the internal and external 
auditors have benefited 
from audit committees since there is now an official body that 
reporting can be submitted to 
in the case of dispute between the external auditor and 
management. " 
With respect to the recommendations, external auditor A suggested that "the selection 
of the audit committees should 
be based on higher qualifications in accounting or 
business related to the knowledge in the financial reporting and companies activities 
(firm-specific knowledge). Also, the SOCPA should carry out the task of creating 
regulations and standards 
that adjust the working of audit committee members. I 
would say the resolution of existing audit committees 
is excellent as a decision but the 
problem is who should 
be the members? Secondly, wider authority should be given to 
the members and also charters. 
" 
External auditor B proposes the same recommendation of external auditor A about the 
regulations, qualifications, and charters. 
He also suggests that "the members should 
not be on the 
board of directors to assure their independence and the committees have 
to submit, annually, a report to 
Annual General Meeting about their activities during 
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the year. " However, external auditor B did not support the withdrawal of the 
resolution but he advocated its maintenance and development because "having 
effective audit committees is very important to help all related parties in the 
companies. " He thought that the resolution of audit committees was created hastily as 
"an imitation of the committees in the UK and USA but the difference is that the 
committees in these countries were established after much research and surveys. " 
External auditor C stressed the fact, "there were some large shareholders that own 
about 30-40% of shares, and they would govern companies without any knowledge or 
qualifications in accounting. Also, strong internal auditing departments should be 
available in companies to strengthening the role of audit committees. Finally, there 
should be continued education for the members to be updated on new issues in 
accounting. " 
Similarly, external auditor D suggested continuous education as well. "The 
shareholders must protect themselves and their investments by learning how to 
understand the financial reports. " External auditor E suggested that "bureaucracy must 
be eradicated by nominating young members who are eager to work harder. Also, the 
committees should consist of specialists in different subjects in order to avoid all 
members coming from the board of directors. " 
In the same way, external auditor F recommended "a minimum level of accounting 
qualifications and experience 
for audit committee members. Similarly, there should be 
regular meetings 
for the members with each other and with internal and external 
auditors to be updated on what 
is happening. " Interestingly, external auditor F "did not 
think that the Ministry of Commerce and SOCPA should intervene between the audit 
committees and other parties. 
" He added that "if audit committees performed their 
business with a conscious attitude and with a feeling of moral obligation, then they 
can improve the performance as well. 
Further, the board of directors, management, 
and audit committee members are 
human beings and they have reputation so they do 
not want to lose their standing 
in the market. I would say that we must not be 
pessimistic since audit committees are still 
in the first stage of development and we 
should not hasten our opinions and 
judgements toward these committees. " 
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The views of'external auditors can be concluded in the following table: 
Table 8-3 Summary of the views of external auditors 
11 Questions External External External External External External 
A B C D E h 
F, " aluation AC should 
do Not required Not yet in the Only a Depcilds of) III(: %1,111\ h- 11''I 
more than just to report actual practice - response to members conrpichcnd 
nominate about members are not legal average until their roles 
auditors - activities of practitioners and requirement now selection 
sonic AC qualified - - the auditor. 
companies selection situation according to the 
have no AC members now is better cheapest price 
according to the than before 
personal AC - non- 
relationship banks 
companies is 
not as 
expected 
antages Theoretical Nomination Nomination of No clear Members are Decreasing 
more than of the the auditors - advantages qualified in dealing between 
reality - auditors draw the accounting and companies and 
nomination of management's finance auditors 
the auditors attention to auditors more 
weaknesses in able to talk about 
companies -- problems in 
useful dialogue companies 
between AC and 
auditors 
pisadvantages No protection Members 
No background Did not see Members are Insufficient 
for are not in accounting or any member old - difficult knowledge in 
shareholder's professionals finance - few in a year for members to accounting - no interests - - the lack is meetings - understand respect for 
weakness in from the weakness in modern members from 
the process of resolution - internal auditing techniques staff 
nomination no charter - - members do 
members; this most not devote their 
makes companies time to 
members have no companies - 
dependent - departments remuneration is 
little authority for internal insufficient 
whereas the auditing 
boards have 
more 
authority 
Accomplishme- No since there 
Only Not yet, there is No authority Achieved 60°;,, No since there is 
is pressure to nominate the no authority or or charter it varies no clear 
nts auditors to cheapest charter between achievement in 
issue clean auditor companies companies 
reports 
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Questions External External 
A 
1)o external 
auditors 
benefit? 
Just in 
increasing 
their 
responsibilities 
- more 
meetings and 
reports 
Recommenda- 
[ions 
Selection 
members 
according to 
qualifications 
and knowledge 
- regulations 
and standards 
for the work of 
the AC 
B 
"I'hcrc is 110 
difference 
for auditors 
before AC 
and after it 
Regulations, 
standards 
and charters 
- members 
must not be 
from board 
of directors 
- submit 
report to 
AGM about 
their 
activities - 
maintain the 
current 
practice for 
AC 
External 
C 
There is no 
difference for 
auditors before 
AC and after it 
All parties 
should be 
informed about 
the benefit of AC 
- strong internal 
auditing 
departments - 
continued 
education for 
members 
Loughborough University 
T External External External 
D 
No obvious 
contribution 
Continued 
education 
for members 
shareholders 
should learn 
about 
financial 
reports 
E 
It deprnds on 
members, there 
are many that 
members help 
auditors by 
open dialogue 
whereas others 
do nothing 
Nomination 
young 
members who 
can work hard 
-- members 
should be 
combined front 
different 
subjects 
I" 
) c, h\ rcpollini". 
to AC' this can 
enhance external 
auditors standing 
and 
independence 
Minimum 
requirement for 
the level of 
qualifications 
and experience 
for members 
regular meetings 
für members and 
with internals 
and externals - 
no intervention 
between 
members and 
others since the 
conscience of 
audit committee 
members is the 
solution 
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8-5 SUMMARY 
In addition to the questionnaire, which was the main method for collecting data, 18 
interviews were held equally between audit committee members, internal and external 
auditors. The interviewees were selected from a non-random sample and conducted in 
April and May 2002 based on the result of the responses received from respondents in 
the questionnaire. The aim of the interview was to complement the close-ended 
questionnaire. Therefore, this method was adopted to gain an insight into the views of 
the respondents about the effectiveness of audit committees as well as the problems 
they face in carrying out their responsibilities. Several observations can be made from 
the interviews results presented in this chapter. There is a consensus between 
respondents that audit committees have had limited success in doing what they were 
expected to do. 
Most of interviewees mentioned that audit committees have little or no advantages 
(they only seem to nominate the external auditors). However, some of interviewees 
claimed that audit committees enhance the 
independence of internal and external 
auditors, give confidence to the shareholders, enlighten the boards of directors, 
decrease the personal relationship and favouritism, make internal and external auditors 
more serious, detect problems early, create a useful dialogue between audit 
committees and auditors, and membership some qualified members in accounting and 
finance. These people were in the minority. 
However, the disadvantages identified by the interviewees are: the meetings of audit 
committees were few, there 
is no charter or agenda that makes the work clear for their 
members, the committee usually comprise the chief executive directors and other 
directors from the board, members are chosen on the basis of friendship, it created 
bureaucracy, and there was a remoteness between companies and members - this 
problem namely the remote 
distance was one of the criticisms of the audit committee 
of Enron (Tonge et al, 2003). 
Also, there was no rotation for members, they simply 
selected the cheapest external auditor, members 
did not devote much time to the 
companies, remuneration was 
insufficient, members were old and so have difficulties 
in understanding modern techniques, and they had 
little respect from staff. Regarding 
the remuneration, it should be noted that Higgs (2003) points out that the remuneration 
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of a non-executive director should be sufficient to attract and fairly compensate high 
quality individuals. 
Regarding remuneration, Smith (2003: 8) made some recommendations, which seem 
to be useful in the Saudi environment: 
each company should consider the further remuneration that should be paid to 
members of the audit committee to recompense them for the additional 
responsibilities of membership. Consideration should be given to the time 
members are required to give to audit committee business, the skills they bring 
to bear and the onerous duties they take on, as well as the value of their work to 
the company. 
Also, the resolution of the Ministry of Commerce (1994) has not clearly explained the 
relationship between audit committees with the external and internal auditors, the 
scope of work to be undertaken, independence, expertise, transparency, and the 
required qualifications and knowledge for audit committee members. There is an 
obvious problem with the resolution because it is too brief and there are no 
explanatory/guidance notes to accompany 
it. 
These views are consistent with the new rules that has been adopted by the NASD 
which require all members of the audit committee "be able to read and understand 
fundamental financial statements" and that at least one member should have "past 
employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in 
accounting, or other comparable experience or 
background. " (Felo et al, 2002: 53). As 
well, Woodlock et al (2001) mentioned that audit committees would be especially 
vulnerable to claims when no members of the committee have accounting or financial 
management experience. However, as mentioned earlier that the existence of an audit 
committee does not ensure monitoring effectiveness (Archambeault and DeZoort, 
2001). 
Furthermore, the respondents mentioned that the resolution has been issued without 
any planning. Whereas with the Treadway Commission, 
during the approximate two 
years span between the commission's formation and the release of its final 
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recommendations, it reviewed dozens of studies which were conducted by major 
universities and organisations (Rezaee and Lander, 1993). Similarly, the Blue Ribbon 
Commission's 36 members worked over a nine-month period and focused on a broad 
range of audit committees responsibilities and practices. 
With respect to the transparency mentioned by the respondents, the SEC issued new 
and amended rules in its "Final Rule: Audit Committee Disclosure, " which requires 
companies to make a series of disclosures in an audit committee report that must 
appear in the annual proxy statement of the corporation (Felo et al, 2002: 52). 
According to the SEC, such enhanced audit committee disclosures should: "(1) 
improve the transparency of the committee's oversight of the financial reporting 
process, (2) provide additional motivation for committee members to effectively 
discharge their duties, and (3) promote investor confidence" (quoted in Carcello et al, 
2002: 292). Also, Smith (2003: 31-32) considered that the committee members shall 
"conduct an annual review of their work and these terms of reference and make 
recommendations to the board. " As well, "The committee's duties and activities 
during the year shall be disclosed in the annual financial statements. The chairman 
shall attend the AGM and shall answer questions, through the chairman of the board, 
on the audit committee's activities and their responsibilities". These requirements 
might be useful to applied within Saudi corporations. 
It should be noted also that the consensus of respondents about the significance of the 
charter is consistent with the SEC that requires the board of directors to adopt a 
written charter for the audit committee (Woodlock, 2001). The lack of the charter in 
Saudi corporations might threaten the effectiveness of audit committees. Knapp (1991) 
claimed that the lack of clearly 
defined responsibilities and insufficient authority for 
audit committees has severely 
hampered their effectiveness. 
However, the respondents distinguished between audit committees in Banks and other 
companies, which are obviously 
different as a result of the effective control from 
SAMA. Hence the weakness of the resolution makes the effectiveness of audit 
committees differs between companies according to their members' diligence and 
qualifications. 
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The interviewees recommended that the Ministry of Commerce and/or SOCPA should 
carry out the duty of develop the resolution to avoid the weaknesses presented. Also, 
shareholders and other related parties should learn how to understand the financial 
statements. As well, other recommendations mentioned by the interviewees are: 
training and continued education for members, more meetings between members and 
boards of directors, transparency (publish report about the activities of members 
during the year), members have not being from the board of directors, establish a 
supervisory party to ensure independence and other legal requirements, enhanced 
independence of internal auditors, and nomination of young members who can deal 
with modern technique and may work harder. 
The opinions of some respondents in these interviews concur with Abdel-khalik 
(2002: 99): 
At the top of the organisational chart of any corporation is a board of directors 
consisting of executives and non-executives who are often chosen by the 
executives. The practice in the United States is for the board of directors (in 
Saudi Arabia for audit committees) to nominate the external auditor for election 
at the annual general meeting. It is very rare that the results of these elections do 
not conform to the recommendations of the management. With highly dispersed 
and diffused ownership of many corporations, typically a few incumbent 
managers exercise shareholders' rights because many shareholders outside the 
company give their proxy votes to the management, while many others neglect 
to participate in the voting process. 
These results as well seem to be consistent with Collier (1997) that held interviews 
within smaller listed companies 
in the UK with the finance directors and non- 
executive directors. 
He concluded that audit committees that have been formed often 
fail to conform to the Cadbury guidance. 
Audit committees in Saudi Arabia, as a mechanism for corporate governance should 
be taken more careful concern from the Ministry of Commerce to prevent any 
potential of failure among 
its corporations. The Ministry and other parties including 
Saudi corporations, shareholders and other stakeholders should look at Enron's 
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debacle as a lesson, and remember what Tonge et al (2003: 16) concluded about the 
story of Enron "Enron certainly had some of the trappings of corporate governance in 
place including a code of ethics and an audit committee, neither of which worked in 
practice. " The concern should also look at the boards of directors in Saudi 
corporations since they are the principal inducement for audit committees to discharge 
their responsibilities effectively. Otherwise, audit committees would merely be `filling 
a legal vacuum'. For this reason, Cadbury (2002: 59) suggests: 
There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board. The object of a formal procedure is to encourage chairman 
and their boards to review their present boards membership and to identify gaps 
in experience, background, age, or personality, the filling of which would 
strengthen the board team. 
Hence, the search for board candidates becomes purposeful and is focused on the 
qualities, which the board and all parties are 
looking for, rather than on names, 
families, or position and wealth. All parties should look for members who, as Olson 
(1999: 1110) describes, spend hours learning about the company and its business. 
"They should visit the facilities, talk with employees, read (publications and analyst 
reports), and learn about the enterprise's major competitors. 
In the electronic age, they 
may even visit chat rooms devoted to the company or 
its industry to see what the buzz 
is about the company. " 
However, as an external auditor mentioned that we should not be pessimistic since 
audit committees 
in Saudi Arabia are at an "infant" stage of evolution as Spira (1998a: 
34) defines and are "finding their feet", in terms of developing their role within 
companies after the catalyst 
for their establishment by the issue of the resolution. 
The next chapter presents the conclusion, recommendations, limitations of the study 
and the potential for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
As set out in Chapter one, the primary aim of this study was to explore and investigate 
the effectiveness of audit committees in Saudi corporations; as well as to explore 
whether there are differences in the perceptions of the three samples comprising of 
audit committee members, internal auditors, and external auditors. It also aimed to 
examine whether the agreement between each respective sample towards specific 
statements is significant or not. 
There has been virtually no prior academic study in the area of effectiveness of audit 
committees in Saudi Arabia or in the other Arab countries. This is because Saudi 
Arabia, up to the present time, is the only Arab country that established audit 
committees within its companies. Hence, this research study has been quite wide 
ranging and in parts exploratory. However, it is hoped that it will form the basis of 
further and more specific research and investigation relevant to the issues highlighted 
in this study. 
This chapter provides an overview of the principal findings of the study together with 
some suggestions for the future development of the effectiveness of audit committees 
in the Saudi Arabian corporate sector. 
9.2 OVERVIEW 
It was argued that the purpose of this research was to investigate the proposition that 
establishing an audit committee is one thing - establishing an effective audit committee 
is another. In the introductory chapter, the justification of the study, its contribution to 
accounting knowledge and its potential benefits to Saudi Arabia and other Arabian 
countries was discussed. As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country 
that set up audit committees among its corporations; yet in spite of the perceived 
effectiveness of audit committees, there is a lack of empirical research on the topic. 
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Chapter two presented the corporate governance issue. It commenced with a 
background to the definition of corporate governance, which is about seeing that the 
business is run properly. The audit committee is but one corporate governance 
mechanism within a menu of possible choices. If corporate governance mechanisms 
are substitutable, then strong alternative corporate governance mechanisms should 
mitigate the need for the firm to have an active, independent audit committee. A 
review of the recent history of scandals was carried out before the chapter outlined the 
main themes in recent concerns about corporate governance. A chronology of the 
development of corporate governance was also discussed. Further, the agency 
problem, which was brought about by the separation of ownership (principals) and 
control (agent) was examined. The chapter argued that the Cadbury Committee and its 
report in 1992 that represented a watershed in the development of corporate 
governance in Britain. 
Chapter three focused on the review of the development of audit committees. This 
chapter commenced with examination of audit committees, which has been defined by 
Marrian (1988: 2) as: 
A committee of the board normally comprising three to five directors with no 
operating responsibility in financial management. Its primary tasks are to review 
the financial statements, the effectiveness of the company's accounting and 
internal control systems, and the findings of the auditors, and to make 
recommendations on the appointment and remuneration of the external auditors. 
A brief background to the development of audit committees in the USA and many 
countries including UK, 
Canada, France, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, and Saudi 
Arabia was discussed. Corporate audit committees have developed and evolved as a 
result of dissatisfaction with methods of corporate governance. 
It is interesting to note 
that in all of the countries where they have become established, audit committees have 
been stimulated by unexpected company failures and/or corporate malpractice. 
Audit committees research is largely US based since the history of audit committees in 
the United States is longer than elsewhere and has been described by Collier (1996) as 
`a peculiarly North American phenomenon'. The chapter also reviewed discussions on 
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the advantages and disadvantages of audit committees. The discussions emphasised the 
effectiveness of audit committees as an instrument for corporate governance. However, 
the advantages and disadvantages that have been mentioned support the idea that 
establishing an audit committee is one thing; establishing an effective audit committee 
is another. As Sommer (1991: 91) noted, "a corporation having an audit committee as 
part of its governance structure and having an effective audit committee are, of course, 
different matters. " 
Chapter four presented a review of the effectiveness of audit committees. Effectiveness 
is an elusive concept that can be approached through several models, none of which is 
appropriate in all circumstances. It was decided - according to many authors who have 
written on audit committees' effectiveness - to use the word "effectiveness" to refer to 
audit committees carrying out 
its specific oversight responsibilities. These 
responsibilities were quoted from the recommendations of Treadway Commission 
(1987), Macdonald Commission (1988), Cadbury Committee (1992), Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999) and other recommendations and checklists of best practice, which 
have been noted in academic and professional literatures. Then, the chapter examined 
the activities of effective audit committees which related to: the financial reporting 
process; internal auditors responsibilities; the annual audit and the external auditors; 
and corporate governance responsibilities. 
The chapter outlined the determinants of 
audit committee effectiveness. 
These attributes were abridged as: 1- independence 
from management: a- Selection, and nomination process; b- Independence in 
assessing fair presentation; and c- 
Independence in setting the agenda; 2- access to 
information: a- Issues to be discussed with the external auditor; b- Issues to be 
discussed with the internal auditor; and c- Issues to be discussed with other company 
personnel; and 3- resources: a- 
An audit committee charter; b- The required 
qualifications for audit committees; c- 
Regular meetings for audit committees; and d- 
Training and skill sets. 
Finally, this chapter discussed the obstacles of audit committees' effectiveness such as 
the lack of independence, knowledge of the enterprise, expertise, training, and 
qualifications that might pose a threat 
to the effectiveness of audit committees. This 
chapter was valuable 
in building the main instrument of this study (questionnaire) 
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since it presented the best practice of audit committees which was used for comparing 
with the actual practice in Saudi corporations and from which conclusions were drawn 
on whether these committees are effective or not. 
Chapter five focused on the adoption of the research approach. In social science, there 
are two main types of empirical research: the quantitative approach and the qualitative 
approach. Many researchers have pointed out that quantitative research, while being 
very useful, is greatly improved when used in conjunction with other qualitative 
research methods such as case studies, interviews and observation. When qualitative 
and quantitative research approaches are combined, we have what is called 
triangulation in action. The questionnaire (close-ended answers) was adopted as the 
main instrument (behind some interviews) to collect data in Saudi Arabia. 
This chapter also explains how the pilot study was carried out to develop the 
questionnaire and how it was conducted and the benefits that were gained from 
respondents to the pilot study. The final version of the questionnaire consisted of six 
parts without the demographic questions containing 39 questions. It also included two 
statements that evaluate the effectiveness of audit committees in general. In addition to 
the previous method for collecting data, some interviews were held with a small 
sample of audit committee members, internal and external auditors. It was already 
decided that the second appropriate method for collecting data in this research is an 
examination through some interviews to explore in some details the effectiveness of 
audit committees in Saudi corporations in the selected case studies. 
The fieldwork started at the beginning of March 2002 and lasted for a period of three 
months and twenty days up to 20 June 2002 with the collection of data from three 
samples, which were related to the audit committees in Saudi corporations. The 
samples were: 1- audit committee members in Saudi corporations, 2- internal auditors 
in Saudi corporations, and 3- external auditors in Saudi Arabia. The respondents that 
contributed to the pilot research stage included eight academics in Saudi Universities 
with an interest in auditing, five internal auditors, seven external auditors, three audit 
committee members in Saudi corporations and seven colleagues who are studying 
Ph. D. in accountancy in Saudi Arabia and in the UK. Finally, this chapter gave details 
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of the questionnaire fieldwork procedures and reported the achieved response rate, 
which was logically reasonable in social research according to the researchers in this 
field. 
Chapter six presented the descriptive data analysis by using the Statistical Package for 
Social Science (SPSS) for analysing data. SPSS was used to compute the mean, 
frequency distribution, and other statistical measurements and tests needed in this 
study. Several observations can be made from the results presented in this chapter. 
First, it appears that audit committee members do not have sufficient professional 
qualifications, and there was an obvious violation of the Ministry of Commerce 
resolution that requires corporations to establish audit committees from non-executive 
directors. Regarding internal auditors, only 4 internal auditors (7.3%) have the CIA 
certification, which is a very low percentage for internal auditors. 
Chapter seven focused on the second part of data analysis, which was by using the 
inferential data analysis. Since the main objectives of this study were to evaluate the 
effectiveness of audit committees by comparing actual practice with best practice, 
which have been noted in academic and professional literatures. The other objective 
was to identify whether there are significant differences between the three samples 
toward the six groups of this study. To achieve these objectives, the t-test was run 
among audit committee members, internal auditors, and external auditors to determine 
if the difference between those respondents is significant or not. Concerning audit 
committee members, the groups related to the role of audit committees with internal 
auditors, authorities of audit committees, and the other two statements that evaluate the 
effectiveness in general are an area of growing concern over the role of audit 
committees in Saudi corporations. About internal auditors, the result demonstrates that 
internal auditors hold audit committees in high regard and they perceive them to have a 
very high level of effectiveness in fulfilling their duties among Saudi corporations. 
This perception is however inconsistent with the perception of external auditors who 
evaluate audit committees lower than the other two samples. 
The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was run to investigate whether there are 
differences between the three samples toward evaluating audit committees. It has the 
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distinct advantage of being applicable when more than two means are being compared. 
Usually when rejecting the null hypothesis, the exact areas of differences need to be 
pinpointed. To do this, multiple comparison procedures, which were used in this study 
includes the Scheffe test. It was found that in 18 pair comparisons, 12 comparisons 
(66.7%) were significantly different. 
The views of audit committee members and internal auditors were significantly 
different in 2 cases from 6. In both these cases, internal auditors evaluated the other 
two groups significantly more than audit committee members. This result seems to be 
inconsistent with the results of Kalbers (1992b) who found that internal auditors rated 
audit committee effectiveness significantly lower than the audit committee members. 
The views of audit committee members and external auditors were significantly 
different in four cases from 6, represent (66.7%). In all cases that were different, audit 
committee members assessed the four groups significantly more than external 
auditors. Interestingly, in all six pair comparisons, the views of internal auditors and 
external auditors were significantly different. Certainly internal auditors evaluated the 
role of audit committees in all groups more highly than external auditors. 
Finally the ANOVA test was run to investigate whether there were significant 
differences between means of different characteristics of audit committee members, 
internal and external auditors with respect to job, number of meetings, and duration of 
meetings. It can be concluded that there is no significant effect of characteristics of the 
three samples on the direction of evaluating the effectiveness of audit committees. The 
results presented in chapters six and seven show a concern about audit committees' 
conduct of their responsibilities. 
Chapter eight reported the results of some interviews that were held with a small non- 
random sample of audit committee members, internal and external auditors. The aim of 
these interviews was to complement the close-ended questionnaire. Therefore, this 
approach was adopted to gain an insight into the views of the respondents about the 
effectiveness of audit committees as well as the problems they face in carrying out 
their responsibilities. Several observations can be made from the interviews results 
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presented in eighth chapter. There was a consensus between respondents that audit 
committees have little benefit regarding what they are expected to do. Some of them 
claimed that audit committees enhance the independence of internal and external 
auditors, give confidence to the shareholders, enlighten the boards of directors, reduce 
the personal relationships and favouritism, make the internal and external auditors 
more conscientious, detect problems early, create a useful dialogue between audit 
committees and auditors, and brought in some qualified members in accounting and 
finance. 
However, the disadvantages identified by the interviewees were: the meetings of audit 
committees are very short, there is no charter or agenda that make the work clear for 
the members; they usually comprise the chief executive directors and other directors 
from the board; were chosen based on friendship, employ complicated procedures; 
were hampered by the physical separation of the audit committee members from the 
running of the company; had no rotation of members, they simply select the cheapest 
auditor, members do not devote much time to companies; the remuneration is 
insufficient; members are old and find it difficult to adapt to modem techniques; and 
they did not command the respect of the other members of staff. Also, the resolution of 
the Ministry of Commerce (1994) did not clearly explain the relationship between 
audit committees and the external and internal auditors; the scope of work to be 
undertaken; independence; expertise; transparency; and the required qualifications and 
knowledge for audit committee members. There is an obvious problem with the 
resolution in that it is too brief and there are no explanatory/guidance notes to 
accompany it. 
These views are consistent with the new rules that has been adopted by the NASD 
which require all members of the audit committee "be able to read and understand 
fundamental financial statements" and that at least one member have "past 
employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in 
accounting, or other comparable experience or background. " (Felo et al, 2002: 53). 
Woodlock et al (2001) mentioned that audit committees would be especially 
vulnerable to legal action if members of the committee do not have accounting or 
financial management experience. 
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However, the respondents distinguished between audit committees in Banks and other 
companies, which are obviously different as a result of the effective control from 
SAMA. Hence the weakness of the resolution makes the effectiveness of audit 
committees differ depending on their members' diligence and qualifications. 
The interviewees recommend that the Ministry of Commerce and/or SOCPA should 
develop the guideline to avoid the weaknesses that were highlighted in the discussions. 
Also, shareholders and other related parties should do more to help themselves by 
learning how to understand the financial statements. Other recommendations 
mentioned by the interviewees are: training and continued education for members; 
more meetings between members and boards of directors; transparency (publish a 
report about the activities of members during the year); members should not be from 
board of directors; establish a supervisory party to assure independence and other legal 
requirements; enhance the independence of internal auditors; and nomination of 
younger members who can deal with modern technique and have the energy to work 
harder. 
These results seem to be consistent with the study of Collier (1997) based on 
interviews within smaller listed companies in the UK. He concluded that audit 
committees that have been formed often fail to conform to the Cadbury guidance. 
These results enhance the idea, which is, the formation of an audit committee does not 
provide evidence about the actual levels of monitoring that will be performed. 
However, as one of the interviewees mentioned that we should not be pessimistic since 
audit committees in Saudi Arabia are at an "infant" stage of evolution as Spira (1998a: 
34) defines, and are "finding their feet", in terms of developing their role within 
companies after the catalyst for their establishment by the issue of the resolution. 
9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this concluding section some general recommendations are made, which may serve 
to advance the work of audit committees in Saudi Arabia and enhance their roles to 
achieve the requisite effectiveness of these committees. The developments in the 
profession of accounting and auditing in Saudi Arabia has culminated in the resolution 
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of the Ministry of Commerce in 1994 requiring all public companies to mandate the 
establishment of audit committees. However, this study clearly shows that audit 
committees have many weaknesses resulting in these committees being seen as 
"rubber stamp" or "red herrings". Therefore, to transform the concept from a good idea 
on paper to a reality in practice, the Ministry of Commerce should follow up its 
resolution by issuing further clarification of what corporations must do exactly to 
implement it. The three attributes (independence from management, access to 
information, and resources) discussed in this research should be addressed. Moreover, 
all related parties should be informed about what is happening in companies by 
executive directors and the activities of audit committees to assist transparency within 
corporations. 
There is an obvious need for the specification of the background and experience 
required for members of audit committees, to ensure that they are not affected by 
company management. Further, clarification of the duties of audit committees relating 
to the corporate governance, the role of internal and external auditors, authorities, 
literacy, and diligence should be clearly defined. This could be achieved by 
establishing a feasible mechanism to prepare the members of audit committees and 
specify their remunerations to enable them to work without any restriction from 
management. 
This recommendation seems to be similar to the new disclosure requirement of SEC 
Release No. 34-42266 that all audit committees of publicly traded companies are 
required to "include within the annual proxy a statement of whether, based on its 
review and discussions of the audited financial statements with management and its 
discussions of certain matters with the external auditor, the committee recommended 
that the company's financial statements be included within the Annual Report for the 
most recent fiscal years. " This disclosure should appear above the printed names of 
each member of the audit committee (Woodlock and Claypool, 2001: 27). 
Similarly, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) and Porter and Gendall (1998: 67) suggest that 
the effectiveness of audit committees could be improved if governing bodies ensure 
that: 
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i. The objectives and responsibilities of their entity's audit committee are clearly 
defined in a written statement; 
ii. All relevant parties (including senior executives) routinely receive the minutes 
of audit committee meetings; and 
iii. Information about the existence, membership and functions of the audit 
committee is disclosed in their entity's annual report. 
There is an awareness and appreciation of the significance of audit committees to both 
individual companies and the economy as a whole, and it should be explained and 
spread to all sectors that are interested in that resolution. Finally, a new organisation 
such as SOCPA may also have an essential role in seeking to integrate the work of 
audit committees for the purpose of assuring effective and responsible corporate 
governance in Saudi corporations. Otherwise, audit committees would be merely 
`filling a legal vacuum'. 
9.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Almost all research projects are constrained in some way whether in terms of the 
design and methodology of the study, the accessibility of data or the interpretation of 
the results of the study. In this context it is important for both the researcher and users 
of the research to be aware of the relevant limitations as they seek to develop and 
interpret the results of the study or to clarify their meaning (Anderson and Poole, 
2001). 
9.4.1 Cultural Factors 
Consideration should be given as to the nature of Saudi Arabian society with its strong 
dependence on connection of family and friendship, which may considerably impact 
on the activities of audit committees. This is consistent with the study of Al-Twaijry 
(2000) relating the function of internal auditing in the Saudi corporate sector. In the 
same way, McKinnon (1984) found in contrast to Western societies, the cultural 
determinants of interpersonal and intergroup relationships in Japan preclude an 
intrinsic acceptance of audit independence. This case is also mentioned by Ow-Yong 
and Guan (2000) in Malaysia. 
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9.4.2 Methodological Issues 
As with all methodological sources the questionnaire method is not without its 
problems. Matthews (2002) suggests that all surveys have the weaknesses. For 
instance, respondents might lie or give the answers, which they think are expected of 
them, or which show themselves and their firm in the best light. This concern might be 
directed to some respondents of internal auditors who may have exaggerated on their 
evaluation the role of audit committees as this was found to be significantly more than 
the other two samples (audit committee members and external auditors). 
Further, responses to the questionnaire may differ according to the education, culture, 
position, and work experience of the parties surveyed. Further, it is possible that the 
questionnaire may have lacked clarity in certain sections causing respondents to 
interpret questions differently. However, although three separate questionnaires were 
employed in this study they were complemented by a large pilot study, both face to 
face, telephone, and by normal mail and emails, in which it was reasonably convincing 
that the questionnaire covered all or most of the principal themes of the effectiveness 
of audit committees in which to achieve objectives of the study and at the same time 
easy, clear and do not take much time to be completed. As well, it is possible that audit 
committee members, internal and external auditors who chose not to participate in this 
study might have substantially different opinions than those who participated. Finally, 
other limitations of the research stems from small sample size, which were six 
interviews with every sample of the study. However, the interview method was not the 
main method for collecting data, it was used to explore in more details some facts 
about audit committees in Saudi corporations. 
9.5 THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This is about the first academic study on the effectiveness of audit committees in Saudi 
Arabia and also in all Arab countries since Saudi Arabia is the first Arab country to 
establish audit committees within their corporations. Arguably many of the areas 
covered warrant more specific in depth investigation and research. Further research 
could investigate some specific determinants of the effectiveness of audit committees. 
It would be useful to see if there is any relationship between the setting up of audit 
committees in Saudi Arabia and any increased in earnings within the corporations. 
267 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion Loughborough University 
In this context, one possible avenue for further research would be to focus on the 
relationship between the possibilities of auditor change after receiving a qualified or 
going-concern report. The relationship between audit fees and the existence of an audit 
committee needs to be studied since audit committees are likely to demand a higher 
quality audit and may require additional work performance to satisfy their own 
requirements as suggested by Goddard and Masters (2000). Also, the possibility of 
establishment audit committees within other business entities such as general 
partnerships, partnerships limited by shares, and limited liability partnerships in Saudi 
Arabia or in other Arab countries is an appropriate area for research. 
Also, researchers might be interested in the roles and participation of other parties 
related to the audit committees such as the executive management (chief executive 
officers, chief financial officers and other executive directors), the board of directors, 
and the shareholders. Due to the dearth of literature and relevant research work in this 
field, researchers might be interested in exploring the respective roles of the different 
parties as a potential area for future research. Their views and evaluation about the 
current practice of audit committees in Saudi Arabia would undoubtedly add to the few 
available works in this area and gradually fill the void of knowledge that currently 
exists. 
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Appendix 1 
Chronology in the development of corporate governance (a combination of CIMA, 
1999: 3; and Demirag et al. 2000: 342). 
Financial Service Act 1986 (major effect on the regulatory role of the 1986 
Stock Exchange) 
Publication of the Treadway Report (USA) Oct. 1987 
SEC update listing requirements (USA) 1988 
Polly Peck £1.3bn business empire collapses 1990 
Establishment of the Cadbury Committee on Financial Aspects of May 1991 
Corporate Governance 
Collapse of BCCI July 1991 
Discovery that £480m has disappeared from Maxwell Group pension funds Dec 1991 
Internal Control - Integrated Framework report published by COSO, providing 1992 
draft guidance on internal controls and financial reporting for directors of listed 
companies, based heavily on the Treadway Commission in the US. 
Cadbury Report and Code published setting out measures to enhance Dec 1992 
financial accountability to shareholders based on improved information, continued self- 
regulation, more independent boards through separation of CEO/Chairman roles and 
enhanced NEDs, and greater auditor independence. 
Citizen's Charter published. 1992 
UK Stock Exchange amends its Listing Rules - companies now have to April 1993 
show the extent of compliance with Cadbury with effect from 1 1993. 
Revision of draft guidance on internal controls published by COSO, 1993 
emphasising a statement of principles with internal control seen as a process that needs 
to be integrated in a company's management systems. 
Publication of the South African `Cadbury', the King Report. 1994 
Rutteman guidance on Internal Control and Financial Reporting published Dec 1994 
limiting directors' reporting responsibilities to internal financial controls and to 
assessing their effectiveness. 
ý 
Establishment of the Greenbury group on executive remuneration. Jan 1995 
Publication of the first Nolan report. May 1995 
The Greenbury proposals on setting of directors' remuneration July 1995 
emphasising the role of independent NEDs and need for comprehensive disclosure of all 
components of remuneration. 
Publication of the French `Cadbury', the Vienot Report. 1995 
UK Stock Exchange amends its Listing Rules-companies now have to Oct 1995 
show the extent of compliance with Greenbury. 
Establishing of Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance. Nov 1995 
Publication of second Nolan report. May 1996 
Publication of the Dutch `Cadbury', the Peters report. 1996 
Stock Exchange amends its Listing Rules in the light of Greenbury's June 1996 
recommendation on the phasing of share options. 
Publication of the third Nolan report. July 1997 
Publication of the fourth Nolan report. Nov 1997 
The Hampel Report aimed to restrict regulatory burden on companies, Jan 1998 
stressing enterprise as well as accountability through flexible rules and 
emphasising principles not prescription and focusing on directors, 
directors' remuneration, shareholders and accountability & audit 
Publication of modern company law for a competitive economy, March 1998 
consultation paper. 
The Hampel committee combined code of 18 principles and 48 code June 1998 
provisions, the main substantive change from earlier proposals being 
requirement for NEDs to account for a 1/3 of board subject to a minimum 
of three. 
Auditing Practices Board issues guidance for auditors on corporate governance 1998 
suggesting a clear statement of auditors' responsibilities be included in the 
annual report. 
Publication of the strategic framework: Modem company law for a Feb 1999 
competitive economy a key element of which is the introduction of a 
stakeholder view of corporate governance and the role of directors. 
9, 
Publication of the Turnbull guidance on internal control widening the Sept 1999 
definition of internal control on which directors are required to report 
including reviews of operational and compliance controls and risk management. 
Law Commission/Scottish Law Commission recommended introduction Sept 1999 
of statutory requirement of the principal duties of directors to companies 
and a statutory definition of a director's duty of skill and care. 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) paper outlining government 1999 
intentions to amend Companies Act so that companies obtain shareholder consent prior 
to political donations. 
DTI consultative paper proposing increased disclosure of linkages of 1999 
performance to pay, simplification of share options disclosure and 
measures for shareholders to vote on remuneration reports. 
Publication of modern company law for a competitive economy: March 2000 
Developing the framework, covering the role of directors, shareholders 
and reporting & accounting; simplification of reporting for private 
companies; and alternative vehicles. 
Publication of the strategic framework; Modem company law for a Nov 2000 
competitive economy: Completing the structure: develops previous 
documents in the light of responses and invites further comments; also 
covers company law and group of companies, restructuring, mergers 
and jurisdictional migration and regulatory and institutional framework 
for companies. 
Company Law Review 2001 
Collapse of Enron Dec 2001 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US July 2002 
Publication of the Higgs' Book about the role of non-executive directors Jan 2003 
in the UK 
Publication of the report of FRC Group chaired by Sir Robert Smith about Jan 2003 
the Combined Code Guidance in Audit Committees in the UK 
Appendix 2 
Specimen Calendar and Agenda for an Audit Committee 
Calendar: 
May Audit committee away-day meeting. 
June 
July 
August (early) Audit committee meeting. 
Interim statement of financial results. 
September Planning visit by external audit. 
October Audit committee meeting. 
November Interim visit by external audit. 
December 
January Final visit by external audit begins. 
February 
March Audit committee final meeting. 
Preliminary announcement of financial results. 
April Annual report. 
May AGM. 
Agenda 
For the May (away-day) meeting of the audit committee 
1- Matters arising from previous meeting. 
" Action taken by management in response to committee 
recommendations. 
" Progress on action points. 
2- Scope of external audit work on interim financial statements. 
3- Self-assessment of committee's effectiveness: 
" Membership. 
" Roles, remit, and relationships. 
" Induction, training, and information support. 
"" Meetings. 
I 
" Business risk and internal control. 
" Financial information, regulator and other matters. 
4- Consideration of changes, which might affect the committee's future role. 
5- Report to main board. 
6- Any other business. 
2 
I Loughborough 
University 
Business School 
AUDIT COMMITTEES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION IN 
SAUDI CORPORATIONS 
Dear: 
I am currently engaged in research for a Ph. D. in the Business School, at Loughborough 
University. I am particularly interested in studying the audit committees in Saudi 
corporations. This survey is an important part of the research; therefore, your valuable 
co-operation and participation in answering the questionnaire will be greatly 
appreciated. I would be most grateful if you could spare some time to complete the 
enclosed questionnaire, which deals with the perceptions of the effectiveness of audit 
committees in Saudi Arabia. All responses will be used for research purposes only and 
will be treated in confidence. Anonymity of respondents is also guaranteed unless you 
want a copy of research results, then I will send it to your address. Also, another 
objective for my research is to hold some interviews. If you feel that you can help in 
this matter please contact me to arrange an appointment, which will be appropriate with 
your time. If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me on: 
Telephone number: 055540774 
Fax: 025485323 Email address: ealmoataz@yahoo. com 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Ehsan Al-Moataz 
Researcher 
ý 
Audit Committees: An Empirical Investigation in Saudi Corporations 
Please answer all of the following questions and thank you for your valuable help. 
Section 1. The following set of statements deal of your attitudes toward some issues, 
which relate to the effectiveness of your audit committee according to the actual 
practice NOT best practice. Please indicate explicitly your agreement or disagreement 
with each of the following statements by circling only one number, where: 1= strongly 
disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neither agree nor disagree. 4= agree, and 5= strongly agree. 
For example, if you strongly agree with a specific statement please put a circle around 
number 5. 
Neither 
Strongly Disagree Agree nor Agree Strongly 
Statements Disagree Disagree Agree 
Corporate governance: 
1 The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
significant changes in accounting policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
2- The audit committee reviews the annual financial 
statements. 1 2 3 4 5 
3- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
accounting estimates and judgements. 1 2 3 4 5 
4- The audit committee monitors corrections made by 
management related to reported deficiencies in the 1 2 3 4 5 
independent auditor's management letter. 
5- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the internal accounting 1 2 3 4 5 
and financial controls of the company. 
6- The audit committee monitors corrections made by 
management related to deficiencies reported by the 1 2 3 4 5 
internal auditors. 
7- Employees are encouraged to report incidents of 
errors or irregularities to the audit committee. 1 2 3 4 5 
8- Beyond meeting legal or other regulatory 
requirements, the audit committee serves an important 1 2 3 4 5 
need in this company. 
Lý 
Statements Neither 
Strongly Disagree Agree nor Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
The role with the external auditors: 
9- The audit committee reviews and analyses the scope 
and activities of the annual audit by the independent 1 2 3 4 5 
auditors. 
10- The audit committee evaluates the independent 
auditors' performance, including determination of 1 2 3 4 5 
independence. 
11-The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
results of the annual audit by the independent auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
12- The audit committee nominates the independent 
auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
13- The audit committee enhances the independence of 
the external auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
The role with the internal auditors: 
14- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
scope and activities of the internal auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
1- The audit committee reviews the appointment and 
replacement of the director of internal auditing. 1 2 3 4. 5 
16- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
internal audit reports, budgets, and findings. 1 2 3 4 5 
17- The audit committee enhances the independence of 
the internal auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
18- The audit committee evaluates the internal 
auditors' performance. 1 2 3 4 5 
The authorities of it committees: 
19-The audit committee has little authority. 
20- Audit committee has ready access to relevant 
information. 1 2 3 4 5 
Z 1- Audit committee has ready access to all levels of 
management. 1 2 3 4 5 
22- Objectives, responsibilities, and authority of the 
audit committee are clearly defined in a written 1 2 3 4 5 
statement (charter). 
23- Audit committee obtains prompt responses from 
management. 1 2 3 4 5 
24- Non-members attend meetings as required. 
1 2 3 4 5 
:S 
Neither 
Statements 
Strongly Disagree Agree nor Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
The literacy of audit committees: 
25- Audit committee members have a sufficient 
knowledge of the entity's business. 1 2 3 4 5 
26- Audit committee members are able to bring up and 
mediate problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
27- Audit committee members have a full 
understanding of the purpose and responsibilities of the 1 2 3 4 5 
audit committee. 
28- Audit committee members have knowledge of 
accounting practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
29- Audit committee members have knowledge of 
auditing practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
0- Audit committee members have ability to ask 
probing questions. 1 2 3 4 5 
31- Audit committee members are carefully selected. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The diligence of audit committees: 
32- Audit committee members are independence from 
management. 1 2 3 4 5 
33- The audit committee accomplishes very little. 
34- Audit committee members have sufficient time to 
devote to committee's affairs. 1 2 3 4 5 
35- Agenda and related material are provided to 
members ahead of meetings. 1 2 3 4 5 
36- Meetings between the audit committee and the 
independent auditors are typified by open and frank 1 2 3 4 5 
dialogue. 
37- The audit committee meets frequently enough. 
1 2 3 4 5 
38- The audit committee meets long time enough to 
carry out the mandate of the committee. 1 2 3 4 5 
39- The audit committee is effective. 
1 2 3 4 5 
L. 
Section 2. The following questions are general questions. Please tick one box or more 
in every question. 
1- Category of respondent 
Audit committee member 
Internal auditor 
2- Professional Qualifications 
SOCPA 
CPA 
CA 
CIA 
Other, please indicate 
External auditor 
3- Educational Qualifications 
Higher School 
Undergraduate in accounting or finance 
Undergraduate in other subject 
Postgraduate in accounting or finance 
Postgraduate in other subject 
Other, please indicate 
'A 
4- Your Current Position in the Company (for audit committee members only) 
Chief Executive in this company 
Chief Executive in another company 
Non-executive in this company 
Retired Executive 
Educator 
Self-Employed 
Auditor 
Other, please indicate 
5- Number of meetings of your audit committee during last year: 
a- once 
e- more than four 
b- twice 
6- Average length of meeting 
a- 30 minutes 
e- more than 2 hours 
b- 1 hour 
7- Average number of members 
a- one member L 
d- 7 members 
e- other, please indicate 
b- 3 members 
c- three 
c- 1,30 hour 
ý 
c- 5 members 
d- four 
d- 2 hours 
The questions finished, please return it back to me by mail: Ehsan Al-Moataz, Makkah, 
P. O Box 5971, or by fax: 025485323, or by email: ealmoataz , yahoo. com. 
Thank you very much for your valuable co-operation. 
CA 
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Loughborough 
University 
Business School 
AUDIT COMMITTEES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION IN 
SAUDI CORPORATIONS 
Dear: 
I am currently engaged in research for a Ph. D. in the Business School, at Loughborough 
University. I am particularly interested in studying the audit committees in Saudi 
corporations. This survey is an important part of the research; therefore, your valuable 
co-operation and participation in answering the questionnaire will be greatly 
appreciated. I would be most grateful if you could spare some time to complete the 
enclosed questionnaire, which deals with the perceptions of the effectiveness of audit 
committees in Saudi Arabia. All responses will be used for research purposes only and 
will be treated in confidence. Anonymity of respondents is also guaranteed unless you 
want a copy of research results, then I will send it to your address. Also, another 
objective for my research is to hold some interviews. If you can help in this matter, 
please contact me to arrange an appointment, which will be appropriate for your time. If 
you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me on: 
Telephone number: 055540774 
Fax: 025485323 Email address: ealmoataz(a, yahoo. com 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Ehsan Al-Moataz 
Researcher 
lo 
Audit Committees: An Empirical Investigation in Saudi Corporations 
Please answer all of the followin uestions and thank you for your valuable be] Va 
Section 1. The following set of statements deal of your attitudes toward some issues, 
which relate to the effectiveness of your audit committee according to the actual 
practice NOT best practice. Please indicate explicitly your agreement or disagreement 
with each of the following statements by circling only one number, where: I= strongly 
disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= agree, and 5= strongly agree. 
For example, if you strongly agree with a specific statement please put a circle around 
number 5. 
Statements 
Corporate governance: 
l- The audit committee reviews the annual financial 
statements. 
2- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
significant changes in accounting policies. 
3_ The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
accounting estimates and judgements. 
4_ The audit committee monitors corrections made by 
management related to reported deficiencies in the 
independent auditor's management letter. 
5- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the internal accounting and 
financial controls of the company. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Disagree 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Agree 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
i'he audit committee monitors corrections made by IIIII 
management related to reported deficiencies reported by 12345 
the internal auditors. 
7- Employees are encouraged to report incidents of errors 
or irregularities to the audit committee. 12345 
g- Beyond meeting legal or other regulatory 
requirements, the audit committee serves an 
important 12345 
need in this company. 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
\\ 
Statements Neither 
Strongly Disagree Agree nor Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
The role with the external auditors: 
9- The audit committee reviews and analyses the scope 
and activities of the annual audit by the independent 1 2 3 4 5 
auditors. 
10- The audit committee evaluates the independent 
auditors' performance, including determination of 1 2 3 4 5 
independence. 
11- The audit committee reviews and analyses the results 
of the annual audit by the independent auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
12- The audit committee nominates the independent 
auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
13- The audit committee enhances the independence of 
the external auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
The role with the internal auditors: 
14- The audit committee reviews and analyses the scope 
and activities of the internal auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
15- The audit committee reviews the appointment and 
replacement of the director of internal auditing. 1 2 3 4 5 
16- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
internal audit reports, budgets, and findings. 1 2 3 4 5 
17_ The audit committee enhances the independence of 
the internal auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
1 g- The audit committee evaluates the internal auditors' 
performance. 1 2 3 4 5 
The authorities of audit committees: 
19- The audit committee has little authority. 1 2 3 4 5 
20- Audit committee has ready access to relevant 
information. 1 2 3 4 5 
21- Audit committee has ready access to all levels of 
management. 1 2 3 4 5 
22- Objectives, responsibilities, and authority of the audit 
committee are clearly defined in a written statement 1 2 3 4 5 
(charter). 
23- Audit committee obtains prompt responses from 
management. 1 2 3 4 5 
24-Non-members attend meetings as required. 
1 2 3 4 5 
\ `ý 
Statements 
The literacy of audit committees: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
25- Audit committee members have a sufficient 
knowledge of the entity's business. 1 2 3 4 5 
26- Audit committee members are able to bring up and 
mediate problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
27- Audit committee members have a full understanding 
of the purpose and responsibilities of the audit 1 2 3 4 5 
committee. 
28- Audit committee members have knowledge of 
accounting practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
29- Audit committee members have knowledge of 
auditing practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
30- Audit committee members have ability to ask probing 
questions. 1 2 3 4 5 
31- Audit committee members are carefully selected. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The diligence of audit committees: 
32- Audit committee members are independence from 
management. 
T3- The audit committee accomplishes very little. 
34- Audit committee members have sufficient time to 
devote to committee's affairs. 
35- Agenda and related material are provided to members 
ahead of meetings. 
36- Meetings between the audit committee and the : 
independent auditors are typified by open and frank 
dialogue. 
3ý The audit committee meets frequently enough. 
TS-- The audit committee meets long time enough to carry 
out the mandate of the committee. 
39- The audit committee is effective. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Disagree 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Agree 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
11 2I3I4Is 
`ý 
Section 2. The following questions are general questions. Please tick one box or more 
in every question. 
1- Is there a department for the internal auditing 
Yes No 
2- Your Professional Qualifications 
SOCPA 
CPA 
CA 
CIA 
Other, please indicate.... 
3- Your experience in Auditing 
less than 5 years 
from 10 to less than 15 years 
from 5 to less than 10 years 
15 years and more 
The questions finished, please return it back to me by mail: Ehsan Al-Moataz, Makkah, 
P. O Box 5971, or by fax: 025485323, or by email: ealmoataz(Ryahoo. com. 
Thank you very much for your valuable co-operation. 
ý 4.. 
11 ---]1 
Loughborough 
University 
Business School 
AUDIT COMMITTEES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION IN 
SAUDI CORPORATIONS 
Dear: 
I am currently engaged in research for a Ph. D. in the Business School, at Loughborough 
University. I am particularly interested in studying the audit committees in Saudi 
corporations. This survey is an important part of the research; therefore, your valuable 
co-operation and participation in answering the questionnaire will be greatly 
appreciated. I would be most grateful if you could spare some time to complete the 
enclosed questionnaire, which deals with the perceptions of the effectiveness of audit 
committees in Saudi Arabia. All responses will be used for research purposes only and 
will be treated in confidence. Anonymity of respondents is also guaranteed unless you 
want a copy of research results, then I will send it to your address. Also, another 
objective for my research is to hold some interviews. If you can help in this matter, 
please feel free to contact me to arrange an appointment, which will be appropriate for 
your time. 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me on: 
Telephone number: 055540774 
Fax: 025485323 Email address: ealmoataz@yahoo. com 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Ehsan Al-Moataz 
Researcher 
Vs 
Audit Committees: An Empirical Investigation in Saudi Corporations 
Please answer all of the followin uestions and thank you for your valuable hel Ly a 
Section 1. The following set of statements deal of your attitudes toward some issues, 
which relate to the effectiveness of your audit committee according to the actual 
practice NOT best practice. If you have ever audited any Saudi corporation in the 
last eight years please indicate explicitly your agreement or disagreement with each of 
the following statements by circling only one number, where: 1= strongly disagree, 2= 
disagree. 3= neither agree nor disagree. 4= agree, and 5= strongly agree. For example, 
if you strongly agree with a specific statement please put a circle around number 5. 
Disagree Neither 
Statements 
Strongly Agree nor Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
Corporate governance: 
1- The audit committee reviews the annual financial 
statements. 1 2 3 4 5 
2- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
significant changes in accounting policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
3- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
accounting estimates and judgements. 1 2 3 4 5 
4- The audit committee monitors corrections made 
by management related to reported deficiencies in 1 2 3 4 5 
the independent auditor's management letter. 
5- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the internal 1 2 3 4 5 
accounting and financial controls of the company. 
6- The audit committee monitors corrections made 
by management related to reported deficiencies 1 2 3 4 5 
reported by the internal auditors. 
7- Employees are encouraged to report incidents of 
errors or irregularities to the audit committee. 1 2 3 4 5 
8- Beyond meeting legal or other regulatory 
requirements, the audit committee serves an 1 2 3 4 5 
important need in this company. 
,4 
Statements Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree nor Agree 
Disagree 
The role with the external auditors: 
9- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
scope and activities of the annual audit by the 1 2 3 4 5 
independent auditors. 
10- The audit committee evaluates the independent 
auditors' performance, including determination of 1 2 3 4 5 
independence. 
11- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
results of the annual audit by the independent 1 2 3 4 5 
auditors. 
12- The audit committee nominates the independent 
auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
13- The audit committee enhances the independence 
of the external auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
The role with the internal auditors: 
14- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
scope and activities of the internal auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
15- The audit committee reviews the appointment 
and replacement of the director of internal auditing. 1 2 3 4 5 
16- The audit committee reviews and analyses the 
internal audit reports, budgets, and findings. 1 2 3 4 5 
17- The audit committee enhances the independence 
of the internal auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
18- The audit committee evaluates the internal 
auditors' performance. 1 2 3 4 5 
The authorities of audit committees: 
19- The audit committee has little authority. 1 2 3 4 5 
20- Audit committee has ready access to relevant 
information. 1 2 3 4 5 
21- Audit committee has ready access to all levels of 
management. 1 2 3 4 5 
22- Objectives, responsibilities, and authority of the 
audit committee are clearly defined in a written 1 2 3 4 5 
statement (charter). 
23- Audit committee obtains prompt responses from 
management. 1 2 3 4 5 
24-Non-members attend meetings as required. 
1 2 3 4 5 
\'1 
Neither 
Statements 
Strongly Disagree Agree nor Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
The literacy of audit committees: 
25- Audit committee members have a sufficient 
knowledge of the entity's business. 1 2 3 4 5 
26- Audit committee members are able to bring up 
and mediate problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
27- Audit committee members have a full 
understanding of the purpose and responsibilities of 1 2 3 4 5 
the audit committee. 
28- Audit committee members have knowledge of 
accounting practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
29- Audit committee members have knowledge of 
auditing practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
30- Audit committee members have ability to ask 
probing questions. 1 2 3 4 5 
31- Audit committee members are carefully selected. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The diligence of audit committees: 
32- Audit committee members are independence 
from management. 1 2 3 4 5 
33- The audit committee accomplishes very little. 1 2 3 4 5 
34- Audit committee members have sufficient time 
to devote to committee's affairs. 1 2 3 4 5 
35- Agenda and related material are provided to 
members ahead of meetings. 1 2 3 4 5 
36 Meetings between the audit committee and the 
independent auditors are typified by open and frank 1 2 3 4 5 
dialogue. 
37- The audit committee meets frequently enough. 
1 2 3 4 5 
38- The audit committee meets long time enough to 
carry out the mandate of the committee. 1 2 3 4 5 
39- The audit committee is effective. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Aý 
Section 2. The following questions are general questions. Please tick one box or more 
in every question. 
1- Have you ever audited a Corporation in Saudi Arabia 
Yes No 
2- Your Professional Qualifications 
SOCPA 1 
CPA II 
CA 
CIA 
Other, please indicate.... 
3- Your experience in Auditing 
less than 5 years 
from 10 to less than 15 years 
from 5 to less than 10 years 
15 years and more 
The questions finished, please return it back to me by mail: Ehsan Al-Moataz, Makkah, 
P. O Box 5971, or by fax: 025485323, or by email: ealmoataz(aýyahoo. com. 
Thank you very much for your valuable co-operation. 
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It is blatant slur on the integrity of 
the hard-working, committed and 
dedicated executive director. The 
whole report is like a script for a 
soap where the non-executive 
director is cast as a saint, the auditor 
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elite with special powers and 
protected status is divisive and 
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